People v. Groves

Third Division
March 12, 1997




No. 1-95-0409

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,    )    APPEAL FROM THE
                                        )    CIRCUIT COURT OF
     Plaintiff-Appellee,                )    COOK COUNTY
                                        )         
     v.                                 )    No. 93 CR 20184
                                        )
KAREEM GROVES,                          )    THE HONORABLE
                                        )    THOMAS A. HETT
     Defendant-Appellant.               )    JUDGE PRESIDING.


     PRESIDING JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the 

court:

     Defendant Kareem Groves was convicted by a jury of first-
degree murder and possession of a stolen motor vehicle.  The
trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years' imprisonment for the
murder conviction, to run concurrently with seven years'
imprisonment for possession of a motor vehicle.  On appeal,
defendant contends that:  (1) he was denied effective assistance
of counsel; (2) the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of
proof during closing arguments; and (3) he was denied a fair
trial where a judge other than the trial judge conducted the voir
dire.
BACKGROUND
     The State charged Kareem Groves and codefendant Lamont
Warren with two counts of first degree murder.  The trial court
granted Kareem Groves' motion for severance. The trial court also
granted defendant's motion to consolidate a separate indictment
charging defendant with possession of a stolen motor vehicle.  At
the jury trial, Deborah Spraggs (Spraggs) testified that, at
approximately 2 a.m., on August 3, 1993, she was sitting on the
trunk of a parked car in the vicinity of 5538 West Congress in
Chicago, talking to a friend, Kareem Williams (Williams).  Xavier
Jasper (Jasper) drove up while Spraggs and Williams were talking. 
Jasper stopped his car and talked with them until a policeman
directed Jasper to move along. While Williams and Spraggs talked,
Spraggs noticed a car pull up and park.  The car came from the
westbound direction on Congress and parked at a distance of two
or three car lengths behind Williams, who was sitting on the
front of a car facing Spraggs.  Spraggs made an in-court
identification of the defendant as the driver of the car. 
Spraggs stated that the defendant wore a black and blue, short-
sleeve, hooded shirt.  Defendant called to Williams, "Hey, man." 
Williams responded, "What's up?"  Defendant then walked towards
Williams and said, "Ain't you the nigger that chased me the other
day?"  After Williams responded "No," defendant, standing
approximately three feet away, drew a shot gun, cocked it back
and said, "Yeah, you was" and shot Williams in the head. 
Defendant then walked back to the car and entered the driver's
side.  Spraggs testified that she saw two heads in the back seat
of the car defendant was driving. As the victim lay shaking on
the ground, Spraggs ran for help.
     Spraggs also testified that defendant and a couple of his
friends were chased out of the neighborhood by the victim and the
victim's cousin just days before the murder.  Spraggs also
testified that the victim was "associated with" the Four Corner
Hustlers street gang, which is a part of the Vice Lord street
gang.  Spraggs positively identified defendant in a lineup on the
day of the shooting.
     Jasper testified that, after he had been told by police to
move his car, he parked in front of his house approximately one-
half block away from where Spraggs and the victim were talking. 
While he sat in his parked car talking to a friend, he heard a
shot and noticed an oncoming car in his rearview mirror.  Jasper
testified that the car was an Oldsmobile Cutlass, burgundy in
color with no license plates.  The car moved westbound until
Central Avenue, where it turned left and headed south.  Jasper
did not see the occupants of the car.
     Leon Bentley (Bentley) also testified that he heard gunfire
as he left his house at 5518 West Congress.  He was the victim's
cousin.  He testified that a shot came from a westerly direction,
a couple of houses down.  When Bentley looked down the street, he
saw a male with a blue hood and a 12 or 20-gauge shotgun get into
the driver's side of the car.  Bentley described the car as a
burgundy, four-door Cutlass.  Bentley also testified that he saw
an individual named Darnell Warren (Darnell) in the back seat of
the Cutlass.  Bentley stated that a few days before the
shooting, he and Williams had chased Darnell and two other
persons down Congress toward Central Avenue.  Bentley testified
that Darnell was a member of the Maniac Latin Disciples, a rival
gang of the Four Corner Hustlers.  
     Chicago police detectives Wojcik and Ricco were assigned to
the Williams homicide.  Pursuant to the investigation, Detective
Wojcik spoke to a person named "Tremelle."  From Tremelle, police
received an address where they could locate defendant. 
Detectives Wojcik and Ricco, along with Chicago police detective
Gawrys went to 5504 West Congress.  After the building manager
opened the rear gate, Detectives Wojcik and Ricco went to the
front of the building, while Detective Gawrys stayed in the back. 
     Detective Gawrys testified that, while he was in the back of
the building, a car pulled into the alley.  Detective Gawrys
walked into the gangway and hid against a garage.  He saw a
maroon Oldsmobile attempting to park in the alley.  Detective
Gawrys testified that he knew one of the individuals to be Lamont
Warren (Lamont) and the driver looked like the defendant.  As the
driver parked the car, Detective Gawrys could see that the rear
window on the driver's side was broken.  As the driver exited the
car, the detective saw that the steering wheel column was peeled. 
When the driver got out of the car, he took a bag from the back
seat.  Detective Gawrys then moved away from the gangway and went
underneath the porch.  From underneath the porch, the detective
watched defendant drop a bag over the fence at 5504 West Congress
and then defendant and Lamont Warren jumped over the fence. 
After they jumped over the fence, Detective Gawrys announced his
office and defendant and Lamont stopped.  Detective Gawrys
testified that at this point he heard footsteps running away. 
Detective Gawrys then went back to the car in the alley and saw
the column peeled, the window broken, and the trunk lock appeared
to have been pulled.  After running the license plate, the police
learned that the car had been reported stolen. Defendant and
Lamont Warren were then placed under arrest. Detectives Gawrys
and Ricco drove the suspects to the police station, and Detective
Wojcik took the bag and drove the Oldsmobile to the station.  
     Following an interview with defendant, detectives went to
defendant's mother's residence at 3018 West Flournoy, pursuant to
a consent-to-search form signed by defendant.  Detectives 
searched defendant's bedroom. Defendant's mother would not
authorize any additional search of the premises.  No gun was
recovered.  Gawrys further testified that on the night of the
shooting, Xavier Jasper and Deborah Spraggs viewed a lineup. 
Jasper made no identification, but Spraggs identified defendant.
     Officer Theatrice Patterson, a fingerprint examiner,
testified that none of the prints recovered from the car matched
those of defendant or Darnell Warren.  However, prints from the
vent window and the exterior driver's door glass matched those of
Lamont Warren.
     Detective Wojcik testified that Spraggs was shown various
articles of clothing that were taken out of the bag.  She
identified a hooded shirt and a pair of pants, but said she was
not sure about the pants.  Detective Wojcik also testified that,
at the 25th district parking lot, Jasper identified the
Oldsmobile as the car he had seen at the time of the shooting. 
Spraggs was unable to identify the car.  Detective Wojcik
subsequently went back to the defendant's apartment building and
found an expended 20-gauge shotgun shell in a bush in an empty
lot below the landing of the rear porch.
     It was stipulated between the parties that, if called to
testify, Caesar Torres would testify that he was the owner of the
1980 red, four-door Oldsmobile Cutlass.  On August 2, 1993, his
car was parked at 2556 West Wabanasia Avenue at 2 p.m., and when
he returned to that location at approximately 5 a.m., his car was
gone.  When Torres identified his car at the police station, the
car now had a broken rear vent window, a peeled column, and a
punched-out trunk lock.
     Officer Treacy testified as an expert in the field of
firearms identification.  He testified that the fragments found
in the victim were classified as being No. 4 leadshot.  He also
identified the wadding cup found at the crime scene to be a 20-
gauge wadding cup.  He testified that the recovered shell was a
20-gauge federal No. 4 shotgun shell.
     Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied.  For
the defense, defendant's mother, Alice Groves, testified that
defendant stayed at her house three or four times a week.  She
testified that, on August 3, 1993, at approximately 11 a.m., the
police knocked on her front door and told her that they had
permission from defendant to search his room.  She testified that
she saw defendant's signature but saw no address typed on the
form.  When the police asked her to sign a consent-to-search
form, she refused. She also stated that police told her that they
were looking for a gold chain that was taken in a robbery.  She
also testified that the police never told her they were looking
for a shotgun or that they were there pursuant to a homicide
investigation.  
     According to defendant's mother, the police did not just
search defendant's room, but they also searched the living room,
her daughter's room and the heating system in the utility room. 
She testified that she refused to allow the police to search her
room. Ms. Groves further testified that the police took a
photograph from her home.  She then called the police and spoke
to Detective Ricco and asked why it was taken. She testified
that, three days later, Detective Ricco came back to her house
and returned the photo.
     Ms. Groves testified that, at the time of the offense,
defendant was at her house.  She stated that on August 2, 1993,
defendant left the house between 7:30 p.m. and 8 p.m.  Defendant
returned a little after midnight, and she let him in because she
was the only one in the household with a key.  She stated that,
between the hours of midnight and 3 a.m., she did not notice
defendant leave the apartment.  She testified that defendant
would have had to come past her room to leave through the back
door, but not if he left through the front door.  According to
defendant's mother, she did not go to sleep until 3 a.m.
     Ms. Groves also testified that when defendant got home, he
took the television from her room and brought it down the hallway
into his room.  She also stated that she heard defendant talking
to her daughter's boyfriend.  She awoke at approximately 6 or 7
a.m. the next morning to a knock on the back door.  After she
unlocked the door, she let Darnell Warren, Lamont Warren and
another person whose name she could not recall into the house. 
The three men sat at the table while Ms. Groves went to wake
defendant.
     She testified that she saw Darnell Warren and defendant go
into the bathroom.  After they left the bathroom, both of them
went into defendant's room.  Defendant and the other men then
went out the back door, and she locked the door behind them.  Ms.
Groves also testified that she gave defendant a brown plastic bag
with a yellow strap for his laundry.  She stated that the short-
sleeve, hooded shirt was not in defendant's laundry bag.  After
being shown the shirt that had been identified by Spraggs as the
one that had been worn by the shooter, and the pants that had
been tentatively identified, Ms. Groves testified that those
items did not belong to her son.
     Defendant testified on his own behalf.  He stated that when
he did not stay with his mother, he stayed with his girlfriend at
5504 West Congress.  Defendant testified that he was at his
mother's house in the early morning hours of August 3, 1993.  He
arrived there sometime between 11 p.m. and midnight.  After
defendant arrived at his mother's home, he watched television and
talked to his sister's boyfriend until he went to sleep sometime
after 3:30 a.m.  He testified he did not leave his mother's house
until approximately 7 or 8 a.m.  He also stated that he did not
have a key to his mother's residence.
     Defendant stated that, at approximately 7 a.m., his mother
woke him after she had let Lamont Warren, Darnell Warren and
Tremelle into the back door of the apartment.  Darnell Warren
wanted to speak with him, so the two went into the bathroom. 
While in the bathroom, the two counted money and talked.  Darnell
and defendant then went into defendant's room, where Darnell
changed his clothes.  Lamont and Tremelle also changed their
clothes.  Defendant stated that he put his friends' clothes into
his laundry bag because he was taking his laundry over to his
girlfriend's house.  He and his friends left his mother's house
at approximately 8 a.m.
     Defendant testified that Tremelle drove a maroon Cutlass to
defendant's girlfriend's house and that he sat in the back seat. 
However, on cross-examination, defendant stated that he had never
seen the car before.  After Tremelle parked the car in the alley
behind defendant's girlfriend's house, defendant got out of the
car and took the bag of laundry with him.  Defendant and Lamont
then jumped over the gate.  Defendant heard the police yell
"freeze."  Defendant and Lamont were arrested, but Darnell and
Tremelle fled.  Defendant stated that, after he was taken to the
police station at approximately 9 a.m., he signed a consent-to-
search form.  He testified that no address was typed on this form
when he signed it, but the police told him they wanted to search
5504 West Congress.  Defendant testified that he later learned
that the police searched his mother's residence.
     Defendant also testified that he was a member of the Maniac
Latin Disciples and that as part of his membership he sold drugs. 
During direct examination, he testified that he was not chased
out of the area of Congress and Central by the victim just days
before the murder.  Defendant also testified that the blue hooded
sweatshirt found in the laundry bag did not belong to him. 
     On cross-examination, defendant testified that he had been a
member of the Maniac Latin Disciples for three years.  However,
he later testified that he had been a member for only one year. 
He testified that the Maniac Latin Disciples are "folks" and that
their colors are black and dark blue.  He denied holding any rank
in his gang.  He also testified that Darnell was a member of the
Gangster Disciples and that they are also "folks."  Defendant
stated that he had heard of the Vice Lords gang and that he knew
they were "people."  However, he testified that he had never
heard of the Four Corner Hustlers, the victim's alleged gang
affiliation.
     When asked about his drug-selling activities, defendant
testified that he made $3,500 a day selling marijuana.  He
testified that he would work a few days and let the money build
to roughly $6,500 and then hide it in a garage located by an
abandoned house on North and Talman Avenues.  Defendant
acknowledged he was involved in a risky business, but he
testified that he did not carry a weapon.  He sold drugs all
around the northwest side approximately three or four times a
week.
     Defendant also testified that he and Darnell sold drugs
together.  Darnell supplied him with the marijuana, which was
already packaged in seven- or eight-ounce portions.  He typically
sold an ounce of marijuana for $10.  Defendant stated he was
familiar with guns and knew the distinction between revolvers and
automatics, but he did not know anything about rifles.  He also
stated that he knows approximately 75 Maniac Latin Disciples, but
he did not know of any that carried a gun, although he had heard
that some do.  Defendant stated that he never sold drugs at
Central and Congress. 
     Defendant testified that when his friends came over to his
mother's house on the morning of August 3, 1993, he gave them
some of his dirty laundry to change into and he put their clothes
into his bag of laundry.  
     The State offered the rebuttal testimony of Detective
Wojcik.  He testified that defendant's mother stated that she saw
defendant before she went to sleep at approximately 10:30 p.m. or
11 p.m. on August 2, 1993.  Defendant's mother also stated she
was awakened at approximately 6:30 a.m. when defendant left
through the back door.  He also testified that the police only
searched defendant's room.
     Detective Ricco testified that he never took the photograph
of defendant and two others that was on the buffet in the living
room of defendant's house and never met with defendant's mother
to return any such photo.
     Following trial, the jury found defendant guilty of first
degree murder and possession of a stolen motor vehicle.  After a
hearing in aggravation and mitigation, defendant was sentenced to
60 years' imprisonment for murder to run concurrently with seven
years' imprisonment for possession of stolen motor vehicle.
Defendant appeals.  
     We affirm.
ANALYSIS
                                     I
     Defendant first contends that he was denied his right to the
effective assistance of counsel during several stages of trial. 
First, defendant argues that defense counsel improperly
introduced evidence of other crimes, thereby prejudicing the
defendant.  The State argues that defense counsel's introduction
of the evidence was a strategic tactic to lend credibility to
defendant's theory of the case. 
     To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must meet both prongs of the Strickland test  See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)), which was adopted by Illinois in People v.
Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984).  First,
counsel's performance must fall well below an objective standard
of reasonableness.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d 
at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d  at 525. 
Second, even if the defendant meets the first requirement,
Strickland requires reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.  Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068; Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d  at 525-27.  When applying
the Strickland standard, a court is to view the totality of
counsel's conduct in light of all the circumstances.  People v.
Jackson, 195 Ill. App. 3d 104, 119, 551 N.E.2d 1025 (1990).  The
failure to satisfy either prong is fatal to a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.  People v. Randle, 277 Ill.
App. 3d 788, 796, 661 N.E.2d 370 (1995).  To establish that
counsel was deficient, the defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that the challenged action or lack of action might be
the product of sound strategy.  Randle, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 797;
People v. Martin, 271 Ill. App. 3d 346, 648 N.E.2d 992 (1995).
     Specifically, defendant argues that defense counsel was
incompetent by allowing the defendant to testify that he sold
drugs for a gang, allowing the State to conduct a "mini-trial" on
his drug-selling activities.  The State maintains that defense
counsel intentionally introduced evidence of defendant's drug
dealing in an attempt to persuade the jury to believe that
defendant was a drug dealer but not a murderer.  The State
further maintains that the introduction of drug-dealing evidence
allowed defendant to provide a reasonable, alternative theory of
his relationship with Darnell Warren, who was implicated in the
murder.
     In the instant case, we believe that defense counsel's
allowance of evidence of defendant's drug sales was trial 
strategy. Defense counsel's strategy is evident through his
statements during closing arguments:
     "My client is a drug dealer.  He's a drug dealer; okay?     
     He's a dope dealer.  He's not a murderer; okay?  Is that the
     way we're going to think as jurors?  Okay, because Mr.      
     Groves sells dope, that he also kills people?
                                   * * *
     Okay.  The bottom line is this.  Is that whatever you may   
     think of him, okay, as a drug dealer, all right, that does  
     nothing to say anything to you about whether or not he      
     committed the offense in question; okay?  It goes to his    
     credibility as a witness.  That's all it does."
It is apparent that defense counsel's trial strategy was to focus
the jury's attention on defendant's drug sales instead of the
murder and to disclose defendant's own wrongdoing to lend more
credibility to his theory of the case. We do not believe that
this strategy was unreasonable or prejudicial to the defendant. 
     Nonpublishable material omitted under Supreme Court Rule 23.
     Defendant also argues that defense counsel's motion to
consolidate his indictment for possession of a motor vehicle 
with the murder indictment demonstrated ineffective assistance of
counsel.  The State argues that counsel's decision to consolidate
the indictments was trial strategy since the stolen car was tied
to the murder and the defendant.
     Defendant asserts that defense counsel incorrectly assumed
that the State would be able to introduce evidence of the
possession-of-a-stolen-motor-vehicle offense because it bore on
the circumstances of the defendant's arrest.  Defendant is
correct that our supreme court in People v. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d 322, 528 N.E.2d 612 (1988), held that evidence is not
admissible merely to show how the investigation unfolded and how
the defendant came into custody.  However, we do not believe that
defense counsel was mistaken in believing that evidence of the
stolen vehicle was admissible to show the circumstances of
defendant's arrest.  Although the State commented that it did not
plan to reveal the time or date that the car was stolen, the
events in this case established that the stolen car was used in
connection with the commission of the offense.  Evidence
regarding the identification of the car and evidence that the car
was stolen were relevant and admissible in the instant case. We
believe that defense counsel's motion to join the offenses was
reasonable trial strategy. 
     Moreover, we do not believe that the defendant was
prejudiced by the joinder of the offenses.  The admission of
evidence of other crimes is admissible where the evidence is also
relevant to specifically connect the defendant with the crime for
which he is being tried.  See People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 449 N.E.2d 821 (1983); People v. McCray, 273 Ill. App. 3d
396, 653 N.E.2d 25 (1995).  In the case sub judice, Spraggs
testified that she witnessed the defendant exit the driver's side
of the car and shoot Kareem Williams.  The stolen car was
identified by Jasper and Bentley as having been driven away from
the murder scene.  Detective Gawrys testified that, after the
shooting, he saw defendant exit the driver's side of a car
fitting the description given by Jasper and Bentley. Based on the
testimony of the witnesses, we believe that the evidence
regarding the stolen vehicle was relevant to specifically connect
defendant to the murder for which he was on trial and was not
offered merely to show how defendant came into custody.  
     Nonpublishable material omitted under Supreme Court Rule 23.
                                    II
     Defendant next contends that the prosecutor's comment during
closing argument shifted the burden of proof upon the defendant
when he stated:
     "You know, ladies and gentlemen there's an old adage that   
     goes around this court building, and the adage is, if you   
     don't have the evidence, argue reasonable doubt.  And if    
     that doesn't work, argue police fraud, and if that doesn't  
     work, argue mistake, and if that doesn't work, it's another
     guy.  Well, counsel has to do all those things because all  
     roads lead to Kareem Groves."
The State argues that this argument has been waived because
defendant failed to object to the remarks and failed to preserve
this issue in a post-trial motion.  We agree.  To properly
preserve an issue for appeal, both a trial objection and a
written post-trial motion are required.  People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988).  
     Even assuming arguendo that the plain error exception to the
waiver rule applies here, defendant's contention must still fail. 
It is fundamental that every defendant has the right to a trial
free from improper prejudicial comments or arguments by the
prosecutor.  Whether a prosecutor's comments or arguments
constitute prejudicial error is evaluated according to the
language used, its relation to the evidence, and the effect of
the argument on the defendant's right to a fair and impartial
trial.  People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 184, 604 N.E.2d 294
(1992).  On the other hand, the prosecutor is allowed a great
deal of latitude in making his opening statement and closing
argument.  Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 184-85.  He has a right to
comment on the evidence and draw all legitimate inferences
deducible therefrom, even if they are unfavorable to the
defendant.  Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 184-85.  Because the trial
court is in a better position than a reviewing court to determine
the prejudicial effect of any remarks made, the regulation of the
substance and style of the opening statement or closing argument
is within the trial court's discretion.  Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at
184.  Although the prosecutor's remarks may sometimes exceed the
bounds of proper comment, the verdict must not be disturbed
unless it can be said that the remarks resulted in substantial
prejudice to the accused, such that absent those remarks the
verdict would have been different.  Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 185. 
The trial court's determination of the propriety of the remarks
made will not be disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion. 
Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d  at 185.
     In the instant case, we do not believe that the prosecutor's
comment rose to the level of impermissible burden shifting;
rather, the prosecutor commented on the evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. 
Furthermore, other instructions given to the jury informed it of
defendant's presumption of innocence, the State's burden of proof
and that closing arguments were not evidence.  In light of the
entire record, the complained-of comments could not have been a
material factor in defendant's conviction.  
                                    III
     Lastly, defendant contends that the trial judge's failure to
preside at the voir dire of the jury was a violation of due
process and the right to a fair trial.  Prior to trial, Judge
Thomas Hett announced that he had a sore throat which prevented
him from selecting the jury.  Judge Hett told the parties that he
had secured the services of either or both of two judges who were
willing to pick the jury, and the next day he would preside over
the trial.  Defense counsel objected, stating that "the defense
wants some continuity between the jury selection and the process
of the trial.  I don't feel it can be had having a different
judge pick the jury and coming to you to try the case."  Judge
Hett noted the defense objection but ruled that the case would be
transferred instanter to Judge Karnezis and that Judge Karnezis
would conduct the selection of the jury.  Judge Karnezis then
proceeded to conduct jury selection.  
     The State initially argues that defendant has waived review
of the Judge Hett's absence from voir dire.  The State points out
that, although defendant objected to Judge Hett's absence of
trial, he did not raise an objection in a post-trial motion. As
stated earlier, a defendant must object to alleged errors at
trial and include the objection in a post-trial motion in order
to preserve an issue for appellate review.  Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at
186.  Defendant argues that this argument cannot be waived
because Judge Hett's absence from the voir dire implicated the
integrity and reputation of the judicial process and resulted in
per se reversible error.  
     As a general rule, a judge cannot finish the performance of
a duty already entered upon by his predecessor where that duty
involves the exercise of judgment and the application of legal
knowledge to, and judicial deliberation of, facts known only to
the predecessor.  For example, in  Durden v. People, 192 Ill. 493, 61 N.E. 317 (1901), on which defendant relies, the trial
judge, after presiding over the trial up to and including a
portion of defense counsel's closing argument, absented himself
from the proceedings and did not return until the hearing on the
motion for a new trial.  Without prior notice to the parties,
another judge presided over the proceedings during the interim
period.  In holding that the presiding judge's absence from the
proceedings required an automatic reversal of defendant's
conviction, the court observed that, because a single judge had
presided over the most of the trial, that judge's absence may
have created a negative impression in the minds of the jurors. 
Durden, 192 Ill.  at 507.
     Most recently, our supreme court has addressed the issue of
substitution of judges in People v. Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 673 N.E.2d 1037 (1996).  In Vargas, the trial judge briefly excused
himself from the courtroom to answer a phone call during
defendant's cross-examination of an assistant State's Attorney. 
Although the defendant had not preserved this error for review,
the court elected to review the issue under the plain error rule. 
The court noted two policy concerns to support its view that the
tri