Patton v. VanterpoolAnnotate this Case
In January 2014, after approximately three years of marriage, Appellant David Patton filed a complaint for divorce against Appellee Jocelyn Vanterpool, M.D. During the pendency of the divorce, the parties consented to Appellee undergoing in-vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment, which would eventually utilize both donor ova and donor sperm. Appellee traveled to the Czech Republic for the IVF procedure. Four days after leaving, a final judgment and decree of divorce was entered in the divorce action. The divorce decree incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement, which reflected that, at the time of the agreement, the parties neither had nor were expecting children produced of the marriage. Approximately 29 weeks later, Appellee gave birth as a result of the IVF procedure. Appellee subsequently moved the superior court to set aside the decree of divorce, seeking to include the minor child in the divorce agreement; this motion was denied. Appellee thereafter instituted a paternity action against Appellant, alleging that he gave written, informed consent for IVF and that OCGA 19-7-21 created an irrebuttable presumption of paternity; Appellee also sought child support. In response, Appellant argued that he did not meaningfully consent to IVF and that, even if he did, OCGA 19-7-21 was unconstitutional. The trial court sided with Appellee, granting her summary judgment on the issue of paternity. In September 2016, the Georgia Supreme Court granted Appellant’s application for discretionary appeal to address whether that irrebuttable presumption applied to children conceived by means of IVF. The Supreme Court concluded that it did not and reversed the judgment of the superior court.