Kurecka v. State* and 4D08-3221-Power v. State
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
July Term 2010
CHARLES KURECKA,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D08-2154
_____________________
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellant,
v.
JAMES J. POWER,
Appellee.
No. 4D08-3221
[ September 29, 2010 ]
ON MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, REHEARING, REHEARING EN
BANC AND CERTIFICATION
TAYLOR, J.
We deny appellee‘s motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc, and
certification, but substitute the following opinion in place of our
previously issued opinion, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D666 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 24,
2010), to clarify the procedural history contained in the first paragraph
of page one of the opinion.
These consolidated appeals present the same issue concerning
whether the defendants‘ refusal to submit to a breath test, following their
arrest for driving under the influence (DUI), should have been
suppressed. The defendants, Charles Kurecka and James J. Power,
moved to suppress evidence of their refusal, based on their mistaken
belief that they had a right to counsel before deciding whether to submit
to breath testing. A circuit court judge temporarily sitting as a county
court judge denied Kurecka‘s motion to suppress, and Kurecka
subsequently appealed his DUI conviction. A county court judge granted
Power‘s motion, and the state appealed the suppression order. Because
the orders under review contained a question certified to be of great
public importance pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.030(b)(4), the appeals were transferred to our district court of appeal.
After accepting jurisdiction in these cases, we consolidated them for
review.
Kurecka v. State
Charles Kurecka was involved in an automobile accident on August
24, 2005. Officer Joseph Rubin of the Greenacres Department of Public
Safety responded to the scene of the accident and conducted a DUI
investigation. After performing field sobriety exercises, Kurecka was
arrested for DUI and transported to the Greenacres Public Safety
Department. At the police station, he refused to submit to an alcohol
breath test. Kurecka later filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his
refusal.
At the hearing on Kurecka‘s motion to suppress his refusal to submit
to breath testing, the parties stipulated to the facts recited in the order
denying the motion to suppress:
On August 24, 2005, after being arrested for DUI, Defendant
was requested by law enforcement to submit to breath
testing. Upon hearing the request, Defendant requested to
speak with an attorney. Prior to requesting Defendant to
submit to breath testing, law enforcement had not advised
Defendant of his Miranda rights. As such, Defendant‘s
desire for counsel was not premised upon law enforcement
advice, but his own belief that he needed to speak with an
attorney. Law enforcement did not inform Defendant that he
did not have a right to speak with counsel prior to deciding
to take or refuse breath testing. Because he wanted to speak
with counsel first, Defendant refused to submit to breath
testing.
During argument on the motion to suppress, defense counsel
conceded that Kurecka did not have a right to a lawyer before deciding
whether to take a breath test. He further acknowledged that Kurecka
was not misled by law enforcement regarding his right to speak with an
2
attorney and that his confusion stemmed from his own
misunderstanding of the law. Nonetheless, he argued that Kurecka‘s
refusal should not be admitted at trial as evidence because his refusal
does not show consciousness of guilt, but mere confusion on his part.
In denying the motion to suppress, the court declined to apply the
confusion doctrine to Kurecka‘s refusal to submit to breath testing since
his confusion about the right to counsel did not derive from any action
by law enforcement. Citing State v. Wymer, 4 Fla. Supp. 113a (Fla.
Hillsborough Cty. Ct. 1995), the court denied the motion to suppress and
certified a question of great public importance. We rephrase the question
as follows:
IF THE CONFUSION DOCTRINE EXISTS IN FLORIDA, DOES
IT APPLY WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT FAILS TO ELIMINATE
A DEFENDANT‘S CONFUSION ABOUT THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL BEFORE SUBMITTING TO A BREATH TEST
EVEN THOUGH LAW ENFORCEMENT DID NOT CAUSE THE
CONFUSION?
We answer the question in the negative and affirm the order denying
Kurecka‘s motion to suppress his refusal to submit to the breath test.
At Kurecka‘s trial, the state argued during closing that appellant‘s
refusal to submit to the breath test showed consciousness of guilt,
stating:
And, why does he refuse the breath test? Because he knows,
he knows he‘s over the legal limit, he knows he‘s impaired,
he knows his normal faculties are impaired and that‘s why
he refuses to give a sample of his breath for testing.
In his closing argument, Kurecka offered the following explanation for
refusing to submit to a breath test:
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: The State wants you to believe and
wants you to use the evidence of the refusal to submit to
testing as an indication of guilt. I‘m sorry, that‘s not what
the evidence supports. Rubin asked Chuck Kurecka to
submit to the breath test. He asked him, something that
has a legal ramification. And, Chuck Kurecka made an
intelligent, rational, sober, request. I‘d like to talk to a
lawyer.
3
Now, whether he was or wasn‘t entitled to talk to a lawyer at
that point is not at issue here. What is at issue, is his state
of mind. I‘d like to talk to a lawyer. Did Rubin say to him,
sir you can‘t talk to a lawyer. You‘re not allowed to talk to a
lawyer? Did he say wait, let me go get a phone, you can talk
to whoever you want? No, he said nothing about it. And,
simply said if you refuse your license is suspended etcetera.
The jury found Kurecka guilty of DUI causing injury to person or
property.
State v. Power
James J. Power was arrested for DUI on December 23, 2000 after he
was stopped for speeding. He was taken to the Breath Alcohol Testing
Center for breath testing and questioning. In response to routine
booking questions and a request to submit to breath testing, Power
responded that he wanted a lawyer. He moved to suppress the questionand-answer session and his refusal to submit to breath testing.
At the hearing on Power‘s motion to suppress, the state played a
videotape of the events that took place at the breath testing facility. The
video recording showed that Sergeant Gray asked Power, a former police
officer, his name, current address, date of birth, and height and weight.
To each question Power responded either, ―I want a lawyer‖ or simply ―A
lawyer.‖ Then the following exchange took place:
Q: All right. I am now requesting you to submit to a true
test of your breath for the purpose of determining your
alcohol content? Will you submit to the breath test?
A: Lawyer.
Q: Lawyer? That means no, right?
A: Get a lawyer.
Q: Okay. I‘m gonna assume that by not saying yes you‘re
saying no, you want a lawyer.
A: A lawyer.
Q: Am I correct in what I‘m assuming?
A: A lawyer, yes.
The sergeant read the implied consent law to Power and advised him
of the consequences of refusing the test, including suspension of his
license and admission of his refusal as evidence in any criminal
proceeding. Sergeant Gray did not repeat his request for Power to take
the breath test; however, he interpreted Power‘s actions as a refusal to
4
submit to breath testing. The officer then read Power his Miranda rights.
After ascertaining that Power understood them, he asked him if he
wanted to answer any questions. Power shook his head to indicate a
negative response, and when asked if he had anything to add, he stated,
―Yea, I want a lawyer.‖
At a continuation of the suppression hearing, Sergeant Gray testified
that Power was not read Miranda warnings before his arrest or before the
request for a breath test. He said that he knew Power was not entitled to
counsel prior to submitting to breath testing, but acknowledged that he
did not advise Power of this fact when he requested counsel. Sergeant
Gray testified that Power was briefly employed as a police officer;
however, he did not know the length of Power‘s law enforcement service
or the extent of his training and experience.
The trial court granted Power‘s motion to suppress. First, the court
ruled that the question-and-answer session that followed the Miranda
warnings had to be suppressed because Power had previously invoked
his right to counsel. Then, as to Power‘s refusal to submit to breath
testing, the court stated the following:
There is no question that Defendant, in the Instant Cause,
made his belief that he was entitled to counsel known to
Sergeant Gray. However, it is equally without question that
Sergeant Gray did not cause Defendant‘s incorrect belief.
Thus, the Court must determine if a mistaken belief in the
right to counsel prior to breath testing, not created by law
enforcement but made known to law enforcement, results in
the suppression of the refusal to submit to breath testing, if
law enforcement does not correct the Defendant‘s mistaken
belief.
The Court believes this question can only be
answered in the affirmative.
The trial court, in essence, applied the confusion doctrine and expanded
it, reasoning that there was no logical basis for distinguishing between
defendants who were confused by law enforcement and those whose
internal confusion was left uncorrected by law enforcement. The court
then certified the following as a question of great public importance:
DOES A DEFENDANT‘S MISTAKEN BELIEF IN THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL PRIOR TO BREATH TESTING, NOT CREATED
BY LAW ENFORCEMENT, BUT MADE KNOWN TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT, REQUIRE THE SUPPRESSION OF THE
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BREATH TESTING IF LAW
5
ENFORCEMENT DOES NOT CORRECT THE DEFENDANT‘S
MISTAKEN BELIEF?
We answer the question in the negative and reverse the order
suppressing Power‘s refusal to submit to the breath test.
Analysis
―A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is clothed with a
presumption of correctness on appeal, and the reviewing court must
interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived
therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court's
ruling.‖ State v. Hebert, 8 So. 3d 393, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing
State v. Manuel, 796 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). In this case,
the underlying facts are undisputed. Because there is no issue as to the
facts of this case, but rather a question of law, we apply a de novo
standard of review to the court‘s application of the law to the facts. Id.
It is well-settled in Florida that a person arrested for DUI does not
have the right to consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit
to a breath test. Nelson v. State, 508 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
(citing State v. Hoch, 500 So. 2d 597, 599–600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
(holding that (1) administration of a breath test is not a critical stage of
the proceedings to which a Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches;
(2) the results of a breath test are physical evidence—not testimonial—
and thus no Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches; and (3) because
an accused has no right to refuse to take the test–—only an option to
refuse—there can be no denial of due process)); State v. Burns, 661 So.
2d 842, 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (holding that a defendant‘s refusal to
submit to a breath test is admissible because administering a breath test
and having a defendant perform a field sobriety task on videotape are
―nothing more than the collection and preservation of physical evidence .
. . and do not constitute a crucial confrontation requiring the presence of
defense counsel‖).
The issue debated here is whether a DUI suspect, who exhibits a
mistaken belief that he has a right to consult with counsel before
deciding whether to take the breath test, is entitled to have his refusal to
take the test excluded as evidence of consciousness of guilt when law
enforcement failed to correct his misunderstanding, or confusion, even
though the confusion was not created by law enforcement.
Under a judicially created exclusionary rule, known as the ―confusion
doctrine,‖ ―a licensee‘s refusal to submit to [a] breath test will be excused
6
if, due to a prior administration of the Miranda warnings, the licensee
believes that he or she had the right to consult with counsel prior to
taking a breath test.‖ Ringel v. State, 9 Fla. Supp. 678a (Fla. 18th Cir.
Ct. 2002). The doctrine is usually invoked by drivers as a defense to a
license suspension or revocation. In most instances, the drivers assert
that, because the police officer contemporaneously advised them of their
Miranda rights (right to refuse interrogation and to have an attorney
present at all stages of an interrogation) and read them the requirements
and sanctions of the implied consent law, they believed that they could
consult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to breath testing.
They contend that they should not be held strictly accountable for
refusing to take a breath test and suffer a license suspension or
revocation when the officer confused them about their right to counsel.
See, e.g., Calvert v. State, 519 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1974).
The confusion doctrine has been adopted by courts in several states
and considered by a few courts in Florida. Florida courts that have
applied the doctrine have rendered conflicting opinions on its
applicability and scope. See Ringel, 9 Fla. Supp. 678a; State v. Alves, 3
Fla. Supp. 553a (Fla. Orange Cty. Ct. 1995); Wymer at 113a. The only
Florida district court to consider the concept did so in the context of a
license suspension administrative hearing. See Dep’t of Safety & Motor
Vehicles v. Marshall, 848 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). In Marshall,
the fifth district did not decide whether the confusion doctrine existed in
Florida. It determined only that the evidence in that case did not
support the licensee‘s claim that she was told by police that she could
consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to a breath
test. Consequently, the court quashed the circuit court‘s decision to
reverse an administrative final order of driver‘s license suspension.
As the eighteenth circuit noted in Ringel, courts that have addressed
the confusion doctrine have done so with mixed results, from outright
rejecting it to liberally applying it to excuse a defendant‘s refusal to
submit to a breath test when law enforcement failed to affirmatively
advise the driver that Miranda rights do not apply to the decision to take
the test. The defendants in this appeal seek application of the doctrine
to exclude evidence of their refusal at trial. According to the defendants,
confusion over one‘s rights, regardless of the source, negates
―consciousness of guilt,‖ which is the evidentiary basis for admitting the
refusal.
In Ringel, the driver sought certiorari review of an order of the
Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles upholding the
suspension of his license for refusal to submit to a breath test. He
7
testified at his formal review hearing that he did not take the breath test
because he thought he was entitled to an attorney prior to deciding
whether to take the test, due to the previously administered Miranda
warnings. The arresting officer had given him Miranda warnings at the
scene and then later read the implied consent warning at the police
station before he refused to take the test.
The circuit court found persuasive the reasoning of those jurisdictions
that excused the refusal to submit to the test when the accused was
confused about his rights by the actions of a law enforcement officer and
actually conveyed that confusion to the officer. The court observed as
follows:
Generally these jurisdictions require the licensee to express
confusion about his or her rights when asked to take a
breath test, typically by requesting consultation with an
attorney first. If the licensee does express confusion, law
enforcement must explain to the licensee that Miranda rights
do not apply to the decision to take a breath test and that
the licensee is not entitled to speak to an attorney prior to
deciding whether to take the test. If law enforcement does
not provide this explanation and the licensee testifies that he
or she refused to take the test because of the mistaken
impression that he or she could do so without suffering
adverse consequences, due to the prior administration of the
Miranda warning, then the refusal will be deemed to be
unknowing and involuntary and will not be held against the
licensee.
Ringel, 9 Fla. Supp. 678a.
Incorporating this approach
procedures, the circuit court stated:
into
Florida‘s
implied
consent
In Florida, a licensee is given the implied consent warning
prior to being requested to submit to a breath test. If, after
receiving the implied consent warning, the licensee is still
confused about the applicability of Miranda rights to the
decision to take a breath test, the licensee should make that
confusion known to law enforcement, so that law
enforcement is aware that further explanation is necessary.
Id.
8
In Ringel, however, because the driver did not testify that he
communicated his confusion to law enforcement, the court found that
his refusal to take a breath test should not be excused. The court
therefore denied his petition.
In Alves, the county court found that the confusion doctrine applied
to the facts in that case because the defendant was read his Miranda
rights, emphatically requested the opportunity to speak to a lawyer when
he was requested to take a breath test, and it was never explained that
the Miranda rights previously read were not applicable to the implied
consent procedure for the breath test. The circuit court explained that
―[i]f a defendant is led to believe by State action that he/she is taking a
‗safe harbor‘ by taking a certain course of conduct, the exercise of such
action by the defendant is inadmissible at trial.‖ Id. (citing South Dakota
v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983)). The court further stated that the
defendant did not demonstrate consciousness of guilt since he was led to
reasonably believe that he was exercising a right that did not actually
exist. Id.
In Wymer, the county court distinguished the facts in Alves and held
that the confusion doctrine was limited to situations where the defendant
is advised of his Miranda rights ―and is then given implied consent
advice, and when he thereafter asks for counsel, is told that he has no
right to counsel with respect to this breath test, after having been told he
has a right to counsel before making any statements.‖
Other states that have adopted the confusion doctrine, at least as a
defense to license suspension or revocation, include Alaska, California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, and
Pennsylvania.1 Because some states recognize that the juxtaposition of
the Miranda warnings (right to refuse interrogation and to have an
attorney present at all stages of an interrogation) with the implied
consent warnings (no right to refuse a test) is likely to induce confusion,
they require that law enforcement always advise a defendant that the
rights contained in the Miranda warnings do not apply to the
See, e.g., Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211 (Alaska 1981); Calvert v. State, 519
P.2d 341 (Colo. 1974); McDonnell v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 45 Cal. App. 3d
653 (1975); Rust v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 267 Cal. App. 2d 545 (1968); State
v. Severino, 537 P.2d 1187 (Haw. 1975); State v. Beckey, 192 N.W.2d 441
(Minn. 1971); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 211 N.W.2d 906 (Neb. 1973); Rawlings v.
Police Dep’t of Jersey City, N. J., 627 A.2d 602 (N.J. 1993); Ehrlich v. Backes,
477 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1991); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp. v. O’Connell, 555
A.2d 873 (Penn. 1989).
1
9
breathalyzer examination; others require that law enforcement do so only
if the defendant actually exhibits confusion.
In the State of Washington, so long as the defendant is advised that
his refusal will lead to license suspension, the confusion doctrine does
not apply. See State v. Staeheli, 685 P.2d 591 (Wash. 1984). Illinois has
likewise chosen not to adopt the confusion doctrine because the wording
of the Illinois implied consent statute does not require that a refusal to
submit to a breath test be made with full knowledge of the defendant‘s
rights and the possible consequences. People v. Mucha, 488 N.E.2d 1385
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986). Similarly, Mississippi has decided not to adopt the
confusion doctrine because its implied consent statute does not require a
knowing refusal; confusion is immaterial as to the defendant‘s rights
once implied consent is read. Sheppard v. Miss. State Highway Patrol,
693 So. 2d 1326 (Miss. 1997).
Here, the defendants urge us to follow the approach of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, which expanded the confusion doctrine to require
police officers to inform suspects who request a lawyer that the right to
counsel does not apply to their decision to submit to breath testing.
Power notes that, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court,
Miranda warnings have become part of our national culture. As such, he
argues, if a suspect incorrectly requests counsel even though Miranda
rights have not been read, law enforcement should be required to advise
suspects that Miranda rights do not apply to the taking or refusal of a
breath test. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth,
Department of Transportation v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (Pa. 1989), held
that police officers have a duty to issue a warning that Miranda rights do
not apply to the implied consent setting. The court stated:
where an arrestee requests to speak to or call an attorney, or
anyone else, when requested to take a breathalyzer test, we
insist that in addition to telling an arrestee that his license
will be suspended for one year if he refuses to take a
breathalyzer test, the police instruct the arrestee that such
rights are inapplicable to the breathalyzer test and that the
arrestee does not have the right to consult with an attorney
or anyone else prior to taking the test.
Id. at 878.
The court explained that its holding was prompted by concern that
defendants confused by police conduct might be ―misled into making
uninformed and unknowing decisions to take the test.‖ Id. Later, the
10
Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended the requirement of the ―O’Connell
warning‖ to situations where defendants had not been confused by a
previous reading of the Miranda warnings. See Commonwealth, Dep’t of
Transp. v. Scott, 684 A.2d 539, 546 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth, Dep’t of
Transp. v. McCann, 626 A.2d 92, 93–94 (Pa. 1993). However, the
O’Connell line of cases spawned uncertainty and confusion in
Pennsylvania‘s implied consent laws and led to a flood of pre-trial
litigation and appeals. See State v. Reitter, 595 N.W.2d 646, 654 n.10
(Wis. 1999).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed with
Pennsylvania‘s expansion of the confusion doctrine, stressing that the
confusion doctrine is ―premised on a reading of Miranda rights and a
showing that the defendant actually was ‗confused.‘‖ Id. at 654. It went
on to explain that Wisconsin declined to adopt the confusion doctrine
because their implied consent statute does not require that police officers
advise suspects that the right to counsel does not attach in the implied
consent setting; it said it was unwilling ―to impose duties beyond those
created by the legislature.‖ Id. at 655. The Wisconsin court stated:
Requiring officers to address nonexistent rights undercuts
the ―simple and straightforward‖ approach and risks
confusing a potentially intoxicated defendant. If police move
beyond the consistent statutory procedures and attempt to
explain the law‘s parameters, defendants will ignite the
confusion defense. Explanations that exceed the statute‘s
language would case an ―oversupply of information‖ and
encourage ―misled‖ defendants to challenge an officer‘s
compliance with statutory requirements. This result would
frustrate the legislature‘s intention to facilitate drunk driving
convictions by offering defendants an avenue for litigating
which presumed rights merit inclusion in an officer‘s
explanation.
Id. at 655 (citing Ozaukee v. Quelle, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)
and Oregon v. Village of Bryant, 524 N.W.2d 635 (Wis. 1994)).2
Other states have rejected the Pennsylvania policy. Sheppard v. Miss. State
Highway Patrol, 693 So. 2d 1326, 1330 (Miss. 1997) (finding that implied
consent statute only requires that suspect be told of the consequences of his
refusal without discussion of his rights); People v. Mucha, 488 N.E.2d 1385,
1389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (same); Schroeder v. Nevada, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,
772 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Nev. 1989) (same); State v. Stewart, 649 S.E.2d 525 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting claim that suspect‘s confusion requires suppression of
his refusal to submit, explaining that to allow an intoxicated person to profess
an inability to comprehend the implied consent law and thereby escape
punishment for avoiding detection would render the law meaningless).
2
11
Similarly, Florida‘s implied consent statute does not require police
officers to advise persons arrested for DUI that the right to counsel does
not attach to their decision to submit to the breath test. The statute
requires only that the person be told that his failure to submit to the test
will result in a suspension of the privilege to drive for a period of time
and that a refusal to submit can be admitted at trial.3 The implied
consent statute establishes a presumption that those who have elected to
enjoy the privilege of driving will, in turn, be required to submit to
chemical testing if they are suspected of driving under the influence. See
§§ 316.1932, 316.1933, and 316.1934, Fla. Stat.; State v. Busciglio, 976
So. 2d 15, 19–20 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (explaining that by exercising the
privilege to drive, all drivers have already consented to taking a breath
test pursuant to section 316.1932). The licensed driver in Florida,
having already consented to the test, is thus not entitled to secure the
advice of an attorney. Accordingly, excluding evidence based on a
suspect‘s misconception about the right to counsel prior to taking the
breath test would be contrary to the legislative intent of Florida‘s implied
consent law.
As we have explained in the past, the purpose of judicially imposed
exclusionary rules is to ―deter police misconduct resulting in
constitutional violations, or its equivalent.‖ Rice v. State, 525 So. 2d 509,
511 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (holding that a deputy‘s decision not to offer the
defendant a pre-arrest breath test did not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation).
If a statute does not expressly list the
exclusionary rule as a remedy, the Florida Supreme Court will ―not infer
that this remedy is available for violations of the statute—regardless of
its effectiveness as a deterrent or how desirable or beneficial we believe
the exclusion may be.‖ Jenkins v. State, 978 So. 2d 116, 130 (Fla. 2008).
Courts must look at the terms of the statute at issue and the legislative
intent rather than to ―judge-made exceptions to judge-made rules‖ when
deciding whether to suppress evidence. Id. (citing Davis v. State, 529 So.
2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)). See State v. Gunn, 408 So. 2d 647,
649 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (explaining that ―[w]e find no legislative intent to
See State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 704–05 (Fla. 1995) (recognizing the
legislature‘s authority to enact statute that permits evidence of a driver‘s refusal
at any subsequent trial); State v. Bender, 382 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1980)
(recognizing compelling state interest in highway safety justifies suspension of
drivers‘ licenses for refusing to take breath test); Smith v. State, 681 So. 2d 894
(Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (recognizing that refusal to submit to chemical test after
reading of implied consent law is admissible).
3
12
impose a further sanction on the state by excluding as evidence the
results of a chemical test administered to a driver (who has not
affirmatively revoked the statutory consent) merely because of his not
being informed, prior to testing, of the consequences should testing be
refused.‖); State v. Iaco, 906 So. 2d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
(finding that suppression of physical evidence based on law
enforcement‘s intentional failure to read all the consequences of refusal
to submit to test was prohibited).
Here, the implied consent warnings read to the defendants did not
violate any statutory or constitutional provisions, and they were not
otherwise deficient so as to justify the extreme sanction of suppression.
Moreover, under the implied consent statute, a defendant is not
precluded from explaining to the jury his reasons for refusing to take the
breath test. The defendant can himself introduce refusal evidence, along
with other testimony concerning the circumstances of refusal, which may
militate in his favor and counter the state‘s consciousness-of-guilt
argument. See Commonwealth v. Ruttle, 565 A.2d 477 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989). A defendant can testify, as did Kurecka, that he refused to take
the breath test—not to conceal evidence of his alleged intoxication—but
because he believed he was wrongfully denied the right to first consult
with an attorney.
Conclusion
Our research has not yielded any clear indication that the confusion
doctrine is a recognized exclusionary rule or defense to a license
suspension in Florida. And though we might agree that the confusion
doctrine could properly be applied in circumstances where law
enforcement created a defendant‘s confusion about the right to counsel
for breath testing, the cases before us do not present those
circumstances. Here, the undisputed facts show that the defendants‘
confusion was not officer-induced. The arresting officers did not advise
the defendants of their Miranda rights before or during their reading of
the implied consent law.
As discussed above, our implied consent statute does not obligate a
police officer to advise an accused that the right to counsel does not
apply to the breath test setting. However, we see no harm in placing a
minimal burden on officers to briefly explain this to suspects who
request counsel when asked to submit to a breath test. Such an
explanation would clear up a suspect‘s confusion and ensure that
refusals admitted into evidence at trial are, in fact, knowing and
voluntary refusals that show ―consciousness of guilt.‖ We believe that
13
responsible police practice ―should lead professional, courteous officers
to advise insistent defendants that the right to counsel does not apply to
chemical tests. Where a driver repeatedly asks to speak with an
attorney, it would be courteous and simple for the officer to correct the
accused‘s mistaken assumptions.‖ Reitter, 595 N.W.2d at 655.
Of course, we cannot impose duties beyond those created by the
legislature. The implied consent statute was enacted to assist in the
prosecution of drunk drivers. Determining whether informing a suspect
that he does not have the right to an attorney for breath testing
purposes—as part of the implied consent warning—supports or
frustrates the goal of gathering evidence for these cases is a matter for
the legislature to decide.
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment of conviction
in Kurecka v. State, 4D08-2154, and reverse the order of suppression in
State v. Power, 4D08-3221.
HAZOURI, J., and BEACH, MARCIA, Associate Judge, concur.
*
*
*
Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit, Palm Beach County; Timothy McCarthy, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502007AP900052AXXXMB and James L. Martz, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502008AP900038AXXXMB.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Patrick B. Burke, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for Appellant Charles Kurecka
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Celia A. Terenzio,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for Appellee State of
Florida (Case No. 4D08-2154).
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Celia A. Terenzio,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for Appellant State of
Florida (Case No. 4D08-3221).
Ira D. Karmelin, West Palm Beach, for Appellee James J. Power.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
14
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.