Clarke v. State
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
July Term 2006
MICHAEL CLARKE,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
No. 4D05-1077
[November 15, 2006]
KLEIN, J.
We withdraw our opinion filed on September 20, 2006 and replace it
with this opinion.
Appellant was convicted of kidnapping and aggravated assault. The
only issue he raises which has merit is whether Bahamian convictions
were qualifying offenses for a habitual offender sentence. The state did
not establish that the three Bahamian crimes, which were the basis for
the harsher sentence, had elements which were similar to Florida
offenses and were punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, as
is required by section 775.084(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2003).
Appellant argues that, on remand, the state should not be given a
second opportunity to prove that appellant qualifies for a habitual
offender sentence, but recognizes that in this district we have allowed the
state a second opportunity. Rivera v. State, 877 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th
DCA), rev. denied, 888 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2004) and cases cited.
He argues that we should follow Collins v. State, 893 So. 2d 592 (Fla.
2d DCA 2005), rev. granted, 929 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2006), in which the
second district held that, where the defendant specifically objects to the
sufficiency of the proof of the prior convictions at sentencing, the state
does not have another opportunity to prove the qualification for habitual
offender sentence on remand. Collins is somewhat distinguishable
because, in the present case, the objection was not raised until
defendant filed a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion while the appeal was pending.
That motion was deemed denied under the rule, because the trial court
failed to rule on it within sixty days.
It appears from our opinion in Rivera that the defendant did not
object at the sentencing hearing, but did raise the issue in a rule
3.800(b)(2) motion which was denied. In Rivera we remanded and gave
the state another opportunity to prove the requirements for a habitual
offender sentence.
This court has also given the state the same
opportunity on remand even where the defendant did raise the objection
at the sentencing hearing. Osborne v. State, 820 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2002); Cameron v. State, 807 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
We have also allowed a defendant, on resentencing, to raise an issue
he did not previously address involving victim injury points on his
scoresheet. Altman v. State, 756 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), in
which we explained:
Appellant has not addressed the fact that he did not raise
this issue when he first appealed his convictions, even
though that is why the trial court denied him relief. We do
note that it is well established in death penalty cases that
resentencing is an entirely new proceeding. Phillips v. State,
705 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 1997). The closest authority we can
find which is not a death penalty case is Baldwin v. State,
700 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). In Baldwin the defendant
had not attacked the state's proof of his prior convictions at
his original sentencing, but he attempted to challenge them
at his resentencing. The trial court held that the issue had
been waived, but the second district reversed and held that
he was entitled to a de novo sentencing hearing. We followed
Baldwin in Mills v. State, 724 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998). Based on these authorities and, because it appears
that there may have been a change in the law involving
sexual contact, we conclude that the trial court should have
allowed appellant to raise this issue at his resentencing.
Although we have concluded that this case is not in direct conflict
with Collins, we recognize that they are similar in the sense that the
sentencing issue was not being raised for the first time on appeal. In
Collins, as we said earlier, it was raised at the sentencing hearing, and in
the present case it was raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion during the
appeal, before the filing of the initial brief. We have accordingly decided
that we should certify the issue as one of great public importance so that
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our supreme court will have the opportunity to decide this frequently
arising question, if Collins, which was orally argued September 21, 2006,
does not address it. We certify the following question as one of great
public importance:
WHERE THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE
PROOF OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS AT THE SENTENCING
HEARING, BUT DOES TIMELY RAISE THE OBJECTION IN A
RULE 3.800(b)(2) MOTION, DOES THE STATE, AFTER
REVERSAL
OF
THE
SENTENCE,
HAVE
ANOTHER
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS?
We affirm the convictions, but reverse and remand for resentencing.
WARNER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
*
*
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Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 0404679CF10A.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin,
Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Laura Fisher
Zibura, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
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