Graham v. State
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
January Term 2011
JAMES GRAHAM,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D09-1273
[ March 9, 2011 ]
TAYLOR, J.
James Graham appeals his conviction and sentence for first degree
murder with a firearm. He argues that the trial court erred in: (1)
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was
insufficient to support premeditation for first degree murder and to prove
robbery as a predicate offense for felony murder, and (2) admitting a
prior consistent statement of the state’s main witness. We affirm.
On the evening of June 30, 2007, Fort Lauderdale police officers
found Alvin Daniels dead, with a single gunshot to the chest, lying
slumped over the center console of his Jeep Grand Cherokee parked
outside his Lauderhill apartment. Officers searched the entire car, but
could not find the victim’s wallet or car keys. Although the victim had a
cell phone case on his belt, no cell phone was found inside or near the
car. The officers were, however, able to obtain the victim’s cell phone
records; they learned that his last phone call was made to an individual
named Eric McNair.
Their investigation later revealed that Phillip
Kenneth Watson, a co-worker of McNair, told a friend, Mark Martin,
about what he heard and saw on the night of the murder.
The police contacted Watson a n d interviewed him on numerous
occasions, b u t he consistently denied knowing anything about the
incident. As a result, detectives asked Watson’s godmother, Theresa
Martin, to secretly record a conversation between her and Watson about
what he knew of the murder. Martin agreed, and on July 12, 2007, she
recorded Watson’s account of the events that occurred on the night of the
murder. Two weeks later, on July 24, 2007, police interviewed Watson.
He initially denied knowing anything about Daniels’s murder, but he
later changed his statement after the police played the recorded
conversation between him and Martin. The information he disclosed
directly implicated the defendant in the murder and led to his arrest.
At trial, Watson testified that after work on June 30, 2007, he walked
to McNair’s home to get change for a twenty-dollar bill. His co-worker,
Daniel LaTorre, was there playing a video game in McNair’s bedroom.
Watson stayed and watched LaTorre play the video game while he waited
for his change. While there, Watson became aware that someone was at
McNair’s front door. Although Watson did not see the person standing
o n McNair’s porch, h e recognized the person’s voice as that of the
defendant. Watson overheard the defendant, also known as “Slick,” ask
McNair for some “fire” or “heat.” Watson said that “heat” means a gun.
LaTorre testified that he did not see or overhear the defendant speak to
McNair.
Immediately after requesting the gun, the defendant left McNair’s
home, but returned about ten minutes later. According to both Watson
and LaTorre, the defendant was “breathing hard” and acting “hyper” and
“nervous.” LaTorre testified that the defendant moved around fast and
said “I got to go.” Watson testified that the defendant confessed that “he
just shot the dude in the chest and he’s gasping for air.” Watson also
overheard the defendant say that, “he just shot the dude in the chest by
accident, a n d he told everybody to leave.” At that point, Watson
observed the defendant pull out a revolver from behind his back and
hand it to McNair as Watson walked out of the bedroom. Watson
testified that he thought the defendant shot the victim because “he was
like trying to get something from him. He was trying to fight with him to
get something.” After he left McNair’s house, Watson did not see the
defendant, but he saw McNair drive off in a van.
During cross-examination of Watson, the defense implied that
Watson’s fear of the police and their threats to arrest him for perjury or
homicide influenced him to change his story that he knew nothing about
the murder and implicate the defendant during the later portion of the
July 24th police interview. On re-direct examination of Watson, the state
questioned him about th e secretly recorded conversatio n with his
godmother o n July 12th. The tape revealed that Watson told his
godmother that the defendant came to McNair’s house and said that he
had shot a guy in the chest and that he was gasping for air. He stated
that he had seen the defendant return a gun to McNair.
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The victim’s step-sister, DeWonda Chambers, testified that she had
twice seen the defendant over at the apartment she shared with her stepbrother in June 2007 and the two appeared to know each other. After
the murder, Chambers recalled that the victim’s Figaro gold necklace was
missing from his belongings. He frequently wore the necklace, but it was
nowhere to be found after his death.
The defendant’s ex-girlfriend, Tamara Tompkins, testified that on July
12, 2007, she pawned a men’s gold necklace that she found inside the
drawer of her living room wall unit. According to Tompkins, she had
seen the necklace around her apartment in May—prior to June 30, 2007.
However, the state published to the jury a taped jail house conversation
in which the defendant told Tompkins that she needed to immediately
get the necklace back from the pawn shop and to “read between the
lines.” In another conversation, the defendant told Tompkins to get the
necklace because he did not want her to “get caught up in whatever.”
Leroy Allen Keating, an employee of the pawn shop, recalled from the
form Tompkins signed at the time of the transaction that she pawned a
men’s Figaro gold necklace similar in style to the victim’s and received
two hundred dollars for it on June 12, 2007. Keating acknowledged that
there was an unknown amount of gold Figaro chains in the Fort
Lauderdale area, but said that there were not many chains that were 10
karat yellow gold, 20 inches in length, and styled for men, which fit the
description of the necklace pawned by the defendant’s girlfriend and the
necklace worn by the victim.
Alice Benitz, a fingerprint examiner with the Fort Lauderdale police
department, found that three fingerprints lifted off the passenger door
handle of the victim’s vehicle matched the defendant’s fingerprints.
Although the defendant’s fingerprints were found at the scene, crime
scene investigator, Brad Jenkins, did not find evidence of a gun, shell
casings, or bullets in the vehicle’s vicinity, other than the bullet removed
from the victim’s chest. However, Erica Lawton-McWhite, a firearms
examiner with the Broward Sheriff’s Office, testified that not finding shell
casings at the crime scene was consistent with the type of bullet fired
and the type of revolver used in the shooting. McWhite explained that
the bullet found in the victim’s chest would be fired from a revolver that
would not leave shell casings in its vicinity.
After the state rested and the defense rested without presenting any
evidence, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The trial
court denied the motion. The jury found the defendant guilty of first
degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment.
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On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal because the case against him was
based entirely o n circumstantial evidence that was insufficient to
support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and felony
murder.
Appellate review of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is
de novo. Burkell v. State, 992 So. 2d 848, 851 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The
principles that govern a motion for judgment of acquittal are wellestablished:
Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction
that is supported by competent, substantial evidence. If,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient
evidence exists to sustain a conviction. In moving for a
judgment of acquittal, a defendant “admits not only the facts
stated in the evidence adduced, but also admits every
conclusion favorable to the adverse party that a jury might
fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence.” We have
stated that “courts should not grant a motion for judgment
of acquittal unless the evidence is such that no view which
the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the opposite
party can be sustained under the law.”
Id. (citations omitted).
However, when a case is completely based on circumstantial evidence
rather than on direct evidence, a special standard of review applies. Id.
When circumstantial evidence provides the sole proof of guilt, “no matter
how strongly it suggests guilt there can be no conviction unless the
evidence is inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.”
Horne v. State, 997 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). As such, in
cases that solely rely on circumstantial evidence, the state is required to
provide substantial competent evidence rebutting the defendant’s theory
of events. Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1145 (Fla. 2006). While
the state does not have to rebut every possible event variation that might
be inferred from the evidence, it has to produce evidence that contradicts
the defendant’s theory. Haugabrook v. State, 827 So. 2d 1065, 1068 (Fla.
2d DCA 2002). However, mere suspicions without more cannot satisfy
the state’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Ballard v.
State, 923 So. 2d 475, 482 (Fla. 2006). And the fact that a defendant
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produced “contradictory evidence as to guilt does not necessarily
mandate reversal because the circumstantial evidence rule does not
require the jury to believe the defendant’s version of the facts where the
State has produced conflicting evidence.” Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d
980, 986 (Fla. 1990). After “competent, substantial evidence has been
submitted on each element of the crime, it is for the jury to evaluate the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Holton v. State, 573 So. 2d
284, 290 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Hufham v. State, 400 So. 2d 133, 135-36
(Fla. 5th DCA 1981)). A court should not grant a motion for judgment of
acquittal unless there is no view of the evidence which the jury might
take favorable to the opposite party that can be sustained under the law.
Geffkin v. State, 820 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
The state argues that this is not a wholly circumstantial case, as the
defendant contends. We agree. Watson’s testimony established that the
defendant came to McNair’s home requesting a gun, left the house, and
returned five minutes later. He was sweating, breathing hard, and acting
nervous. He stated that he had just “shot the dude in the chest by
accident” and that the “dude was gasping for air.” Watson saw the
defendant remove a pistol or revolver from behind his back and start to
hand it to McNair. The defendant’s fingerprints were found on the
passenger side door handle of the victim’s car. The car was located a few
yards from McNair’s house.
In this case, although there was insufficient evidence from which the
jury could infer premeditation, the state presented competent substantial
evidence to support its felony murder theory based on robbery. Trial
testimony indicated that the defendant took the victim’s gold chain at the
time of the victim’s murder. The victim’s step-sister gave him a Figaro
gold chain that he wore often. The chain was not found on him or in his
belongings after his murder. Recorded portions of two jail phone
conversations between the defendant and his girlfriend showed that the
defendant was upset that the girlfriend had pawned a similar gold chain
she found in the apartment that she shared with the defendant.
Reasonable inferences arose from the evidence that the defendant took
the gold chain from the victim at the time of the murder. Additionally,
Watson testified about his belief that the defendant was trying to fight
with the victim to get something from him. Thus, we find no error in the
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on
the first degree murder charge.
The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the
state to question Watson regarding his prior consistent statements. The
statements were made on July 12, 2007 during a secretly recorded
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conversation between Watson and his godmother. Although the tape
recording was not played for the jury, the defendant argues that the trial
court erred in allowing the state to question Watson about the prior
statements because they were inadmissible hearsay a n d improperly
bolstered his credibility.
Our standard of review of the trial court’s decision to admit Watson’s
prior consistent statement is abuse of discretion. Tumblin v. State, 29
So. 3d 1093, 1100 (Fla. 2010). “‘Generally, prior consistent statements
are inadmissible to corroborate or bolster a witness’s trial testimony’”
because they are usually hearsay, but a prior consistent statement may
be admitted as nonhearsay if certain conditions are met.” Id. (quoting
Taylor v. State, 855 So. 2d 1, 22-23 (Fla. 2003)). Under section
90.801(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), prior statements of a witness that
are “‘[c]onsistent with the declarant’s testimony and are offered to rebut
an express or implied charge against the declarant of improper influence,
motive, or recent fabrication’ are not inadmissible hearsay if the
declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement.” Id. Both conditions must be satisfied to admit a prior
consistent statement as nonhearsay. Peterson v. State, 874 So. 2d 14,
17 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Harris v. State, 843 So. 2d 856, 862 (Fla.
2003)).
Here, both conditions were met for the admission of Watson’s
statement. First, Watson’s statements in the July 12th recording were
consistent with his testimony at trial and he was subject to crossexamination regarding these prior consistent statements.
Second,
defense counsel’s cross-examination of Watson expressly or impliedly
charged that Watson’s testimony was improperly influenced by police
threats and intimidation. The underlying theme throughout the defense
cross-examination was that Watson would tell the police exactly what
they wanted to hear in order to avoid being charged with the homicide.
In response, the state questioned Watson on redirect examination
about the July 12, 2007 recorded statement to show that Watson’s trial
testimony, along with the statements made in the second portion of the
July 24, 2007 interview, were not the product of police threats, but
rather an independent account of what happened on the night of the
murder—free from any kind of improper motive, influence, or fabrication.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
the state to question Watson about his prior consistent statement.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence in this
case.
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Affirmed.
GROSS, C.J., and STEVENSON, J., concur.
*
*
*
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 07013655CF10A.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Richard B. Greene, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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