A.D. V. STATE
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA THIRD DISTRICT JULY TERM, 2006 A.D., a juvenile, Appellant, vs. ** ** ** THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. CASE NO. 3D06-629 ** ** LOWER TRIBUNAL NO. 05-4781 ** Opinion filed October 4, 2006. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mindy S. Glazer and Orlando A. Prescott, Judges. Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Blumberg, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Fattel, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Howard Juliet K. S. Before GERSTEN, FLETCHER, and ROTHENBERG, JJ. ROTHENBERG, Judge. A.D., a juvenile, appeals the trial court s order adjudicating him delinquent and the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of his arrest. We affirm. A.D. was observed by law enforcement in a business area on Main Street in Miami Lakes at approximately 8:59 p.m. It is undisputed that some of the businesses were open at the time, and that the area is marked with signs which provide that the business owners individuals from have authorized loitering or law enforcement trespassing. to While prevent there was conflicting evidence as to exactly what occurred during A.D. s encounter with the police, it is undisputed that A.D. was asked to leave and when he became agitated, he was asked to step off to the side to speak to an officer, who explained to A.D. that he was obstructing a walk-way on private property and that the officer was authorized by the owner of the property to prevent loitering. search When A.D. refused to leave, he was arrested. incident to the arrest revealed a Xanax pill A in the that his pocket of A.D. s shorts. A.D. detention argues was that unlawful he was as not law trespassing enforcement and lacked reasonable articulable suspicion that A.D. was trespassing or engaged in any other criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop. As we conclude that the encounter with A.D. did not rise to the level of an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, we affirm. There encounters: are three levels of law enforcement/citizen (1) consensual encounters where the citizen is free 2 to leave and investigatory no constitutional stops ( Terry temporarily detained and articulable suspicion safeguards stops ) which that the where are a citizen requires person invoked; a has (2) may be well-founded committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime; and (3) an arrest, Popple v. State, 626 which must be supported by probable cause. So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993). A.D. argues that when he was asked to move to another area for further questioning, what may have begun as a consensual encounter, reasonable turned into suspicion. an We investigatory disagree. The stop requiring Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not implicated when an encounter with the police is found to be consensual. Whether a particular encounter is consensual requires consideration of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding circumstances the encounter would and communicate to hinges a on whether the person that reasonable he/she is free to leave and terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S 429, 439 (1991); Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 15 (Fla. 2003). Under the facts and circumstances in this case, law was enforcement not attempting to detain A.D. To contrary, they were attempting to convince him to leave. the A.D., therefore, could not reasonably argue that he or any reasonable person would have felt that he/she 3 could not leave. The consensual encounter unfortunately turned into a valid arrest after A.D. was asked three times to leave by the officer, and refused to do so, thus elevating the consensual encounter to an arrest for trespass after warning. Affirmed. 4
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