MURPHY V. MURPHY
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Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida, July Term, A.D. 2013
Opinion filed November 06, 2013.
THIS OPINION IS NOT FINAL UNTIL DISPOSITION OF ANY FURTHER
MOTION FOR REHEARING AND/OR MOTION FOR REHEARING EN
BANC. ANY PREVIOUSLY-FILED MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC IS
DEEMED MOOT.
________________
No. 3D11-1604
Lower Tribunal No. 05-430
________________
Nancy B. Murphy,
Appellant,
vs.
Dennis J. Murphy,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mark H. Jones,
Judge.
Jay M. Levy; Hershoff, Lupino & Yagel, LLP, and Jay A. Hershoff, for
appellant.
Rosenthal Rosenthal Rasco Kaplan, LLC, and Daniel Kaplan and Jeffrey D.
Swartz, for appellee.
Before SUAREZ, ROTHENBERG and EMAS, JJ.
On Motion for Rehearing
ROTHENBERG, J.
We grant the appellee’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our former opinion
dated October 3, 2012, and substitute the following opinion in its stead.
Nancy Murphy (“former wife”) appeals the trial court’s order granting her
former spouse Dennis Murphy’s (“former husband”) petition for a downward
modification of alimony and denying her request for attorney’s fees.
After
conducting an extensive evidentiary hearing and conscientiously weighing the
evidence, the trial court concluded that the former wife and Mark Llerena
(“Llerena”) were involved in a “supportive relationship” within the meaning of
section 61.14(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), and that a reduction in the former
wife’s alimony was warranted. Accordingly, the trial court reduced the former
husband’s alimony payment of $4,200 per month, which is currently 46% of his
net salary,1 to $3,500 per month, a $700 per month reduction. Because the trial
court correctly interpreted the law, the record evidence supports the trial court’s
findings, and the $700 per month reduction is wholly reasonable, we affirm the
trial court’s order granting the former husband’s motion for a reduction in his
alimony obligation.
1
When the parties entered into the settlement agreement, the monthly payments of
$4,200 equaled 42% of the former husband’s net monthly income; however, after
his salary was reduced following the dissolution, the $4,200 monthly payments
equaled 46% of his net monthly salary.
2
THE EVIDENCE
On September 14, 2005, the former husband and the former wife entered
into a marital settlement agreement, and their marriage was dissolved on
November 9, 2005. Pursuant to the marital settlement agreement, the former
husband was required to pay the former wife $3,200 in alimony and $1,000 in
child support every month until August 1, 2006. Thereafter, the former husband’s
child support obligation would terminate, and the former husband’s alimony
obligation would increase to $4,200 per month. The agreement provided that
alimony would terminate upon the former wife’s marriage or death, or upon the
former husband’s retirement or his reaching the age of sixty-five, whichever
occurred later. At the time of the dissolution, the former wife’s adult son and the
parties’ seventeen-year-old daughter were living with the former wife.
In distributing the assets, the parties agreed to an uneven distribution, with
the former wife receiving the marital residence, which was valued at $450,000, but
encumbered by a small $15,000 mortgage at the time of the modification hearing,
an IRA at Smith Barney, a fixed annuity, a cash value life insurance policy, and an
automobile. The former husband received a separate IRA at Smith Barney; his
401(k); a separate cash value life insurance policy; his State of Florida retirement
account; and an automobile.
It is undisputed that the former husband made all payments timely and has
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complied with the terms of the final judgment of dissolution, despite the reduction
of his salary and various increases in his expenses, which at the time of the
evidentiary hearing included several substantial expenditures. The former husband
has remarried, and his wife was living in her home in Broward County, which she
could not sell because it was “upside down.”
However, because the former
husband is a Miami-Dade circuit court judge and must reside in Miami-Dade
County, he maintained a separate residence in Miami. The former husband was
also financially assisting the former wife’s adult son and supporting the parties’
adult daughter and her child (the parties’ grandchild), who were both living with
the former husband’s wife in her Broward County home at the time of the
evidentiary hearing. Based on the former husband’s salary reduction, he was
paying the former wife 46% of his net income, compared to the 42% he was
paying the former wife when the parties divorced in 2005, despite her decreased
expenses and his increased expenses. The record also reflects that at the time of the
evidentiary hearing the former husband was driving a 2004 GMC Envoy that had
at least 118,000 miles because he could not afford to replace it.
In contrast, the former wife, who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the
evidentiary hearing, no longer worked and was living with her boyfriend, Llerena,
in the $450,000 former marital home. The monthly mortgage payment on the
remaining $15,000 debt was only $400.
4
The relationship between the former wife and Llerena began in 2008.
Thereafter, they established a monogamous, romantic relationship. In March 2009,
Llerena began living with the former wife in the former marital home. Although
Llerena had full-time employment, he contended he contributed nothing towards
the household expenses. He did not pay rent to the former wife and he did not
contribute any money towards the utilities or the maintenance of the home.
Although he periodically purchased some of the groceries, the former wife
primarily paid for the food they consumed and the other products used within the
household. According to Llerena, although he lived full-time with the former wife,
he only contributed approximately $150 a month towards the relationship, which
was spent on food and meals consumed outside of the home. Further, the former
wife “loaned” Llerena $1,200 to enable him to purchase an automobile, but at the
time of the hearing, the “debt” remained unpaid.
Besides providing Llerena with a home with various amenities—including a
pool, and all of the comforts of a home—for the three years preceding the hearing,
the former wife converted her son’s bedroom into a room for Llerena’s two minor
children to facilitate Llerena’s overnight visitation with his minor children. The
former wife purchased the beds and paid for the changes she made for the benefit
of Llerena’s minor children, and she apparently also paid for the expenses incurred
during their stays since there is no evidence that Llerena paid for anything other
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than $150 per month for food and meals consumed outside of the home.
THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER
The trial court found that the former wife and Llerena were involved in a
“supportive relationship” within the meaning of section 61.14(1)(b), and that based
on this finding, section 61.14(1)(b)3. provided the court with authority to reduce or
terminate the former husband’s alimony obligation to the former wife. Then the
trial court considered the factors listed in section 61.08(2) in determining whether
a reduction or termination of alimony was appropriate, as is required under that
subsection. After considering all the relevant factors and balancing the equities,
the trial court concluded that a $700 per month reduction in the former husband’s
alimony obligation was warranted. Accordingly, the trial court reduced the former
husband’s monthly alimony obligation from $4,200 per month to $3,500 per
month, awarded him a credit of $2,100 for the overpayment of $700 per month for
the three months preceding the issuance of the trial court’s order, and ordered that
each party bear their own attorney’s fees and costs.
The former wife contends that the trial court’s order reducing the former
husband’s alimony obligation must be reversed. We disagree. As the trial court’s
order is supported by substantial competent evidence and comports with applicable
Florida law, the order is affirmed.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
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A. Standard of Review
Although the parties disagree as to this Court’s standard of review, we agree
with the appellant and the Second District Court of Appeal that a review of a trial
court’s decision under section 61.14(1)(b) is a mixed question of law and fact that
requires a mixed standard of review. See Buxton v. Buxton, 963 So. 2d 950, 953
(Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The trial court must first make factual findings based on the
evidence presented and then determine whether the facts establish the existence of
a “supportive relationship,” which requires an interpretation of the statute and an
application of the law to the facts. If the trial court concludes that a “supportive
relationship” exists, it has the discretion to reduce or terminate the alimony
obligation. Id. Thus, we review the trial court’s factual findings to determine
whether they are supported by competent substantial evidence; the trial court’s
interpretation and application of the law should be reviewed de novo; and the
exercise of the trial court’s discretion should be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See King v. King, 82 So. 3d 1124, 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Buxton,
963 So. 2d at 953.
B. Modification of Alimony
Section 61.14(1)(a) authorizes a modification of alimony when “the
circumstances or the financial ability of either party changes . . . .” § 61.14(1)(a);
see also King, 82 So. 3d at 1131.
To obtain a modification under section
7
61.14(1)(a), the trial court must make a determination that: (1) there was a
substantial change in circumstances; (2) the change was not contemplated at the
time of the final judgment of dissolution; and (3) the change is sufficient, material,
involuntary, and permanent in nature. Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla.
1992). Thus, prior to the enactment of subsection (b) of section 61.14(1) in 2005,
to obtain a reduction or the termination of alimony based on unmarried
cohabitation, the obligor was required to show a substantial change in
circumstances, and unmarried cohabitation created a presumption of changed
circumstances. Bridges v. Bridges, 842 So. 2d 983, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
To find a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant a reduction or the
termination of alimony based on cohabitation, a trial court is required to consider
whether either of the following two factors is present: “[1] whether the cohabitant
provides support to the recipient spouse, or [2] whether the recipient spouse
contributes to the support of the cohabitant.” Bridges, 842 So. 2d at 984 (citing
Maclaren v. Maclaren, 616 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)) (emphasis
added).
For example, in Stuart v. Stuart, 385 So. 2d 134, 135 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980),
the Fourth District recognized that cohabitation relationships necessarily will result
in either financial or in kind contributions flowing from the former spouse to the
new partner or vice-versa, explaining:
8
Obviously, if a spouse receiving alimony enters into an arrangement
which involves living with a member of the opposite sex, that is
rather clear evidence of a substantial change of circumstances. There
will either be financial or in kind contributions of the new partner to
be taken into account, or, if the contributions go from the spouse to
the new partner, the fact that the spouse is providing board and
room to the new partner is evidence that the fair market value of
those and any other contributions is some measure of the extent
to which periodic alimony is excessive.
(emphasis added).
In Schneider v. Schneider, 467 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), the
Fifth District noted that, for three years, the former wife had been cohabitating
with a man, Rex Springer, in the former marital residence, and although Springer
contributed little or nothing to the household expenses, the former wife was,
to some extent, contributing to Springer’s support. Thus, the Fifth District
reversed the trial court’s order denying modification of the former husband’s
alimony based on the trial court’s finding that there had not been a substantial
change in the economic circumstances of the parties. Id. at 467-68.
In 2005, the Florida Legislature enacted subsection (b) of section 61.14(1),
which codifies the law regarding reduction or termination of alimony on the basis
of cohabitation.
King, 82 So. 3d at 1131.
Section 61.14(1)(a) authorizes a
modification of alimony when “the circumstances or the financial ability of either
party changes,” whereas section 61.14(1)(b) authorizes modification based on the
existence of a “supportive relationship” between the obligee and another person. §
9
61.14(1)(b); King, 82 So. 3d at 1130. Section 61.14(1)(b) provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
1. The court may reduce or terminate an award of alimony upon
specific written findings by the court that since the granting of a
divorce and the award of alimony a supportive relationship has existed
between the obligee and a person with whom the obligee resides. On
the issue of whether alimony should be reduced or terminated under
this paragraph, the burden is on the obligor to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a supportive relationship exists.
2. In determining whether an existing award of alimony should
be reduced or terminated because of an alleged supportive relationship
between an obligee and a person who is not related by consanguinity
or affinity and with whom the obligee resides, the court shall elicit the
nature and extent of the relationship in question. The court shall give
consideration, without limitation, to circumstances, including, but not
limited to, the following, in determining the relationship of an obligee
to another person:
a. The extent to which the obligee and the other person have
held themselves out as a married couple by engaging in conduct such
as using the same last name, using a common mailing address,
referring to each other in terms such as “my husband” or “my wife,” or
otherwise conducting themselves in a manner that evidences a
permanent supportive relationship.
b. The period of time that the obligee has resided with the
other person in a permanent place of abode.
c. The extent to which the obligee and the other person have
pooled their assets or income or otherwise exhibited financial
interdependence.
d. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has
supported the other, in whole or in part.
e. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has
performed valuable services for the other.
f. The extent to which the obligee or the other person has
performed valuable services for the other’s company or employer.
g. Whether the obligee and the other person have worked
together to create or enhance anything of value.
h. Whether the obligee and the other person have jointly
contributed to the purchase of any real or personal property.
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i. Evidence in support of a claim that the obligee and the other
person have an express agreement regarding property sharing or
support.
j. Evidence in support of a claim that the obligee and the other
person have an implied agreement regarding property sharing or
support.
k. Whether the obligee and the other person have provided
support to the children of one another, regardless of any legal duty
to do so.
(emphasis added).
Section 61.14(1)(b) specifically provides that the court shall consider the
economic support and other benefits the obligee has conferred upon the third
party cohabitant. Section 61.14(1)(b)2.c. requires the court to consider “[t]he
extent to which the obligee and the other person have pooled their assets or income
or otherwise exhibited financial interdependence.” Section 61.14(1)(b)2.d. requires
the court to consider “[t]he extent to which the obligee or the other person has
supported the other, in whole or in part.”
(emphasis added).
Section
61.14(1)(b)2.e. requires the court to consider “[t]he extent to which the obligee or
the other person has performed valuable services for the other.” (emphasis added).
Section 61.14(1)(b)2.k. additionally requires the court to consider “[w]hether the
obligee and the other person have provided support to the children of one another,
regardless of any legal duty to do so.” There was clear and unrefuted evidence in
the record as to each of these and other relevant factors.
The unrefuted evidence considered by the trial court was that the former
11
wife had been living with Llerena in a monogamous, romantic relationship since
2008 in the former wife’s home, which she was awarded in the dissolution of her
marriage. The former wife provided support to Llerena by providing him with a
home, which includes a pool; paying all of the utilities, taxes, and insurances
relating to the home; providing him with a location where he could exercise his
visitation rights with his two minor children; providing a separate bedroom for
Llerena’s children to sleep in and beds she purchased for that purpose; loaning him
money to purchase a vehicle (a debt which remained unpaid at the time of the
hearing); paying for all the maintenance and upkeep of the home; paying for all
household supplies; and paying for most of the food expenses, as he only
contributes approximately $150 per month towards his and his children’s food bill.
Because the former wife, who was able-bodied and only fifty-eight years old at the
time of the hearing, was not working, the former husband was providing the means
whereby his former wife could offer these substantial benefits to Llerena, who
worked full-time but did not contribute towards his and his children’s room and
board. Although the former wife and Llerena did not pool their assets or share a
bank account, it is clear that Llerena was substantially dependent on the former
wife. It is also undisputed that, although Llerena either lacked the financial ability
or the inclination to provide financial assistance to the former wife, he did perform
valuable services for the former wife.
12
He cleaned the pool, cut the grass,
periodically washed the former wife’s car, and helped with some of the chores.
The relationship is not dissimilar to many marriages where one spouse financially
supports the other, while the other spouse contributes by performing valuable
services that reduce the couple’s overall expenses.
The cases relied on by the former wife do not support a conclusion that a
supportive relationship cannot be found absent some form of direct economic
support by the third party cohabitant to the recipient spouse.
In Overton v.
Overton, 34 So. 3d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“Overton I”), Lynn Overton, the
former wife, appealed the trial court’s order reducing her alimony award on the
ground she was in a supportive relationship. The First District reversed based on
its findings that: (1) the trial court did not make any findings regarding the factors
outlined in section 61.14(1)(b); and (2) the relationship had not yet reached the
point contemplated by the statute.
Id. at 762.
Although the former wife’s
boyfriend lived with her when her children were not visiting her, and the former
wife and her boyfriend drove to work together, there was no other indicia of a
“supportive relationship.”
Id. They did not pool their assets, did not hold
themselves out as married, and unlike the facts in the instant appeal, had separate
residences, and there was no evidence that either was supporting the other,
providing valuable services to the other, or providing support to the children of the
other. Id.
13
Subsequently, in Overton v. Overton, 92 So. 3d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
(“Overton II”), the First District addressed whether the trial court may exercise its
discretion as to whether to reduce or terminate alimony upon finding that the
former spouse was in a supportive relationship. In reaching its determination that
the statute contemplates an exercise of discretion, the First District rejected
Edward Overton’s reliance on language from Overton I, which is the very same
passage relied on by the majority in the instant appeal. This passage quotes, in
part, to French v. French, 4 So. 3d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).2 Overton II, 92 So. 3d
at 254-55. The Overton II court explained that this reference in Overton I was
“obiter dicta,” id. at 254, and ultimately certified conflict with this reference in
French. Id. at 255.
In King, another case relied on by the former wife, the Second District noted
that “section 61.14(1)(a) authorizes a modification of alimony when ‘the
circumstances or the financial ability of either party changes,’” King, 82 So. 3d at
1131 (emphasis added), and that subsection (1)(b) must be read in pari materia with
2
The passage relied on by the majority in the instant appeal and rejected by the
First District in Overton II provides:
A supportive relationship is a relationship that “takes the financial
place of a marriage and necessarily decreases the need of the obligee.”
French, 4 So. 3d at 6. Section 61.14(1)(b) recognizes the economic
support that occurs when independent individuals cho[o]se to live
together. Such support is equivalent to a marriage and requires a
reduction in alimony. See id. at 8.
(alteration in original).
14
subsection (1)(a). King, 82 So. 3d at 1131. In determining whether a reduction in
alimony is appropriate under subsection (1)(b), the Second District noted that the
trial court must consider the nature and extent of the relationship in question and
the non-exclusive factors identified in subsection (1)(b)2. Id. at 1131. The Second
District concluded that the analysis involved a four step process: (1) considering
and making findings concerning the factors listed in section 61.14(1)(b)2. and any
other pertinent circumstances; (2) determining whether, based on these findings, a
supportive relationship exists; (3) considering the relevant economic factors for
determining an award of alimony under section 61.08(2); and (4) determining
whether alimony should be reduced or terminated and, if so, by how much. Id. at
1129. Although the trial court found that a supportive relationship existed, the
appellate court concluded that because the supportive relationship, and thus the
change in circumstances, predated the divorce and the award of alimony, the circuit
court was not authorized to reduce or terminate the alimony payments under
section 61.14(1)(b).
Id. at 1132.
The King court did not state that the
determination of whether a supportive relationship exists requires a finding that the
third party cohabitant is providing economic support to the recipient spouse, nor
could it under the statutory scheme.
The statute specifically provides that a
supportive relationship may exist if, in whole or in part, either the obligee or the
other person is supporting the other, is providing valuable services for the other, or
15
providing support to the other’s children. See § 61.14(1)(b)2.d., e., k. The impact
that a third party cohabitant’s contributions, financial or otherwise, may have on
the former spouse’s need is merely a relevant consideration as to whether to reduce
or terminate alimony after a determination is made that a supportive relationship
exists. King, 82 So. 3d at 1129.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to the former wife’s argument that section 61.14(1)(b) requires at
least some form of economic support being provided to the recipient spouse by a
third party cohabitant, the statute provides that a supportive relationship may be
established through the economic support provided by the recipient spouse to the
third party cohabitant, and other valuable non-economic services provided by
either to the other is a relevant consideration in determining whether a supportive
relationship exists.
Based on the undisputed evidence that the relationship between the former
wife and Llerena, which began in 2008 after the divorce, was a monogamous,
romantic relationship; Llerena had been living with the former wife in the former
marital home since March of 2009, and he had no other residence; Llerena did not
contribute any money towards his share of the utilities or the maintenance of the
home; the former wife primarily paid for the food they consumed; the former wife
provided room and board and a venue to facilitate visitation for Llerena with his
16
minor children at the former wife’s home; and Llerena provided certain valuable
services, including maintenance of the pool and yard, and washing the former
wife’s car, the trial court’s finding that the former wife and Llerena were involved
in a “supportive relationship” is supported by competent substantial evidence.
Because the trial court considered and weighed the former wife’s need and the
former husband’s decreased ability to pay, the trial court’s order finding that a
reduction in the former wife’s alimony award was warranted is also supported by
the evidence.
Lastly, the $700 per month reduction to the former husband’s $4,200
monthly alimony obligation was entirely reasonable. Thus, the trial court’s order
reducing the former husband’s monthly alimony obligation by $700 (from $4,200
to $3,500) is affirmed, and the former husband’s future alimony payments should
be adjusted for payments he may have made to the former wife in excess of $700
from the time the trial court’s order granting the modification was entered.
Affirmed.
17
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