State v. Osuji
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
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STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
v.
NDIDI O. OSUJI,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed December 19, 2001.
Appeal from the Circuit
Court for Hillsborough County;
Cynthia A. Holloway, Judge.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney
General, Tallahassee, and
Erica M. Raffel, Assistant
Attorney General, Tampa, for
Appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public
Defender, and Timothy J. Ferreri,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow,
for Appellee.
WHATLEY, Judge.
CASE NO. 2D01-743
The State appeals the order dismissing the information charging Ndidi O.
Osuji with obstructing or opposing a law enforcement officer with violence and battery on a
law enforcement officer.1 We reverse.
The charges against Osuji stemmed from Osuji’s fleeing two law
enforcement officers who had stopped his vehicle after he committed traffic infractions in
an attempt to avoid a driver’s license checkpoint. The officers gave chase and caught up
to Osuji while he was scaling a fence. During the struggle to handcuff Osuji, he struck one
of the officers. An officer at the checkpoint radioed the arresting officers to stop Osuji after
she observed him make an abrupt turn without using a signal just before reaching the
checkpoint and drive through a retirement home parking lot.
A conviction for either obstructing a law enforcement officer or battery on a
law enforcement officer requires proof that the officer was engaged in the performance of
a lawful duty. Taylor v. State, 740 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The arresting
officers were authorized to stop Osuji based upon section 316.074(2), Florida Statutes
(2000) (“No person shall drive any vehicle from a roadway to another roadway to avoid
obeying the indicated traffic control indicated by such traffic control device.”2) and section
316.155 (requiring use of turn signal). Violation of this statute constitutes a noncriminal
1
The order erroneously states that the trial court was granting a motion to
suppress.
Traffic control devices are defined in section 316.003(16), Florida Statutes
(2000), as follows: “All signs, signals, markings, and devices, not inconsistent with this
chapter, placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction for the
purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.”
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traffic infraction, § 316.074(2), .155(5), for which an individual may be stopped by law
enforcement. See Willis v. State, 762 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Thus, the officers
were lawfully attempting to stop Osuji when he committed the offenses with which he was
charged. Consequently, the information against Osuji should not have been dismissed.
Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the information against Osuji
and remand with instructions that it be reinstated.
Reversed and remanded.
FULMER, A.C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur.
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