Hamilton v. Ford Motor Company
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
July Term 2006
DONALD H. HAMILTON and CHERI B. HAMILTON,
Appellants,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
Appellee.
No. 4D04-4955
[September 1, 2006]
ON MOTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION
MAY, J.
We grant the parties’ motions for clarification, withdraw our prior
opinion, and substitute this opinion in its place. The plaintiffs appeal an
attorney’s fees judgment raising multiple issues. We reverse in part, and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The plaintiffs initiated an arbitration proceeding against Ford Motor
Company alleging their new truck was defective. The Arbitration Board
denied relief. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint alleging claims under
the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, section 681.112, Florida
Statutes (2002) [Florida Lemon Law Act] and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310.
On June 12, 2003, the defendant served an offer of judgment on the
plaintiffs in the amount of $100,000. The plaintiffs rejected the offer.
The jury subsequently rendered a verdict for the plaintiffs of $76,240 on
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim. Following the verdict, the
defendant filed the offer of judgment with the trial court.
The plaintiffs then moved to compel the defendant to repurchase the
vehicle and brand the title as a “lemon.” They also moved for attorney’s
fees, seeking a lodestar amount of $152,227 and a 2.5 multiplier. On
March 29, 2004, the trial court “denied” the plaintiffs’ motion to compel
in part, awarding them equitable relief in the form of access to the motor
vehicle at the dealership for the purpose of removing it.
At the hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs,
each side presented expert testimony. The plaintiffs’ expert testified that
a reasonable hourly rate was $300 - $400 per hour, the total number of
hours expended (408) was reasonable, and a multiplier of 1.5 to 2.5 was
appropriate. The defendant’s expert testified to a reasonable hourly rate
of $200 - $250 per hour. He further opined that if the fees stopped
accruing on the date the offer of judgment was served, then 111 hours
was reasonable, of which “probably 70 to 80 percent might have been
recoverable.” Analyzing the number of hours through the date of the
hearing, however, he opined that 250 hours would have been reasonably
expended.
The trial court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a multiplier finding
“that Plaintiffs were not substantially prevailing parties under the . . .
[Florida] Lemon Law.” It found time spent by plaintiffs’ counsel traveling
and performing “ministerial and clerical” tasks should be deducted from
the documented hours. When the court signed the order, however, it left
the space provided for the number of reasonable hours blank. The trial
court then found $250 per hour to be a reasonable hourly rate.
The order also contained the following paragraph:
F. The Court finds persuasive the testimony of Defendant’s
expert witness, Glen Goldsmith, Esquire, that the offer of
judgment has the effect of cutting off attorney fees from the
date of said offer, when Plaintiffs would have been better off
accepting the offer of judgement than going through with the
litigation of their claim. Thereby, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs’ counsel costs and expenses from the date of the
offer of judgment forward should be borne by Plaintiffs’
counsel.
Ford’s written offer of judgment/proposal for
settlement of June 12, 2003, would have made the plaintiffs
whole thereby, attorney fees incurred after said offer of
judgment do not accrue, since a party cannot continue to
incur attorney fees after a legitimate offer of settlement.
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. DeSalvo, 748 So. 2d 941, 943 (Fla.
1999).
The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $75,000 in attorney’s fees and
costs “accrued up to the time [the defendant] served the Offer of
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Judgment.” The trial court disallowed any costs and expenses covered in
the overhead of the law office, and denied attorney’s fees for time
expended in litigating the fee issue.
Each party filed a motion for clarification. The trial court then
rendered a new order. In the new order, the trial court found 300 hours
to have been reasonably expended on the case.
The plaintiffs first suggest the trial court erred in not awarding
attorney’s fees for the full 408 hours requested because they prevailed on
both their Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Florida Lemon Law Act
claims. We disagree. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides:
If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under
paragraph (1) of this subsection, he may be allowed by the
court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the
aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys’
fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court
to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in
connection with the commencement and prosecution of such
action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine
that such an award of attorneys’ fees would be
inappropriate.
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (2002) (emphasis added).
“As suggested by the statutes, an award of attorneys’ fees is not
automatic; rather, the party seeking fees bears the burden of proving
that the fee request is reasonable by submitting evidence to support the
hours worked and the rates charged.” Hines v. Chrysler Corp., 971 F.
Supp. 212, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citation omitted); Gill v. Bluebird Body
Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1268-69 (M.D. Ga. 2005). Similarly, under
the Florida Lemon Law Act, “[t]he court shall award a consumer who
prevails in such action the amount of any pecuniary loss, litigation costs,
reasonable attorney’s fees, and appropriate equitable relief.”
§681.112(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added). In other words, these
statutes allow for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, they do not
mandate an award equal to that requested by the consumer.
The plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred in relying on an
improperly filed offer of judgment and improperly admitted expert
testimony in deciding the amount of attorney's fees. We agree that the
defendant should not have filed the rejected offer of judgment because
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the plaintiffs' recovery was not 25% less than the offer. See § 768.79(1),
Fla. Stat. (2002).1 We also agree that the court should not have admitted
the defense expert’s testimony concerning the rejected offer of judgment.
And, it is clear from paragraph F. of the order that the court referenced
not only the wrongly filed offer, but the defense expert’s testimony. For
these reasons, the order must be reversed.
The plaintiffs’ third argument concerns whether fees can be awarded
for time spent litigating the issue of attorney’s fees. They argue that the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act controls state law in this area and entitles
them to attorney’s fees incurred in litigating the fee issue. We agree.
Federal courts “have consistently held that attorneys may be
awarded, under statutory fee authorizations, compensation for the
expenses of and time spent litigating the issue of a reasonable fee [i]. e.
for time spent on the fee application and successful fee appeals.”
Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis
added). The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is a fee authorization statute.
The plaintiffs may therefore recover attorney’s fees for time spent on
litigating this issue.2
The use of the word “may” indicates the trial court has discretion in
awarding such fees. Here, the order simply stated the court “denie(d)
Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees expended litigating the issue of
attorneys’ fees.” It is unclear if the trial court denied the plaintiffs’
request because it believed it did not have the discretion to award
attorney’s fees for time spent litigating the issue of a reasonable fee or
because it simply denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees for
litigating this issue. Upon remand, the trial court may revisit this issue
should it choose to do so.
The defendant offered the plaintiffs $100,000. The jury awarded them
$76,240. This rendered the offer of judgment inadmissible. § 768.79(8), Fla.
Stat. (2002).
1
In Florida, generally, “statutory fees may be awarded for litigating the issue
of entitlement to attorney’s fees but not the amount of attorney’s fees.” State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 1993). As the total
number of hours expended is not broken down between the Florida Lemon Law
and the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, the plaintiffs may be entitled to the
hours spent in litigating the fee issue as they relate to the Magnuson Moss
Warranty Act claim.
2
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The plaintiffs next claim the trial court erred in adopting the
defendant’s proposed order for attorney’s fees and that the order was
inconsistent with the court’s prior rulings. See Perlow v. Berg-Perlow,
875 So. 2d 383, 384 (Fla. 2004). As we are reversing and remanding the
case, this issue is now moot.
The plaintiffs next argue the trial court incorrectly found they were
not the substantially prevailing party in their Florida Lemon Law Act
claim and that they are entitled to a multiplier. The defendant argues
the plaintiffs were not the substantially prevailing party under the
Florida Lemon Law Act because the trial court specifically denied their
requested equitable relief.
The test for determining the substantially prevailing party is “whether
the party succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Padow v.
Knollwood Club Ass’n, 839 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the plaintiffs sought to
have the defendant repurchase the motor vehicle and notify the
Department of Motor Vehicles of the repurchase. See §§ 681.104(2)(a),
681.114(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). The trial court denied this relief, but
allowed the plaintiffs access to the defendant’s dealership to retrieve the
vehicle. Because the plaintiffs did not prevail in their requested relief,
they were not the substantially prevailing parties on their Florida Lemon
Law Act claim.
And last, the plaintiffs argue, and the defendant agrees, the trial court
erred in failing to award costs under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty and
Florida Lemon Law Acts, and interest on the attorney’s fees judgment.
Upon remand, the trial court should address these issues.
Reversed and Remanded.
STONE and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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*
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Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; John D. Wessel, Judge; L.T. Case No. CA-02-9878-AH.
Rebecca J. Covey of Rebecca J. Covey, L.L.C., Fort Lauderdale, for
appellants.
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Wendy F. Lumish and Alina Alonso of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, for
appellee.
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