UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. CONNIE ANDREW and WILLIAM ANDREW, individually and for the Estate of DUSTIN ANDREW
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Appellant,
v.
CASE NO. 1D06-5893
CONNIE ANDREW and WILLIAM
ANDREW, individually and as
Personal Representatives of the
Estate of Dustin Andrew, deceased,
Appellees.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed July 31, 2007.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Columbia County.
E. Vernon Douglas, Judge.
Susan L. Kelsey of Anchors Smith Grimsley, Tallahassee; Eric P. Gibbs of Hannah,
Estes & Ingram, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
Rebecca Bowen Creed and Tracy S. Carlin of Mills & Creed, P.A., Jacksonville, for
Appellees.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING,
REHEARING EN BANC, AND CERTIFICATION
THOMAS, J.
This cause is before us on Appellant’s motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc,
and certification. We deny the motion for rehearing en banc and certification, but
grant the motion for rehearing in order to clarify that there was no evidence presented
to demonstrate that Appellant’s university ("university") operated the hospital in
question. Our opinion on the merits remains unchanged. Accordingly, we withdraw
our opinion of May 31, 2007, and substitute this opinion in its place.
The underlying action here is a wrongful death suit alleging medical negligence
by a radiologist employed by Appellant at Shands at Lake Shore, Inc. (“the hospital”).
Appellant moved for change of venue, arguing that because the university used only
some of its employees to provide radiology services at the hospital, and did not
establish a branch campus, venue in Columbia County is inappropriate under section
768.28(1), Florida Statutes (2005). The trial court denied Appellant’s motion. On
appeal, Appellees established that the university's presence in Columbia County meets
the statutory requirements; therefore, venue is proper. We affirm.
Section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides:
In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution, the
state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives
sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified
in this act. Actions at law against the state or any of its agencies or
subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money damages . . . may be
prosecuted subject to the limitations specified in this act. Any such
action may be brought in the county where the property in litigation is
located or, if the affected agency or subdivision has an office in such
county for the transaction of its customary business, where the cause of
action accrued. However, any such action against a state university
board of trustees shall be brought in the county in which that university's
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main campus is located or in the county in which the cause of action
accrued if the university maintains therein a substantial presence for the
transaction of its customary business.
(Emphasis added.) We are asked to interpret whether the university maintains a
“substantial presence for the transaction of its customary business,” which is an issue
of first impression.
The plain meaning of a statute is the first and paramount consideration of
statutory construction. Capers v. State, 678 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1996). Only when a
statute is of doubtful meaning should the courts resort to extrinsic interpretive aids.
Id. We acknowledge that because this is a legislative waiver of sovereign immunity,
any ambiguity must be strictly construed in favor of Appellant and against Appellees.
See Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. K. E. Morris Alignment Serv.,
Inc., 444 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 1983) (“A waiver of sovereign immunity . . . should
be strictly construed in favor of the state and against the claimant.”). However, we
find no ambiguity here.
Although the key terms in section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes, are not defined,
the words have common and ordinary meanings that lead to clear and unambiguous
results. See Donato v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2000) (holding that
where the legislature has not defined terms that it uses in a statute, the terms must be
construed according to their common and ordinary meanings). If a university
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maintains a substantial presence in a particular county and transacts its customary
business in that county, an action against that university’s board of trustees may be
brought in that county under the plain language in section 768.28(1), Florida Statutes.
Appellant argues that the only way this definition can be met is if a university
operates a “branch campus” in a foreign county. In support of this argument,
Appellant attacks both prongs of the statutory test. Appellant first argues that in order
to prove a “substantial presence” in a particular county, the presence of the university
in the foreign county must be compared to its presence in its home county. Appellant
next argues that the statutory exception only applies in those counties where the
university participates in all three of its “customary business” practices.1 Because the
university does not teach any students at the hospital in Columbia County, Appellant
argues that it is impossible to consider that the business conducted is “customary.”
When interpreting a statute, courts are not at liberty to add words to the statute
that were not placed there by the legislature. State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 111 (Fla.
2002). This is precisely what Appellant’s interpretation of the statute would do. The
fact that the university's contacts in the remote county may be less substantial than its
1
Appellant argues that Article IX, section 7(a) of the Florida Constitution
establishes that the “customary business” of a university is “to achieve excellence
through teaching students, advancing research and providing public service for the
benefit of Florida’s citizens.” Appellees do not dispute this premise.
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contacts in its home county is irrelevant. The statute clearly provides that any
“substantial” presence will qualify. The evidence presented below shows that in the
years preceding the alleged negligence, the university leased a building, hired
employees, billed millions of dollars in medical bills, and paid thousands of dollars
to vendors in Columbia County. Therefore, we agree with the trial court’s finding that
the university's presence in the foreign county is substantial.
As to Appellant’s second argument, its interpretation of the statute again
requires adding words to the statute. There is nothing in the provision that requires
the university to participate in all of its various “customary businesses” in order for
the exception to apply. If the legislature wanted to require this, it would have done
so. This court is without power to apply such a standard on its own. See Donato, 767
So. 2d at 1150-1151 (a court abrogates legislative power when it construes “an
unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its express terms
or its reasonable and obvious implications”).
Furthermore, as Appellees point out, the legislature used the term “branch
campus” in other statutes, including five provisions that were passed in the same
legislative session as the language in question. See §§ 1004.26, 1004.33, 1004.34,
1005.02, and 1009.24, Fla. Stat. (2002). There is no question the legislature could
have chosen that particular term again if it wanted to. Moreover, in reference to
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another, unrelated venue provision, this court has said, “‘Transaction of customary
business’ means that the business transacted in the county must be a part of the
corporation's usual or ordinary business and must be continuous in the sense of being
distinguishable from mere casual, occasional or isolated transactions.” Armstrong v.
Times Publ’g Co., 481 So. 2d 41, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (emphasis added). The
university’s business endeavors in Columbia County certainly were not mere casual,
occasional, or isolated transactions, and Appellant admits that at least some of its
university's ordinary business is conducted at the hospital. Accordingly, we hold that
the statutory exception applies and affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s
motion for change of venue.
AFFIRMED.
KAHN and POLSTON, JJ., CONCUR.
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