IN THE INTEREST OF JANE DOE vs
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT In re Petition of Jane Doe for a Judicial ) Waiver of Parental Notice of Termination ) of Pregnancy. ) ___________________________________) ) JANE DOE, ) ) Appellant. ) ) Case No. 2D20-2368 Opinion filed August 17, 2020. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Christine Ann Marlewski, Judge. Jonathan E. Hackworth of Hackworth Law, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. SLEET, Judge. Jane Doe, a minor, challenges the trial court's final order dismissing her petition for judicial waiver of the notice and consent requirements of section 390.01114, Florida Statutes (2020). We affirm the trial court's order. Section 390.01114, the Parental Notice of and Consent for Abortion Act, requires a physician to provide actual notice to a minor's parent or legal guardian before terminating the pregnancy of the minor. § 390.01114(4)(a). Furthermore, section 390.01114(5)(a) requires that "[a] physician must obtain written consent from a parent or legal guardian before performing or inducing the termination of a pregnancy of a minor."1 However, "[a] minor may petition any circuit court in which the minor resides for a waiver of the requirements of this section." § 390.01114(6)(a). And "the court shall issue an order authorizing the minor to consent to the performance or inducement of a termination of the pregnancy" if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the minor is the victim of child abuse or sexual abuse at the hands of her parent or legal guardian or it "finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy" or "that the requirements of this section are not in the best interest of the petitioner." § 390.01114(6)(c)-(d). Only the latter two considerations are at issue in the instant appeal. In her petition, the only basis for judicial waiver that Doe alleged was that notification of a parent was not in her best interest due to her "fear of mother kicking me out of the house." However, at the hearing on the motion, Doe testified that she did not live with her mother and that, in fact, her mother lived in Guatemala. Doe stated that she came to this country with her father and that he would get angry and punish her if he knew she was pregnant. But she also testified that she did not live with her father, that he "lives in another state and [she doesn't] really know where he went," and that she no longer speaks with him because since he moved, both she and he had changed their phone numbers. As to her current living situation, Doe testified that she lives with her seventeen-year-old boyfriend, who is the man who impregnated her. She testified: "We got a room. And we are living together . . . with the lady and the - - the gentleman of the house. They are the owners." As to the "lady" and "gentleman," Doe stated, "They don't want me to do it. They said that I am going to be fine and that I am not 1Section 390.01114(5)(a) sets forth certain criteria for the written consent to ensure that it is the valid consent of the minor's actual parent or legal guardian. -2- having any problems. And besides, my father would be angry if he knows that I am pregnant and he will punish me." Neither the court nor Doe's counsel sought clarification of whether the "it" that the lady and gentleman did not want Doe to do referred to her terminating her pregnancy or to her having the child. Doe's counsel and the trial court questioned Doe regarding her maturity level. She testified that at the time of the hearing, she was twelve days shy of fifteen years old, that she was in school, and that her grades were "[s]ometimes A's, C's, and B['s]." When her counsel asked her if she was aware of the possible health consequences of the procedure, she responded, "I talked to a lot of people, they - - and they gave me a lot of examples and I know how it is. . . . Like, I know that there is pain and like body aches." When asked specifically about the long-term effects of the procedure, she stated: "I know that there - - well, I don't understand it much, but what I understand is that you need to be sure. You need to know what you are doing. You need to think how it's - - how to do it or how is it done. You need to know it." She testified that she did not work but that her boyfriend did and that he "support[s] me and giv[es] me everything." She also stated that no one influenced her decision and that she made the decision "because I don't have any other choice." In its order dismissing the petition, the trial court found as follows: [Doe] presented as a very young, immature woman who was unable to articulate any potential effects of the procedure other than pain. She did not know any long-term effects. While she indicated her Mother lived in Guatemala and she did not know the location of her Father, the Court does not find credible that she is unable to contact either parent. She also did not provide clear and convincing evidence that it would not be in the minor child's best interest to notify her parents. Her testimony only indicated that they would be upset and her Father would punish her. In her petition, she indicates her reason was a "fear of her mother kicking her out of the house," but in her testimony she says that her -3- Mother allegedly lives in Guatemala, so those reasons do not meet her burden to prove it would not be in her best interest. On appeal, Doe first argues that the trial court erred in making this ruling because her testimony below established that she was sufficiently mature to make the decision to terminate her pregnancy. We review the trial court's findings for an abuse of discretion. See In re Doe, 139 So. 3d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); In re Doe, 113 So. 3d 882, 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). "The minor has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is sufficiently mature." In re Doe, 67 So. 3d 268, 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the evidence presented by Doe did not establish sufficient maturity in this case. In determining whether the minor is sufficiently mature to make this decision without parental consent, [f]actors the trial court shall consider include: 1. The minor's: a. Age. b. Overall intelligence. c. Emotional development and stability. d. Credibility and demeanor as a witness. e. Ability to accept responsibility. f. Ability to assess both the immediate and long-range consequences of the minor's choices. g. Ability to understand and explain the medical risks of terminating her pregnancy and to apply that understanding to her decision. 2. Whether there may be any undue influence by another on the minor's decision to have an abortion. § 390.01114(6)(c). -4- In the instant case, Doe was not yet even fifteen years old at the time of the hearing. Although she made decent grades in school, her answers to the questioning of counsel and the trial court were vague, and our review of her testimony supports the trial court's finding that she was unable to articulate her understanding of the procedure, the medical risks involved, and the long- and short-term consequences of her decision. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to refute the trial court's assessment of her demeanor as "present[ing] as a very young, immature woman," and we must take that assessment into consideration. See § 390.01114(6)(c)(1)(d); In re Doe, 67 So. 3d at 268 ("Significantly, the trial court made specific findings and expressed particular concern regarding the minor's demeanor."); cf. In re Doe, 932 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("[W]hen making the required written and specific findings in support of its ruling, the trial court did not mention that it found Doe's demeanor to be immature[] or even suggest that Doe's demeanor had any bearing on its consideration."). Based on this record, Doe did not meet her burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that she possesses sufficient maturity to make the decision to terminate her pregnancy without parental consent. See In re Doe, 973 So. 2d 548, 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("The minor's testimony in this case tells us virtually nothing about her level of maturity. Significantly, the minor failed to demonstrate any knowledge regarding any specific immediate or long-term physical, emotional, or psychological risks of having an abortion. The record contains no evidence indicating that the minor was aware of, appreciated, or had seriously considered those risks." (emphasis added)). -5- Doe also argues on appeal that because her mother lives in Guatemala and she does not know where her father is, the requirements of section 390.01114 are not in her best interest. Again, the burden is on Doe to prove by clear and convincing evidence that requiring notification to and the consent of her parents is not in her best interest. See In re Doe, 153 So. 3d 925, 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). The only proof Doe provided of her parents' whereabouts was her own testimony. But her testimony that her mother lived in Guatemala and that she had come to this country with only her father contradicted the allegations of her own sworn petition that she feared her mother would kick her out of the house if her mother found out she was pregnant. As such, she was untruthful with the court in her sworn testimony at the hearing or in her petition, which required her to sign an oath "swearing and affirming the truthfulness of the information herein" under the threat of "fines, imprisonment or both." This placed her credibility in question. The court stated both at the hearing and in its written order that it did not find some of Doe's testimony credible, and "[t]he circuit court sits in a far better position to assess a minor's demeanor and credibility than this [c]ourt can upon review of the transcribed hearing," In re Doe, 204 So. 3d 175, 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). We do note that this court is not insensitive to the difficult situation Doe finds herself in where the statute requires notice to and the consent of her parents while at the same time her parents may not be available to accompany her and provide such consent. However, upon the request of Doe's counsel, the trial court agreed that counsel could file a motion for reconsideration and either present a sworn affidavit from either of Doe's parents or present either parent via video conference to indicate consent to the procedure. The mother's unsworn affidavit was filed, and a second hearing was -6- held. A woman representing herself as Doe's mother appeared,2 but she initially gave a different name than that of Doe's mother and needed to be corrected by Doe. The woman offered no other proof that she was Doe's mother. The trial court ruled that it could not confirm that the woman who appeared was in actuality Doe's mother, and Doe does not challenge that ruling on appeal. Accordingly, based on the evidence presented below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Doe did not meet her burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence either that she was sufficiently mature to make the decision to terminate her pregnancy without notice to or the consent of her parents or that the requirements of the statute were not in her best interest. We, therefore, must affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the petition. Affirmed. VILLANTI and LaROSE, JJ., Concur. 2It is unclear from the record before us whether the woman appeared via video or only by audio. -7-
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