C.A. v. Department of Children and Families, State of Florida
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
July Term 2009
C.A.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D08-3394
[July 22, 2009]
CORRECTED OPINION
FARMER, J.
The father was killed in an automobile accident before his appeal of
an order terminating his parental rights (TPR) as to his daughter could
be submitted to this court for a final decision on the merits. The State
agency, DCF, duly filed a notice of his death. It’s notice advises that
even if the final judgment of TPR were soundly based and affirmed, it
may not now be in the best interests of the child to do so. DCF points
out that a TPR may have adverse legal consequences for her in regard to
any interest she may have in a wrongful death action related to her
father’s death. Regional Conflict Counsel representing the father on the
appeal argues we should either determine the merits and reverse the
judgment, or instead abate the appeal in the manifest best interests of
the child.
The death of a party to an appeal before review occurs arises in other
legal contexts. For example, in criminal cases the death of the defendant
before appellate review does not erase the presumably correct conviction
by the trial court. State v. Clements, 668 So.2d 980 (Fla. 1996) (holding
that upon death of criminal defendant, appeal of conviction may be
dismissed but ma y not b e abated ab initio, that the death of the
defendant does not extinguish a presumably correct conviction and
restore the presumption of innocence which the conviction overcame).
The paramount concern here is the State’s interest in vindicating its
criminal laws b y punishing offenders. Id. On the other hand, the
conviction may have adverse consequences against the defendant’s
estate. Therefore upon a proper showing the court may allow the appeal
to proceed to finality. If good cause is not demonstrated, the court may
then dismiss — but not abate — the appeal. Id.
Similarly, in dissolution of marriage (DOM) cases when dissolution
has been bifurcated from the other issues, the death of one of the parties
has no effect on the judgment dissolving the marriage itself even though
there are collateral matters still undecided. Gaines v. Sayne, 764 So.2d
578 (Fla. 2000) (fact that matters collateral to issue of dissolution remain
unresolved should not alter court’s unchallenged finding that marriage is
irretrievably broken). The death of the party does not divest the court of
jurisdiction to decide the remaining issues between the parties. Id. The
collateral consequences as to the remaining issues between the parties —
division of property and other financial matters — can still be addressed
by the trial court in spite of the death. Barnett v. Barnett, 768 So.2d
441, 442 (Fla. 2000) (death of party after entry of judgment of dissolution
did not affect decree or divest court of jurisdiction to decide remaining
issues between the parties).
Neither the criminal nor DOM rule is an exact fit for this TPR case. We
do observe, however, that in both criminal and DOM cases the court was
careful not to allow the presumption of validity of the judgment to inflict
adverse consequences on collateral property interests. We must not
forget that the overriding concern in TPR cases is for the best interests of
the child, not the parents. § 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2008) (in TPR cases court
shall consider the manifest best interests of the child). The State
initiates TPR proceedings, not to punish parents who fail to meet their
obligations to the child, but to protect the child and her interests.
The term best interests of the child is broad enough to encompass
property interests of the child related to her natural parent. See, e.g.,
D.L.S. and J.S., v. L.R.G., 345 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 1984) (reversing denial of
motion to vacate TPR order after death of child, because no interest of
child is served by having a TPR order remain in force after death of child
a n d vacation of TPR furthers substantial rights of natural father
regarding burial rights, selection of personal representative, and
distribution of property in intestate estates). A final judgment ending
this father’s parental rights might be presumed correct for purposes of
beginning the process of deciding the merits on full appellate review. But
the State’s interest in vindicating judgments presumed correct must give
way to that paramount concern, the best interests of the child, especially
as to collateral property rights related to her father that might be lost by
upholding a final judgment terminating his parental rights.
At this point, we have only the final judgment and the record leading
to that judgment. As with criminal and DOM cases, the death of the
father should not render moot the jurisdiction of either this court or the
trial court as to the collateral property rights affected by the death. We
hold that the father’s death at this point in the legal proceedings does not
prevent the courts from assessing whether, considering the best interests
of the child, a judgment terminating the parental rights of the father
should be made final in spite of collateral consequences. At this point,
we have no basis or any record on which to determine whether a final
decision on the merits of TPR would be in the child’s best interests if it
would adversely affect an interest relating to a wrongful death of the
father. Rather than rendering TPR moot, the death of the father simply
raises new issues as to whether termination is in her best interests.
We therefore conclude instead, as suggested by ORC, that it is now in
the best interests of the child to abate this appeal and relinquish
jurisdiction to the trial court to make that decision in the first instance.
The trial court is authorized to reopen the case, take such additional
evidence as may be relevant to that issue and, based on all the evidence
before the court, re-enter a judgment on the petition as to whether in
light of his death it is in the child’s best interests to enter a final order
terminating the father’s parental rights.
Appeal abated; jurisdiction relinquished to trial court for further
proceedings.
HAZOURI and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.
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Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; John A. Frusciante, Judge; L.T. Case No. 94-2980
CJDP.
Philip Massa, Regional Counsel, J. Patrick Reynolds, Assistant
Regional Counsel and Debbie Maken, Legal Intern, Office of Criminal
Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel for the Fourth District, West Palm
Beach, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Thomas B. Arden,
Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
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