Jones v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

                                                               FIRST DIVISION
                                                               JUNE 23, 1997 








Nos. 1-94-2957 and 1-94-3229 (Consolidated)


DONNA P. JONES, Guardian of the Estate             )   APPEAL FROM THE
of JESSICA JONES, a minor,                         )   CIRCUIT COURT
          Plaintiff-Appellant,                     )   OF COOK
COUNTY.
     v.                                            )
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a  )
corporation, PATRICIA C. JUNIOUS, and HARB BOURY,  )
          Defendants-Appellees.                    )
----------------------------------------------------    )
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and      )
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,              )
          Counterplaintiffs-Appellants,            )
     v.                                            )
NABIL BOURY; MAYSOON BOURY; MAYSOON BOURY, Special      )
Administrator of the ESTATE OF REENA BOURY, Deceased;   )
RANNIE AL-AMIRI; PAUL LEDER, Special Administrator of   )
the ESTATE OF SUZANNE LEDER, Deceased; and DONNA JONES,)
Guardian of the ESTATE OF JESSICA JONES, a minor,  )
          Counterdefendants-Appellees.             )
-------------------------------------------------------)
HARB BOURY, Individually and as Independent        )
Administrator of the ESTATE OF REENA BOURY, Deceased;   )
NABIL BOURY; MAYSOON BOURY; PAUL LEDER, Individually    )
and as Independent Administrator of the ESTATE OF  )
SUZANNE LEDER, Deceased, JANE LEDER; HASSOON AL-AMIRI; )
RONDA AL-AMIRI; and RANNIE AL-AMIRI,               )
          Counterplaintiffs/Cross-Appellants,           ) 
     v.                                            )
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY; STATE   )
FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY; and DONNA P. JONES,     )   
HONORABLE
Guardian of the ESTATE OF JESSICA JONES, a minor,  )   AARON JAFFE,
          Counterdefendants/Cross-Appellees.       )   JUDGE
PRESIDING.


     PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court:
     This appeal arises out of an action brought by the plaintiff,
Donna P. Jones, guardian of the Estate of Jessica Jones, a minor,
seeking a declaratory judgment that certain automobile liability
insurance policies issued by defendants, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm Mutual) and State Farm
Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm Fire) (collectively, the
Insurance Companies), provided underinsured motorist coverage to
plaintiff for an accident occurring on June 23, 1992.  The In-
surance Companies filed a counterclaim against plaintiff and
counterdefendants Nabil Boury; Maysoon Boury; Maysoon Boury,
Special Administrator of the Estate of Reena Boury, deceased;
Rannie Al-Amiri; and Paul Leder, Special Administrator of the
Estate of Suzanne Leder, deceased, all of whom were occupants in
the same car with plaintiff at the time of the accident, seeking a
declaratory judgment that:  (1) certain automobile policies issued
by them to all of the counterdefendants did not provide excess
underinsured motorist coverage to the counterdefendants; and (2)
the umbrella policy issued by State Farm Fire provided a total of
$1,000,000 of excess underinsured motorist coverage to all of the
counterdefendants.
     Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and all
of the other parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.  In
two orders entered on August 9, 1994, and August 22, 1994, the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and
counterdefendants and against State Farm Mutual that certain
automobile policies provided excess underinsured motorist coverage
to the parties who were insured under said policies.  The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire on the
umbrella policy, ruling that it provided a total of $1,000,000 of
excess underinsured motorist coverage for all of the
counterdefendants.  The trial court also ruled that the "each
accident" limit, rather than the "each person" limit, applied to
the wrongful death claims of Reena Boury and Suzanne Leder, and
that the loss of consortium claims of Ronda and Hassoon Al-Amiri
were covered for excess underinsured motorist coverage under
certain automobile policies issued by State Farm Mutual.    On
appeal, the Insurance Companies contend that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs-
counterdefendants as follows:  (1) determining that certain Il-
linois policies of automobile liability insurance provide excess
underinsured motorist coverage for the accident of June 23, 1992;
(2) determining that the "each accident" limit, rather than the
"each person" limit, applied to the wrongful death claims of Reena
Boury and Suzanne Leder; (3) determining that the Ohio policies
provide more than $100,000 of excess underinsured motorist coverage
for the claim of Rannie Al-Amiri; (4) determining that Ronda and
Hassoon Al-Amiri have claims for loss of consortium for the in-
juries to their son, Rannie Al-Amiri; and (5) determining that the
Ohio policies provide underinsured motorist coverage for the loss
of consortium claims of Ronda and Hassoon Al-Amiri.
     Plaintiff and counterdefendants filed cross-appeals, con-
tending that the trial court erred in determining that the
$1,000,000 limit of personal liability umbrella insurance on the
policy issued to Harb Boury provides underinsured motorist coverage
with a total limit of $1,000,000 for the claims of all of the
occupants of the Ford Explorer at the time of the accident, rather
than on a per person basis.  For the following reasons, we affirm
in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
     The record reveals the following relevant facts.  On June 23,
1992, Nabil Boury was driving a 1992 Ford Explorer on the
Eisenhower Expressway near Damen Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, when he
was involved in an accident with a vehicle driven by Patricia
Junious.  Jessica Jones, Maysoon Boury, Reena Boury, Rannie Al-
Amiri and Suzanne Leder were passengers in Nabil's Ford Explorer. 
Jessica Jones was seriously injured in the collision, sustaining
brain damage; Reena Boury and Suzanne Leder died as a result of the
accident; Rannie Al-Amiri suffered debilitating brain damage and
blindness in one eye; and Nabil Boury and Maysoon Boury both
sustained significant injuries.
     The vehicle driven by Junious was insured by State Farm Mutual
with bodily injury liability limits of $20,000 per person, $40,000
per accident.  The parties reached a settlement based on the
Junious policy and it is not the subject of this appeal.
     The Ford Explorer occupied by counterdefendants was covered by
an insurance policy issued by State Farm Mutual which provided
primary underinsured motorist coverage with limits of $100,000 per
person, $300,000 per accident.  The parties do not dispute that
this policy provides $260,000 of underinsured motorist coverage for
all six occupants in the Ford Explorer with the maximum amount
collectible by any one occupant being the sum of $100,000, minus
the amount paid to that person by the tort-feasor's liability
insurer.  This policy and the trial court's order relating thereto
are therefore not involved in this appeal.
     In addition to the policy on the Ford Explorer, State Farm
Mutual issued the following policies to the following counter-
defendants:
          A.   Four separate policies to Harb Boury for
          four other cars: a 1990 Mercedes; a 1979 Cadil-
          lac; a 1988 Honda; and a 1992 Jaguar, all with
          $100,000/$300,000 underinsured motorist limits; 
               
          B.   Two separate policies to Paul and Jane
          Leder for a 1991 Chevrolet and a 1987
          Chevrolet, both with $100,000/$300,000 underin-
          sured motorist limits;
          C.   One automobile policy to Winslow and Donna
          Jones for a 1989 Jeep, with underinsured
          motorist limits of $250,000/$500,000;
          D.   Five separate automobile policies to Ronda
          and Hassoon Al-Amiri for:  a 1989 Toyota; a
          1987 Acura; a 1988 Toyota; a 1981 Buick; and a
          1982 Toyota, all with underinsured motorist
          limits of $100,000/$300,000.
     State Farm Fire issued one automobile policy to Winslow and 
Donna Jones on a 1982 Isuzu with $100,000/$300,000 underinsured
motorist limits.    The five policies issued to the Al-Amiri family
members were issued in Ohio to Ohio residents on vehicles
registered in Ohio.  All other policies were issued in Illinois to
Illinois residents on vehicles registered in Illinois.
     In addition to the above described automobile policies, State
Farm Fire issued a personal liability umbrella policy to Harb Boury
which provided a total of $1,000,000 of underinsured motorist
coverage applicable to all of the occupants of the Ford Explorer.
     On August 9, 1994, the trial court entered an order granting
in part and denying in part both counterdefendants' motion for
summary judgment and the Insurance Companies' motion for summary
judgment as follows:
               "3.  The automobile liability policy on
          the Ford Explorer [citations omitted] provides
          primary underinsured motor vehicle coverage to
          the occupants of said Ford Explorer at the time
          of the accident with total applicable coverage
          of $260,000 with the maximum amount that any
          one person can collect being the sum of
          $100,000 less the amount said person is paid by
          the tortfeasor's liability insurance.
               4.   The Court finds that the policy lan-
          guage relied upon by State Farm (i.e. the
          policy language on page 14 of each State Farm
          policy) to deny stacking of underinsured motor
          vehicle coverages is, as a mater of law, am-
          biguous.  Accordingly, the counterdefendants
          may stack their respective underinsured motor
          vehicle coverages.
               5.   The automobile liability policies
          issued to counterdefendant HARB BOURY, other
          than the policy on the Ford Explorer [citations
          omitted] provide excess underinsured motor
          vehicle coverage with a limit of $100,000 for
          the claim of NABIL BOURY and a limit of
          $100,000 for the claim of MAYSOON BOURY under
          each policy.
               6.   The automobile liability policies
          issued to RONDA or HASSOON AL-AMIRI [citations
          omitted] each provide excess underinsured motor
          vehicle coverage with a limit of $100,000 for
          the claim of RANNIE AL-AMIRI.
               7.   The automobile liability policies
          issued to PAUL and JANE LEDER [citations
          omitted] each provide excess underinsured motor
          vehicle coverage for the claim of PAUL LEDER,
          Special Administrator of the Estate of Suzanne
          Leder, Deceased.  The amount of the excess
          underinsured motor vehicle coverage under each
          of the Leder policies (i.e. whether
          $100,000.00, the per person limit, or $300,000,
          the per accident limit) is not determined by
          this order.  
               8.   The automobile liability policies
          issued to counterdefendant, HARB BOURY, other
          than the policy on the Ford Explorer [citations
          omitted] each provide excess underinsured motor
          vehicle coverage for the claim of HARB BOURY,
          Special Administrator of the Estate of Reena
          Boury, Deceased.  The amount of the excess
          underinsured motor vehicle coverage under each
          of the Boury policies (i.e. whether $100,000.00
          the per person limit, or $300,000.00, the per
          accident limit) is not determined by this
          order.
               9.   The personal liability umbrella
          policy issued to counterdefendant, HARB BOURY,
          [citations omitted] provides underinsured motor
          vehicle coverage with a total limit of
          liability of $1,000,000.00 for the claims of
          all of the occupants of the Ford Explorer at
          the time of the accident."
The trial court did not render its order final and appealable.   
     On August 22, 1994, the trial court entered a second order,
granting counterdefendants' motion for summary judgment and denying
the summary judgment motion of the Insurance Companies, finding as
follows:
               "2.  The court finds that the underinsured
          motor vehicle coverage wrongful death claims
          relating to the deaths of REENA BOURY and
          SUZANNE LEDER are subject to the $300,000.00
          "each accident" limits of liability under each
          of the applicable automobile liability poli-
          cies.
               3.   The automobile liability policies
          issued to HARB BOURY, [citations omitted], each
          provide excess underinsured motor vehicle
          coverage with limits of $300,000.00 under each
          policy for the wrongful death claims relating
          to the death of REENA BOURY.
               4.   The automobile liability policies
          issued to PAUL and JANE LEDER [citations
          omitted], each provide excess underinsured
          motor vehicle coverage with limits of
          $300,000.00 under each policy for the wrongful
          death claims relating to the death of SUZANNE
          LEDER.
               5.   The Court finds that Ohio law governs
          the loss of consortium claims of RONDA and
          HASSOON AL-AMIRI, the parents of RANNIE AL-
          AMIRI.  Accordingly, the automobile liability
          policies issued to the AL-AMIRIs [citations
          omitted] each provide excess underinsured motor
          vehicle coverage for the loss of consortium
          claims of RONDA and HASSOON ALL-AMIRI [sic]
          with a limit of $100,000.00 for the claim of
          each under each of the policies.
The trial court concluded that both its orders of August 9, 1994,
and August 22, 1994, were final and appealable, the court having
decided all of the issues in the case. 
     The Insurance Companies filed their timely notice of appeal of
portions of the trial court's orders of August 9, 1994, and August
22, 1994, on August 26, 1994.  Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal
of paragraph 9 of the trial court's order of August 9, 1994, on
September 21, 1994.
OPINION
     Initially, the Insurance Companies contend that the trial
court erred in determining that:  (1) the applicable provision of
the eight Illinois policies of automobile liability insurance is
ambiguous and therefore permits stacking of underinsured motor
vehicle coverages; and (2) the same provisions provide excess
underinsured motorist coverage for the accident of June 23, 1992.
     Section 143a-2(5) of the Illinois Insurance Code provides in
pertinent part as follows:
               "(5) Scope.  Nothing herein shall prohibit
          an insurer from setting forth policy terms and
          conditions which provide that if the insured
          has coverage available under this Section under
          more than one policy or provision coverage, any
          recovery or benefits may be equal to, but may
          not exceed, the higher of the applicable limits
          of the respective coverage, and the limits of
          liability under this Section shall not be in-
          creased because of multiple motor vehicles
          covered under the same policy of insurance * *
          *."  215 ILCS 5/143a-2(5) (West 1994). 
Thus, the Insurance Code provides that if an insurance company
intends to prohibit the stacking of underinsured motorist benefits,
it must expressly so state.  
     The function of the court in construing an insurance policy is
to ascertain and enforce the intention of the parties as expressed
in the agreement, and the construction given the policy should be a
natural and reasonable one.  de los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance
Companies, 135 Ill. 2d 353, 358, 553 N.E.2d 301, 304 (1990).  If
the language of an insurance policy is ambiguous, it must be
construed against the insurance company and in favor of the in-
sured.  Allstate Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez-Loya, 226 Ill. App. 3d
446 (1992).  However, if a policy of insurance is clear and unam-
biguous, it must be enforced according to its terms. United States
Fire Insurance Co. v. Schnackenberg, 88 Ill. 2d 1, 429 N.E.2d 1203
(1981).  An insurer is entitled to the enforcement of unambiguous
antistacking provisions to the extent that such provisions
represent terms to which the parties have agreed to be bound. 
Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 188-89,
620 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1993).  This court cannot strain or torture
the language of an insurance policy to create an ambiguity. 
Gonzalez-Loya, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 449. 
     Each of the Insurance Companies' policies in the present case
contain the identical relevant provisions as follows:
          "Section III - Uninsured Motor Vehicle -
          coverage U,
     Uninsured Motor Vehicle - Coverage U, and 
     Underinsured Motor Vehicle - Coverage W
                                   * * * 
            If There is Other Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage
                                    * * * 
          3.   If the insured sustains bodily injury
               while occupying a vehicle which is not
               your car, coverage under this policy ap-
               plies;
               a.   as excess to any underinsured motor
                    vehicle coverage which applies to the
                    vehicle as primary coverage, but
               b.   only in the amount by which it
                    exceeds the primary coverage.
          If coverage under more than one policy issued
          by us or any other insurer applies as excess:
          a.   the total limits of liability shall not
               exceed the difference between the limit of
               liability of the coverage that applies as
               primary and the highest limit of liability
               of any one of the coverages that apply as
               excess; and
          b.   we are liable only for our share.  Our
               share is that per cent of the damages that
               the highest limit of liability of any
               policy issued by us bears to the total of
               all underinsured motor vehicle coverage
               applicable as excess to the accident.
                                    * * *
          Your Car - Means the car or the vehicle
          described on the declarations page."
The Insurance Companies argue that the above provision clearly
provides that there is no excess underinsured motorist coverage
applicable whenever the limits of the excess underinsured motorist
coverage are the same as or less than the limits of the primary
underinsured motorist coverage.  The Insurance Companies argue that
with the exception of one Jones policy, which provides excess
coverage with limits of $250,000/$500,000, all of the other
policies provide excess underinsured motorist coverage with the
same limits as the primary coverage on the Ford Explorer, i.e.,
$100,000/$300,000.  
     However, the trial court determined that the above policy
language is ambiguous, and the Insurance Companies have failed to
show otherwise.  
     The cases relied upon by the Insurance Companies are all
distinguishable.  First, the Insurance Companies rely on Grzeszczak
v. Farmers Ins. Co, 168 Ill. 2d 216, 659 N.E.2d 952 (1995).  There,
the plaintiff Molly Grzeszczak's decedent, Jeffrey, was killed
while riding in an automobile owned and driven by his brother,
Richard, and settled for the policy limits of Richard's insurance. 
However, Jeffrey was also covered under two separate Farmers'
insurance policies, which insured two different automobiles.  Both
policies provided for underinsured-motorist coverage of $100,000
for each person and $300,000 for each occurrence.  The Grzeszczaks
paid an identical premium of $23.30 for underinsured-motorist
coverage under each policy.  Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d  at 219-20.
     After settling with Richard's insurer for $100,000, Molly
demanded payment from Farmers in the amount of $100,000, reasoning
that Jeffrey had a combined total of $200,000 underinsured-motorist
coverage because they paid separate premiums for the two policies. 
Farmers denied Molly's claim based on antistacking clauses con-
tained in each policy.  The relevant policy provision stated as
follows:
               "With respect to any accident or occur-
          rence to which this and any other auto policy
          issued to you by any member company of the
          Farmers Insurance Group of Companies applies,
          the total limit of liability under all the
          policies shall not exceed the highest applica-
          ble limit of liability under any one policy." 
          Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d  at 220.
Molly theorized that the above anti-stacking provision was am-
biguous because:  (1) the two policies named different insureds;
(2) the two $23.30 premiums should have purchased two $100,000
coverage limits; and (3) Farmers never explained the limits of the
coverage, and it was unfair to imply such knowledge to a layperson. 
Molly further claimed that the $23.30 premium on the second vehicle
was exorbitant.  Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d  at 221.
     The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of
Farmers, finding that the anti-stacking clause contained no am-
biguity and therefore precluded Molly's recovery.  This court
reversed, agreeing that the anti-stacking clauses in the two
policies were clear and unambiguous, but concluding that the $23.30
premium for the second car was exorbitant and in violation of
public policy.  This court found that Molly had established "ove-
rreaching" by an insurance company, an exception to the general
rule that unambiguous antistacking clauses are to be enforced as
written.  Overreaching is evidenced by exorbitant premiums, which
justify a court in refusing to enforce anti-stacking clause con-
tained in insurance contracts.  Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance
Co., 78 Ill. 2d 420, 426, 401 N.E.2d 539 (1980).
     On appeal, our supreme court reversed the judgment of the
appellate court, finding that the language in Molly's policies
clearly and unambiguously prohibited the stacking of underinsured-
motorist coverage, and that the antistacking clauses were not
rendered ambiguous by any of the factors she asserted. See
Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d  at 225-233. 
     Allstate v. Gonzalez-Loya, 226 Ill. App. 3d 446 (1992),
another case upon which the Insurance Companies rely, is similarly
distinguishable.  There, the plaintiff attempted to stack underin-
sured motorist coverage, arguing that the policy only prohibited
stacking of uninsured motorist coverage.  This court determined
that a plain reading of the policy disclosed:  (1) that "uninsured"
always includes "underinsured"; and (2) that the antistacking
provision clearly provided that $100,000 was the highest limit
available to the Loyas for underinsured motorist benefits, and
clearly and unambiguously prohibited the stacking of underinsured
motorist benefits.  
     The construction of insurance policies is a question of law
that this court determines de novo.  Shefner v. Illinois Farmers
Insurance Co., 243 Ill. App. 3d 683, 686 (1993).  "An insurance
policy is not to be interpreted in a factual vacuum; it is issue
under given factual circumstances.  What at first blush might
appear unambiguous in the insurance contract might not be such in
the particular factual setting in which the contract was issued." 
Glidden v. Farmers Auto Insurance Association, 57 Ill. 2d 330, 336
(1974); Kauffmann v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 76 Ill. 2d 11, 16
(1979).
     Grzeszczak and Gonzalez-Loya are factually distinguishable
from the present case and therefore inapposite to the disposition
of this matter.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Grzeszczak and Gonzalez-
Loya, the plaintiff and counterdefendants here are not asserting
that certain factors render otherwise unambiguous anti-stacking
policy language to be ambiguous.  The trial court correctly
determined that the antistacking policy language here is in fact
ambiguous, when applied to the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
     The Insurance Companies further rely on Armstrong v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 229 Ill. App. 3d 971 (1992).  There, the 
plaintiff, Robert Armstrong, was riding a motorcycle when he was
struck and seriously injured by a car.  The driver of the car had
no automobile insurance.  At the time of the accident, plaintiff
was residing with his mother, Phyliss and his brother Steven.  All
three family members had automobile insurance policies with State
Farm, and all of the policies covered plaintiff either as a named
or unnamed insured.  Both a policy on a motorcycle and on a 1979
Chevrolet Malibu named Robert as an insured and had uninsured
motorist limits of $25,000; a policy on a 1987 Plymouth Colt named
Phyliss and had uninsured motorist limits of $100,000; and a policy
on a 1986 Mazda named Steven and had uninsured motorist limits of
$50,000.  Each policy provided in pertinent part:
          "If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle
          Coverage
               1.  Policies Issued By Us to You
               If other uninsured motor vehicle coverage
          issued by us to you also applies to the in-
          sured's bodily injury, the total limits of
          liability under all such coverages shall not
          exceed that of the coverage with the highest
          limit of liability.
               2.   Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle
          Coverage Available From Other Sources
               Subject to 1. above:
               (a)  If the insured sustains bodily in-
               jury:
                    (1)  as a pedestrian and uninsured
               motor vehicle coverage from a policy not
               issued by us also applies; or
                    (2)  while occupying your car, and
               your car is described in the declarations
               page of another policy not issued by us
               providing uninsured motor vehicle
               coverage,  we are liable only for our
               share. Our share is that per cent of the
               damages that the limit of liability of
               this coverage bears to the total of all
               such uninsured motor vehicle coverage
               applicable to the accident.
               (b)  If the insured sustains bodily injury
                    while occupying a vehicle not owned
                    by you, your spouse or any relative
                    and uninsured motor vehicle coverage
                    also applies from a policy not issued
                    by us, coverage under this policy ap-
                    plies:
                    (1)  as excess to any uninsured motor
               vehicle coverage which applies to the
               vehicle as primary coverage, but
                    (2)  only in the amount by which it
               exceeds the primary coverage.
                    If coverage under more than one
               policy applies as excess:
                    (a)  the total limits of liability
               shall not exceed the difference between
               the limit of liability of the coverage
               that applies as primary and the highest
               limit of liability of any one of the
               coverages that apply as excess; and
                    (b)  we are liable only for our
               share.  Our share is that per cent of the
               damages that the highest limit of
               liability of any policy issued by use
               bears to the total of all uninsured motor
               vehicle coverage applicable as excess to
               the accident."  Armstrong, 229 Ill. App.
               3d at 972-73.
The policy also included "Amendatory Endorsement 6989G" relating to
uninsured motorist coverage, which read:
          "d.  If There Is Other Uninsured Motor Vehicle
          Coverage
               (1)  Item 2(b) is changed to read:
                    b.  If the insured sustains bodily
          injury while occupying a vehicle which is not
          your car, coverage under this policy applies:
               (1)  as excess to any uninsured motor
          vehicle coverage which applied to the vehicle
          as primary coverage, but
               (2)  only in the amount by which it ex-
          ceeds the primary coverage. 
          If coverage under more than one policy applies
          as excess:
               a.  the total limits of liability shall
          not exceed the difference between the limit of
          liability of the coverage that applies as
          primary and the highest limit of liability of
          any one of the coverages that apply as excess;
          and
               b.  we are liable only for our share. Our
          share is that per cent of the damages that the
          highest limit of liability of any policy issued
          by us bears to the total of all uninsured motor
          vehicle coverage applicable as excess to the
          accident."
     On cross-motions for summary judgment, State Farm argued that
as a result of paragraph 2b of the Amendatory Endorsement 6989G,
Robert was limited to collecting $100,000 uninsured motorist
coverage.  State Farm argued that under the endorsement the
policies of Phyliss and Steven were excess coverage and that
defendant was entitled only to excess coverage in the amount by
which the highest limit of either policy exceeded plaintiff's
primary coverage, i.e., the $75,000 difference between plaintiff's
coverage limit and Phyliss' coverage limit.  Plaintiff maintained
that because the endorsement was ambiguous, it was not an effective
"antistacking" provision.  Armstrong, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 974.
     The trial court held that under the policy, as amended,
plaintiff was allowed excess uninsured motorist coverage only to
the extent of the difference between his primary coverage on the
motorcycle, $25,000, and the coverage under Phyliss' policy,
$100,000, i.e., $75,000.  Armstrong, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 974.
     On appeal, this court held that the trial court correctly
ruled that the amendatory endorsement unambiguously prevented
stacking and limited plaintiff to the excess coverage conceded by
State Farm.  The court stated:
          "Part 2 simply refers to any other source of
          uninsured motor vehicle coverage.  Read
          naturally, this would include sources such as
          policies where the plaintiff is not the named
          insured.  Section 2(b) similarly states, in
          unambiguous language, that defendant's
          liability is limited to the highest limit of
          liability of any of the coverages that apply as
          excess.  This limits plaintiff's total recovery
          of uninsured motorist coverage from defendant
          to $100,000."  Armstrong, 229 Ill. App. 3d at
          976. (Emphasis in original).
The court further noted that the supreme court of Ohio reached the
same result in construing substantially similar policy language as
being sufficiently unambiguous to be enforceable as a valid antis-
tacking provision in Sacucci v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 32 Ohio St. 3d 273, 512 N.E.2d 1160 (1987).  There,
the Ohio supreme court acknowledged "detailed and conflicting,
arguments as to the degree of clarity, conspicuousness and am-
biguity of the language at issue," and determined that "although
the language at issue is somewhat technical, it does not seem that
the provision is so unclear or ambiguous as to be deceptive or
unreasonably difficult to understand."  Sacucci, 512 N.E.2d  at
1163-64.  
     However, three justices dissented from the Sacucci decision,
noting that:  "the antistacking provisions in State Farm's policies
are not worded clearly enough to be understood by an ordinary
person to preclude the stacking of policies."  Sacucci, 512 N.E.2d 
at 1164.
     We find Armstrong distinguishable on its facts.  First, the
Armstrong case dealt with uninsured motorist coverage, rather than
underinsured motorist coverage, which is at issue here. In addi-
tion, in Armstrong, one insured claimant collected the full amount
of $100,000, the highest limit of uninsured motorist coverage under
any of the policies combined, $75,000 of which represented the
excess coverage.  By contrast, none of the counterdefendants in the
present case will recover the entire Ford Explorer's policy limits
of $300,000.  Finally, the Armstrong plaintiff was a named insured
on two policies and attempted to aggregate coverage from those
policies as well as those held by his mother and brother where he
was an unnamed insured.  By contrast, plaintiff Jessica Jones was
not a named insured on any of the policies at issue.
     Although the antistacking policy language in Armstrong is
comparable to the antistacking clause in the present case, this
court is not obliged to interpret similar policy language in a
similar fashion.  The antistacking language in the present case, on
its face, is not reasonably read to have one specific meaning.  The
portion of the antistacking provision here which reads:  "Our share
is that percent of the damages that the highest limit of liability
of any policy issued by us bears to the total of all uninsured
motor vehicle coverage applicable as excess to the accident,"
(emphasis added) creates an ambiguity as to the amount the insurer
will pay out, in light of the policy provision that all applicable
policies will be considered in the "equation."  We  therefore find
that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial
court properly determined that the policy language at issue here is
ambiguous and that the policies may therefore be stacked to provide
excess coverage. 
THE AL AMIRIS AND THE OHIO POLICIES
     The Insurance Companies further contend that the trial court
erred in determining that the Al-Amiris have valid claims for loss
of consortium under Ohio law for the injuries incurred by Rannie
Al-Amiri.  The Insurance Companies argue that this issue is con-
trolled by Illinois law, which provides that the issue of whether
the Al-Amiris have a cause of action for loss of consortium is a
tort law issue and not a contract issue.
     Under Illinois choice of law principles, the "most significant
contacts"  must be examined. Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill. 2d 42, 45
(1970).  When two or more jurisdictions have an interest in apply-
ing their law to a matter in controversy, the following factors are
relevant in choosing which rule of law to apply:
               "(a) the needs of the interstate and in-
          ternational systems,
               (b) the relevant policies of the forum,
               (c) the relevant policies of other inter-
          ested states and the relative interests of
          those states in the determination of the par-
          ticular issue,
               (d) the protection of justified expecta-
          tions,
               (e) the basic policies underlying the
          particular field of law,
               (f) certainty, predictability and unifor-
          mity of result, and
               (g) ease in the determination and applica-
          tion of the law to be applied."  Estate of
          Barnes, 133 Ill. App. 3d 361, 366, 478 N.E.2d 1046 (1985)(citing Restatement of the Law 2d,
          Conflict of Laws 2d, Sec. 6 (1971)).
     Where a conflict arises in the area of tort law, the Restate-
ment requires that the law of the State that has "the most sig-
nificant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the
principles stated in section 6" should be applied.  Barnes, 133
Ill. App. 3d at 366; Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws
2d, Sec. 145 (1971).  Important contacts that the forum will
consider in determining the State with the most significant rela-
tion are:
          "(a) the place where the injury occurred,
          (b) the place where the conduct causing the
          injury occurred,
          (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place
          of incorporation and place of business of the
          parties, and
          (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
          between the parties is centered."  (Restatement
          of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws 2d, Sec. 145
          (1971).)
     However, conflicts analysis under the second Restatement
requires more than a mere tallying of contacts in each respective
State and a comparison to determine which State has the highest
total.  Illinois courts have rejected this "contact counting"
approach in favor of a more sophisticated "interest analysis"
construction of the Restatement.  Mitchell v. United Asbestos
Corp., 100 Ill. App. 3d 485, 426 N.E.2d 350 (1981).  As the court
noted in Mitchell:
               "This approach [interest analysis] is
          based on the conclusion that '[c]ontacts obtain
          significance only to the extent that they re-
          late to the policies and purposes sought to be
          vindicated by the conflicting laws.'  (Miller
          v. Miller (1968), 22 N.Y.2d 12, 17, 290
          N.Y.Supp.2d 734, 738, 237 N.E.2d 877, 880; In
          re Estate of Crichton (1967), 20 N.Y.2d 124,
          134-35, 281 N.Y.Supp.2d 811, 820, 228 N.E.2d 799, 806.)  Instead of a mere counting of con-
          tacts, what is therefore required is a 'co-
          nsideration of the interests and public
          policies of potentially concerned states and a
          regard as to the manner and extent of such
          policies as they relate to the transaction in
          issue.'"  100 Ill. App. 3d 485, 493, 426 N.E.2d 350.
     Accordingly, sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement are con-
strued together as requiring (1) an examination of the relevant
policies of the forum; and (2) the relevant policies of other
interested states and the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law in order to determine whether a contact has any
significance for choice of law purposes.  This gives rise to a
three-step process for conflicts analysis.  First, the issue is
isolated and the conflict defined.  Next, the policies embraced in
the laws in conflict are identified.  Finally, contacts of the
respective jurisdictions are examined in order to determine which
has a superior connection with the occurrence and thus would have a
superior interest in having its policy or law applied.  Barnes, 133
Ill. App. 3d at 367.
     Applying these principles to the present case, a conflict
exists between Illinois law and Ohio law in that Illinois has
rejected claims of parents for loss of consortium for injuries to a
child (Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61 (1988)), while Ohio has
identified a clear policy favoring filial consortium claims for its
citizens.  In Gallimore v. Childrens Hospital Medical Center, 67
Ohio St. 3d 244, 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (1993), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a parent may recover damages in a derivative action
against a third-party tortfeasor who intentionally or negligently
causes physical injury to the parent's minor child for a loss of
filial consortium.  
     Examining the significance of the contacts in light of the
differing state policies, the record shows first that the Al-Amiris
are residents of Ohio.  Within the area of tort law, the domiciles
of the parties are generally considered significant contacts for
conflicts analysis because a jurisdiction will normally formulate
tort policies with reference to the competing interests of com-
pensating its domiciliaries for injury and of limiting tort
recoveries against its domiciliaries.  Estate of Barnes, 133 Ill.
App. 3d at 368.  Accordingly, there are strong incentives to apply
the tort law of a jurisdiction where all the parties are domiciled
because this contact bears a strong relation to the policies and
purposes sought to be achieved in the jurisdiction's tort law.  See
Ingersoll, 46 Ill. 2d 42. The simple fact of domicile indicates the
jurisdiction's superior interest in having its laws applied in
order to give effect to those tort policies.  In the present case,
because the Al-Amiris live in Ohio, the State Farm insurance
policies were sold in Ohio and are controlled by Ohio law, and
Rannie's physical injury will be suffered and endured in Ohio, the
trial court properly determined that the laws of Ohio apply.
     Next, the Insurance Companies contend that under Ohio law, the
maximum amount of excess underinsured motorist coverage provided
under all of the Ohio policies for the claim of Rannie Al-Amiri is
$100,000, and that the trial court erred in determining that each
of the five Al-Amiri policies provides excess coverage of $100,000.
     This issue is controlled by Savoie v. Grange Mutual Insurance
Co., 67 Ohio St. 3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809 (1993), which held that the
stacking of underinsured limits of liability in interfamily cir-
cumstances cannot be precluded where the policy language at issue
is not clear and unambiguous.  Under the circumstances presented
here, the Al-Amiris may stack the Boury Ford Explorer policy with
all five of their family insurance policies for the claim of Rannie
Al-Amiri.
     The Insurance Companies incorrectly argue that the Al-Amiris
may only stack one policy on top of the Boury Ford Explorer Policy
because intrafamily stacking may be prohibited by insurers under
Ohio law.  Intrafamily stacking only arises where the entire pool
of policies against which claims are being made belong to the same
family.  Here, the Al-Amiris have asserted a claim against the
Boury policy and against their own policies.  Thus, the interfamily
stacking in the present case is permissible.
"EACH ACCIDENT" VS. "EACH PERSON"
     Next, the Insurance Companies contend that the trial court
erred in determining that the claims for the deaths of Reena Boury
and Suzanne Leder were subject to the "each accident" limit of the
uninsured motorist coverage rather than the "each person" limit of
the same.  The trial court ruled that the five next of kin of Reena
Boury and the three next of kin of Suzanne Leder were entitled to a
total recovery of $300,000 per policy, under the respective ap-
plicable policies.
     The relevant policy language provides as follows:
          UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE - COVERAGE W
                                   . . . 
          Coverage W
          The amount of coverage is shown on the declara-
          tions page under "Limits of Liability - W -
          Each Person, Each Accident".  Under "Each
          Person" is the amount of coverage for all
          damages due to bodily injury to one person. 
          "Bodily injury to one person" includes all
          injury and damages to others resulting from
          this bodily injury.  Under "Each Accident" is
          the total amount of coverage, subject to the
          amount shown under "Each Person" for all
          damages due to bodily injury to two or more
          persons in the same accident.
                                    . . .
          DEFINED WORDS
          Bodily Injury - means bodily injury to a person
          and sickness, disease or death which results
          from it."
     In support of their contention, the Insurance Companies rely
on Creamer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 161 Ill.
App. 3d (1987).  There, the plaintiffs' minor daughter was struck
and injured by an uninsured motorist's vehicle.  Plaintiffs
demanded payment from State Farm for the minor's bodily injury,
their loss of consortium and incurred medical expenses.  State Farm
tendered the $25,000 uninsured motor vehicle policy limits for the
minor's bodily injury but denied the plaintiffs' claim for addi-
tional recovery.  The trial court granted State Farm's motion to
dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs' recovery for the minor's
bodily injury was limited to the amount specified per accident for
bodily injury sustained by one person.  Creamer, 161 Ill. App. 3d
at 223-24.
     On appeal, plaintiffs argued that as parents of the minor
insured, they are entitled to separate recovery under the policy
for loss of consortium and medical expenses.  Plaintiffs contended
that the policy vaguely defined "bodily injury" as a personal
injury and thus, that phrase encompassed their claims.
     The insurance policy provided under "damages for bodily
injury" that "an insured is legally entitled to collect from the
owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle."  Each insured is
covered "for all damages due to bodily injury to one person."  The
policy further provided that liability limits were not increased
because more than one person is injured when an accident occurs and
shall not exceed the uninsured motor vehicle "coverage with the
highest limit of liability."  The policy defined bodily injury as
"bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which
results from it."  Creamer, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 224.
     This court construed the policy term "one person" as "one
person injured," and determined that the policy term did not
provide a means to extend an insurer's liability to loss of consor-
tium.  This court held that loss of consortium is a personal rather
than a bodily injury and is generally included and subject to the
policy limitations for bodily injury to one person, in affirming
the judgment of the trial court.  Creamer, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 225. 

     Based on Creamer, the Insurance Companies argue that the total
coverage available to the next of kin under any of the automobile
policies would be the $100,000 "each person" limit.
     Creamer is distinguishable in that the facts there did not
involve the purchase of multiple policies, but rather, involved a
situation where the full uninsured motorist coverage limits had
been paid by the insurance company, and the parents sought addi-
tional payment by reason of their loss of filial consortium, which
was not covered under the policy at all.
     Counterdefendants respond that where the per person coverage,
if applied to each of the beneficiaries, is equal or greater than
the per accident coverage, the per accident coverage should apply. 
In support, counterdefendants rely on the Ohio case of Savoie v.
Grange Mutual Insurance Co., 67 Ohio St. 3d 500, 620 N.E.2d 809
(1993).  Savoie states that under Ohio law, each person who is
covered by an uninsured/underinsured policy and who is presumed to
be damaged pursuant to Ohio law has a separate claim subject to a
separate per person policy limit.  Because Ohio law applies, the
trial court properly determined that the Al-Amiris, who are Ohio
residents and are insured under State Farm's Ohio policies, are
entitled to liability coverage on an "each accident" basis.
CROSS-APPEAL
     Plaintiff and counterdefendants cross-appeal that portion of
the trial court's orders of August 9 and 22, 1994, which declared
that the Boury umbrella policy provided underinsured motorist
coverage with a total limit of $1,000,000 for the claims of all of
the occupants of the Ford Explorer at the time of the accident. 
Plaintiff and counterdefendants contend that the Boury umbrella
policy provides $1,000,000 in underinsured motorist coverage to
each insured.
     The Boury umbrella policy provides in relevant part as fol-
lows:
          "COVERAGE W - Underinsured Motor Vehicle
          We will pay, up to the Coverage W limit, the
          amount which you and your passengers are legal-
          ly entitled to recover as bodily injury damages
          from the owner or driver of an underinsured
          motor vehicle.
          These conditions apply:
          1.   You must maintain underlying limits for
               underinsured motor vehicle coverage equal
               to the limits listed in the Declarations. 
               If these underlying limits are not main-
               tained, this coverage will not apply.
          2.   The retained limit for Coverage W is the
               total amount received for the loss from or
               on behalf of the liable party plus the
               amount received from your underlying cov-
               erage, but not less than the amount of
               your required underlying limits.
          3.   We will pay only the amount in excess of
               the retained limit up to the coverage W
               limit per loss.
          4.   This coverage will apply only when damages
               are paid by or on behalf of the owner or
               operator of the underinsured motor vehi-
               cle.
          5.   This coverage will apply in accordance
               with the terms and conditions of your
               underlying Underinsured Motor Vehicle
               Coverage.
          OTHER CONDITIONS
                                    * * *
          5.   Other Insurance.  This policy is excess
               over all other valid and collectible in-
               surance.
                                   * * * 
          15.  Limit Per Loss.  This insurance applies
               separately to each insured, but our limit
               of liability per loss will be no greater
               than the individual coverage limits shown
               in the Declarations."
Plaintiff and Counterdefendants contend that the "Limit Per Loss"
provision is ambiguous, and that a reasonable interpretation is
that each insured is entitled to a maximum underinsured motorist
coverage recovery of $1,000,000, because each of the six injured
insureds sustained a separate and distinct "loss" and each insured
suffered an "accident."
     The Insurance Companies respond that the Boury umbrella policy
is a "single limit liability policy," which contains only a per
accident limit, and not a per person limit.  The Insurance Com-
panies explain that if only one of the six claimants had suffered
serious injury, the entire $1,000,000 of underinsured motorist
coverage provided by the umbrella policy would be available to that
claimant without regard to any per person limit.  The Insurance
Companies note that the term "loss" is defined in the policy as
follows:
          "'loss' means an accident that results in
          personal injury or property damage during the
          policy period.  This includes injurious ex-
          posure to conditions."
The Declarations Page of the umbrella policy provides that the
limits of liability for underinsured motor vehicle coverage are
$1,000,000.  The Insurance Companies respond that the "Limits of
Liability" provision clearly and unambiguously provides that there
is no per person limit; that the $1,000,000 is all that is avail-
able per accident.
     Neither party has cited authority which is instructive to the
present case.  Plaintiff and counterdefendants cite Mason v. Home
Insurance Co., 177 Ill. App. 3d 454 (1988), and Lyon v. Lumbermans
Mutual Casualty Co., 207 Ill. App. 3d 730 (1990).  Both cases are
distinguishable.  Mason involved claims against a restaurant
arising out of the serving of contaminated food.  The court
determined that the cause of each injury was the serving of con-
taminated food to the customer, not the improper preparation of
food, therefore there were multiple occurrences of injuries, one
for each customer served.  In the present case, there was a single
cause of all of the claimants' injuries, i.e., the collision
between the Junious car and the Boury Ford Explorer.
     In Lyon, the plaintiff owned eight McDonald's restaurants,
each insured under one policy, but each assessed a separate
premium.  A theft from an armored car resulted in the loss of cash
receipts from several of the stores, and because of the manner in
which the policy was formulated, the court construed the $10,000
loss limitation to apply on a per store basis rather than a per
theft basis.  The facts of Lyon are obviously distinguishable from
the facts of the present case.
     Nevertheless, we agree with plaintiff and counterdefendants
that the "Limit Per Loss" provision in the excess policy is am-
biguous, in that the phraseology, "This insurance applies separate-
ly to each insured," may be interpreted as providing a coverage of
up to $1,000,000 to each insured for bodily injury damages.  We
therefore hold that up to $1,000,000 in umbrella coverage is avail-
able to each insured who is entitled to bodily injury damages in
connection with the accident of June 23, 1992, and reverse that
portion of the trial court's order of August 9, 1994, granting
summary judgment in favor of State Farm Fire on the limits of the
Boury umbrella policy.
     For all of the reasons stated herein, we therefore affirm the
judgment of the trial court pertaining to the appeal of the In-
surance Companies, reverse the portion of the judgment of the trial
court as it pertains to the cross-appeal of the plaintiff and
counterdefendants, and remand this matter for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
     Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
     O'BRIEN, J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.