Archbishop John Favalora v. Sidaway
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
July Term 2008
ARCHBISHOP JOHN FAVALORA, as Archbishop of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Miami, a corporation sole,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN SIDAWAY,
Respondent.
Nos. 4D08-3210 & 4D08-3211
[December 3, 2008]
PER CURIAM.
In separate petitions, one for a writ of certiorari and the other for a
writ of prohibition, John Favarola, Archbishop of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Miami (“the Archdiocese”), a corporate sole, seeks to
quash an order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint and to prevent
the lower court from continuing to assert jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
complaint. Because both petitions assert that the trial court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, we have consolidated them for extraordinary
writ consideration.
The petitions contend that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the
Fourth Amended Complaint because the complaint raises issues
concerning the scope of authority of an agent of the Archdiocese, who
served as the Archdiocese’s representative in settling a prior claim
brought b y the plaintiff. In this case, the plaintiff alleges that the
Archdiocese fraudulently induced him to settle his claim by promising to
implement reforms which the Archdiocese never planned to implement
and which cannot be enforced. Plaintiff further alleges that the agent
may have lacked authority to enter into all the terms of the settlement
agreement and bind the Archbishop or Archdiocese.
The Archdiocese moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the
allegations concerning th e agent’s delegated powers are matters of
internal church governance, over which a civil trial court h a s no
jurisdiction. We disagree and deny the petitions. The mere fact that this
case may require inquiry into the applicable church law does not
constitute “excessive entanglement” under the First Amendment. As
explained by the Florida Supreme Court in Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347
(Fla. 2002), neither the First Amendment, nor the religious autonomy
principle, bars consideration of secular tort claims brought by third
parties against a religious institution. The underlying suit will not
require the circuit court to resolve any ecclesiastical dispute of religious
doctrine or governance. Here, though questions regarding the scope of
the agent’s authority may require some examination of church law, this
in no way interferes with the Archdiocese’s religious autonomy over its
internal affairs. The lower court is not being called upon to resolve any
disputed intra-organizational issue of governance, and th e plaintiff’s
secular tort claims are not barred by the First Amendment. See also
Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 944 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
(explaining that the First Amendment does not bar tort claims).
Nothing in this case suggests that the circuit court is poised to
substitute its interpretations of church law for those of the religious
organization and usurp the autonomy of the Archdiocese’s government.
In fact, the issue in this case involves far less “entanglement” in internal
church affairs than the negligent hiring and supervision claims found
constitutionally permissible in Malicki.
The Archdiocese’s policies
regarding the scope of its agent’s authority to enter into settlement
agreements has nothing to do with religious belief or practice. Inquiry
into these matters neither furthers nor inhibits any particular religion,
nor does it interfere with anyone’s right to freely exercise religion.
A First Amendment violation does not occur any time a case requires
a court to examine church law or policies. See Malichi v. Archdiocese of
Miami, 945 So. 2d 526, 529 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (explaining that “[t]he
subject of a priest’s employment relationship with his church is not per
se barred by the church autonomy doctrine”). The Archdiocese is not
immune from suit merely because it is a religious organization. Indeed,
such immunity and preferential treatment for a religious organization
might itself violate the Establishment Clause. Here, the Archdiocese
cannot evade justice and obtain de facto immunity by refusing to explain
the scope of its agent’s authority and, thereby, attempt to force the court
to adjudicate a matter of church law. Although courts are required to
accept a religious body’s pronouncements of its internal laws and cannot
adjudicate matters purely within the religious organization’s authority, c
courts are not forbidden from examining a religious organization’s
internal laws or structure, especially where the inquiry is relevant to a
third party’s purely secular tort or contract claims. Malicki, 814 So. 2d
at 355-357. See also Malachi, 945 So. 2d at 529 (explaining that “the
nature of a priest's employment relationship with his church may be
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explored when a third party seeks damages from a church based on the
priest's alleged tortious actions”).
Accordingly, we deny the petitions with prejudice.
WARNER, STEVENSON and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
*
*
*
Petitions for Writ of Certiorari and Prohibition from the Circuit Court
for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; John J. Hoy,
Judge; L.T. Case No. CA02-7631AG.
Michael A. Millen and Anne C. Sullivan of Gaebe, Mullen, Antonelli,
Esco & DiMatteo, Coral Gables, and J. Patrick Fitzgerald of J. Patrick
Fitzgerald, P.A., Coral Gables for petitioner.
Sheldon D. Stevens, Merritt Island, and Jack Scarola of Searcy,
Denny, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., West Palm Beach for
respondent.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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