People v. Jackson

September 30, 1998



                          NO. 5-96-0243

                             IN THE 

                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                          FIFTH DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,   )  Appeal from the 
                                       )  Circuit Court of 
     Plaintiff-Appellee,               )  St. Clair County.
                                       )  
v.                                     )  No. 95-CF-74
                                       )
MARCUS JACKSON,                        )  Honorable
                                       )  Michael J. O'Malley, 
     Defendant-Appellant.              )  Judge, presiding.  
_________________________________________________________________

     JUSTICE MAAG delivered the opinion of the court:  
     Marcus Jackson was charged with aggravated battery with a
firearm for allegedly shooting David Rhodes in the chest.  Jackson
was tried before a jury and was found guilty.  He was sentenced to
a 20-year term of imprisonment.  Jackson appeals.
     The facts are as follows.  On January 17, 1995, David Rhodes
was shot.  At trial, he claimed that he spent most of the day in
question at his grandmother's house.  He stated he also spent some
time at Paula Carter's house, drinking beer and smoking marijuana. 
Rhodes testified that at about 10:30 or 11 p.m. that night, he was
walking back to the Carter residence when a Nissan Maxima pulled up
beside him.  He claimed he recognized the driver as Jackson, whom
he had known for about seven years.  He further testified that the
driver asked him what he was up to, to which he responded "nothing
much", and then the driver shot him.  Rhodes made it to the Carter
residence, and before he lost consciousness, he managed to tell
them that "Jack, Pug's cousin," shot him.  "Jack" was the name
Rhodes used to refer to defendant, Marcus Jackson.  "Pug" was the
name Rhodes used to refer to Belgium Lewis, Jackson's nephew.
     Rhodes claimed that he was standing beside the passenger's
side window, close to the car, looking in, but not actually pressed
against the car.  The police did not find blood, nor did they find
Rhodes' fingerprints on Jackson's car.  
     Jackson was arrested on January 19, 1995.  Illinois State
Police Sergeant Gregory Fernandez testified that he saw a pistol on
a night stand in the bedroom where he arrested Jackson.  The pistol
was a .357 Magnum revolver.  Jackson claimed that the gun belonged
to one of his friends, but he admitted that his fingerprints would
probably be found on it.  Two salient points must be stated at this
time.  First, because the bullet had not been surgically removed
from Rhodes at the time of trial, the caliber of the bullet was not
established and no ballistics tests had connected the bullet to the
pistol on Jackson's night stand.  Second, no witnesses ever
identified the pistol on the night stand as the weapon used to
shoot Rhodes.  Despite these facts, the pistol was admitted into
evidence without objection.
     The police compiled a photo lineup, which included Jackson,
and took it to the hospital to Rhodes for identification.  Rhodes
picked out Jackson as the person who had shot him.
     Jackson's former girlfriend, Tewonda Walton, testified during
trial that Jackson was with her during the time Rhodes was shot. 
She stated that Jackson picked her up from work at 5:30 p.m. on
January 17.  They went to her mother's house, where she showered
and ate.  She further testified that they left about 7 p.m. to go
to the movies.  After they could not decide which movie they wanted
to see, they went to Jackson's brother's house, where they sat and
talked.  Then they decided to go to a hotel.  She stated they
arrived at the hotel between 9:30 p.m. and 10 p.m.  They left
between 10:45 p.m. and 11 p.m.  Walton stated that they got
something to eat, went to Jackson's brother's house for a short
time, and then went back to her house.  Jackson did not get out. 
Walton testified that they sat in the car for a while outside her
home and then she went in.  She stated that the last time she saw
Jackson was between 11:30 p.m. and midnight.
     The State called Officer Martin Milkovich as a rebuttal
witness.  Milkovich testified that in his statement on January 19,
1995, Jackson did not mention the hotel, getting food, or going to
his brother's house.  Milkovich further testified that based upon
the time of the 9-1-1 call, he would estimate that the shooting
occurred between 11:46 p.m. and 11:48 p.m.
     The issues presented for review on appeal are:
               1.   Whether Jackson was denied a fair trial by the admission
          of a pistol that was never identified by the complainant
          and where the complainant did not describe the weapon
          used to attack him as a pistol and there was no evidence
          that the weapon was capable of producing a wound
          compatible to the one suffered by complainant. 
               2.   Whether Jackson was denied a fair trial by the closing
          argument of the prosecutor, during which erroneous
          statements were made concerning evidence produced at
          trial.
               3.   Whether Jackson was denied the effective assistance of
          counsel by his attorney's failure to object to the
          admission of the weapon and the erroneous statements of
          the prosecutor made during closing argument.
               4.   Whether Jackson must receive a new trial because he was
          taking Thorazine during his trial and no hearing was held
          on his fitness.
     Jackson's first contention is that he was denied a fair trial
by the admission into evidence of the .357 Magnum revolver found on
his night stand.  The State asserts that Jackson has waived this
issue because defense counsel made no objection to the admission of
the handgun.  We disagree.
     "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
trial court."  134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).  "It must be plainly apparent
that an error is so prejudicial that real justice has been denied
or that the verdict of the jury may have resulted from the error[,]
before the plain error rule may be invoked."  People v. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d 502, 533 (1983), citing People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564,
577 (1980).  We believe that if the issue of the admissibility of
the pistol is not considered on appeal, a serious injustice to
Jackson will occur.
     The State argues that under Illinois law, a gun found on a
defendant when he is arrested is admissible if it could have been
used to commit the crime.  Stated another way, a weapon found on a
defendant when he is arrested is admissible if it can be connected
to the crime.  A connection exists if the weapon is suitable to
commit the crime charged.  People v. Wade, 51 Ill. App. 3d 721, 729
(1977).  A connection can be established where there is (1)
sufficient testimony to establish that a weapon was used, (2)
substantial evidence the defendant participated in the crime, and
(3) testimony that the weapon admitted was similar to the one used
during the crime.  People v. McCasle, 35 Ill. 2d 552, 559 (1966). 
We think the State has failed to establish that the weapon admitted
at trial was connected to the crime.
     The State did not offer any testimony to establish that the
.357 Magnum found when Jackson was arrested was capable of
producing an injury such as the one suffered by Rhodes. 
Furthermore, the State did not offer any testimony that the .357
Magnum admitted was similar to the weapon used to commit the crime. 
While questioning Rhodes, the State asked him about the lighting
conditions, to establish that he clearly saw his shooter, but the
State never once asked him to describe or identify the weapon used. 
As a matter of fact, nowhere in the record is it established that
Rhodes was shot with a handgun or pistol, as opposed to some other
firearm.  
     Accordingly, it was plain error for the trial court to admit
the gun where no proper evidentiary foundation had been laid.
          Because of our disposition of this first issue, we need
not consider the other issues raised.
     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.

     Reversed and remanded.

     WELCH, P.J. and RARICK, J., concur.