D04-2271-Shimkus v. State of Florida, Dept., etc.
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
January Term 2005
LARRY E. SHIMKUS,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD,
Appellee.
No. 4D04-2271
[June 15, 2005]
KLEIN, J.
We withdraw our previously filed opinion and substitute it with the
following.
Florida has a Construction Industry Recovery Fund, which, in general
terms, reimburses people who have unpaid judgments against builders
who have been found liable on specified types of claims. In this case
nine home buyers recovered judgments against the insolvent builder, a
corporation, and were reimbursed by the fund. The statute provides for
license suspension until the fund is repaid by the licensee, but appellant
contends that his license should not have been suspended because the
judgments were only against the corporation. We disagree and affirm.
Appellant, a licensed residential contractor, agreed with Thomson
Homes, Inc., that he would serve as its qualifying agent under section
489.119, Florida Statutes (2003). The statute requires corporations
engaged in construction to have licensed individuals serving as their
qualifying agents. Appellant and Thomson agreed he would supervise
construction, and in return receive a salary and part of the profits.
During a several month period while appellant was told by Thomson that
no activity was occurring, Thomson took deposits, started construction,
and then went out of business.
Nine home buyers obtained judgments against Thomson Homes, were
unable to collect, and obtained reimbursement from the fund. The
licensing board then suspended appellant’s license until he reimbursed
the fund. Appellant argues that his license should not have been
suspended, because the judgments were not against him, but rather
against Thomson Homes. He rests his argument on section 489.143(7),
Florida Statutes (2003) which provides:
(7) Upon the payment of any amount from the Construction
Industries Recovery Fund in settlement of a claim in
satisfaction of a judgment or restitution order against a
licensee as described in s. 489.141(1), the license of such
licensee shall be automatically suspended, without further
administrative action, upon the date of payment from the
fund. The license of such licensee shall not be reinstated
until he or she has repaid in full, plus interest, the amount
paid from the fund. A discharge in bankruptcy does not
relieve a person from the penalties and disabilities provided
in this section. [e.s.]
The administrative law judge interpreted the emphasized language to
require that judgments, as well as restitution orders, must be against the
licensee, in order for there to be a suspension. The board reversed and
held that the statute did not require that the judgment be against the
licensee.
Appellant’s argument that the judgment must be against the licensee
ignores other provisions in the statute. We must, however, read all parts
of the statute together in order to achieve a consistent whole. T.R. v.
State, 677 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1996).
The legislative intent expressed in section 489.140(a), describes the
purpose of the fund as being to reimburse any person “adjudged by a
court of competent jurisdiction to have suffered monetary damages, or to
whom the licensee has been ordered to pay restitution by the board.”
Section 489.143(7), on which appellant relies, refers to licensees
described in section 489.141(1), and that provision describes a person
eligible to seek recovery against the fund as a person who:
[H]as received a final judgment in a court of competent
jurisdiction in this state in any action wherein the cause of
action was based on a construction contract or the
Construction Industry Licensing Board has issued a final
order directing the licensee to pay restitution to the claimant
based on a violation of s. 489.129(1)(g), (j), or (k), where the
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contract was executed and the violation occurred on or after
July 1, 1993…
It is obvious that restitution orders can only be against licensees,
because it is only the licensee who is under the control of the Board.
This provision, however, does not require that the judgment be against
the licensee.
Section 489.129(1) authorizes disciplinary action (revocation or
suspension of license) if the business organization for which the
contractor is a primary qualifying agent (licensee) is found guilty of
abandoning a construction project.
Section 489.1195(1)(a) makes
qualifying agents for a business organization jointly and equally
responsible for supervision of all operations of the business organization
including field work and financial matters.
Under these statutes it is clear that the legislature intended to
compensate aggrieved homeowners who obtain judgments in
circumstances where the activities of the qualifying agent violate section
489.129(1), which is what occurred in this case. We accordingly agree
with the board that, reading the statute as a whole, there is no
requirement for a judgment to be against a licensee in order for the
suspension to be imposed in this case.
Although it is unnecessary to our conclusion, it is worth noting that
normally a contracting entity is not the individual holding the license,
but rather a corporation. Under those circumstances the homeowner
may not be able to sue the licensee, who is not a party to the contract.
Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp., 644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994). Given the risky
nature of the business, and the protection offered by the corporate
structure, requiring that the judgment be against the licensee, who can
only be an individual, would, in most cases, make the suspension
provision meaningless.
We have considered the other arguments raised by appellant and find
them to be without merit. Affirmed.
GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.
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Appeal from the State of Florida, Department of Business &
Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board; L.T.
Case Nos. C99-189, C00-54, C00-82, C00-83, C00-138, C00-157,
C00204, C01-62, C01-100.
Bruce G. Kaleita of Bruce G. Kaleita, P.A., West Palm Beach, for
appellant.
Gail Scott Hill, Tallahassee, for appellee.
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