SEMINOLE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE and GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES v. FRANK JOHNSON
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
SEMINOLE COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE AND JOHNS EASTERN
COMPANY, INC.,
Appellants,
v.
CASE NO. 1D03-5334
FRANK JOHNSON,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed May 4, 2005.
An appeal from an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims.
Honorable Thomas G. Portuallo, Judge.
Barbara A. Eagan, Esquire, Danni Lynn Germano, Esquire, and Karen J. Cullen,
Esquire, of Broussard, Cullen, DeGailler & Eagan, P. A., Orlando, for Appellants.
Jack T. Keller, Esquire, Winter Park and Bill McCabe, Esquire, Longwood, for
Appellee.
ON MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTY
PER CURIAM.
We withdraw our previous opinion in this cause issued March 24, 2005, and
substitute the following therefor.
Appellants argue that the Judge of Compensation Claims (the "JCC") erred by
interpreting section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1999), providing a rebuttable
presumption for specified firefighters and state law enforcement officers, to include
county sheriff's deputies. The JCC found that claimant suffered a stroke caused by
hypertension and that claimant's hypertension was statutorily presumed to have been
accidental and suffered in the line of duty pursuant to section 112.18(1). We agree
with appellants that the amended 2002 version of the statute expanded the class of
people entitled to the statutory presumption and claimant was not entitled to that
presumption based on the 1999 statute. See Ch. 2002-236, § 3, at 1720, Laws of Fla.
(changing the classification to include "any" law enforcement or correctional officer
as statutorily defined).
However, we also agree with claimant's argument that the 2002 amendment was
a procedural enactment and should apply retroactively without regard to the date of
accident and injury. See Brown v. L.P. Sanitation 689 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla. 1st DCA
1997) (discussing section 440.15(13), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), which changed
a rebuttable presumption, and affirming the JCC’s ruling that the change in the law was
a procedural enactment because it affected the burden of proof). As in Brown, the
2002 amendment to section 112.18(1) changed only the procedure of establishing
entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits. Id. Claimant’s substantive right to
those benefits, or lack thereof, has remained unchanged since the date of his first
2
stroke.
Although the presumption should apply to claimant under the amended statute,1
the JCC did not address whether appellants rebutted the presumption with competent
evidence and, if so, whether there was evidence to establish that claimant's
hypertension was occupationally related. See e.g., Caldwell v. Div. of Ret., Florida
Dep't of Admin., 372 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1979); City of Temple Terrace v. Bailey, 481 So.
2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Therefore, we reverse the JCC's award of compensation
and remand for the JCC to address these issues pursuant to the amended statute.
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.
VAN NORTWICK, POLSTON AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
1
We reject appellants' evidentiary argument relating to claimant's prerequisite
physical examination under section 112.18(1) without further comment.
3
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