Leonard Luckey v. State
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
JANUARY TERM 2008
LEONARD LUCKEY,
Appellant,
v.
CASE NO. 5D06-3851
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
________________________________/
Opinion filed February 15, 2008
3.850 Appeal from the Circuit
Court for Volusia County,
R. Michael Hutcheson, Judge.
Leonard Luckey, Orlando, pro se.
Bill
McCollum,
Attorney
General,
Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.
LAWSON, J.
Leonard Luckey, appearing pro se, appeals the trial court's orders denying his
motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
The trial court summarily denied five of Luckey’s six postconviction claims, and denied
the last claim after conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the summary denial of
Luckey’s claims two, three, four, and five, without further comment. We reverse as to
Luckey’s other two claims, for the reasons explained below.
Luckey was charged by amended information with burglary of a dwelling with a
battery. He was tried by jury, convicted as charged and sentenced to natural life as a
Prison Releasee Reoffender (“PRR”).1 His conviction and sentence w
ere affirmed on
appeal. Luckey v. State , 876 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). A mandate was issued
on June 29, 2004.
Luckey filed his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850 on June 22, 2006. As his first issue, Luckey claimed that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to request that he receive a "further" mental health
exam, failing to tell the court that he was taking prescribed psychotropic medication
during the trial, and also failing to request that the court instruct the jury that he was
taking psychotropic medication pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.215.
We read Luckey’s claim as an attempt to assert that counsel was ineffective for allowing
Luckey to proceed to trial while incompetent, or for failing to pursue an available insanity
defense. The State pointed out and the trial court agreed that as to this claim Luckey
has not asserted in his motion that he actually was incompetent to proceed to trial or
insane at the time of his offense. We agree that that the claim was therefore facially
insufficient.
Cf. Gillis v. State, 807 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (recognizing
postconviction relief movant's conclusory allegations that he was incompetent to plead
guilty to robbery, unsupported by any corroborating evidence, was insufficient to state a
claim for relief); Baker v. State , 404 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (holding a motion
by a prisoner asserting, as basis for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, his
own mental incompetence at time of trial, in general terms with no corroboration and no
1
§ 775.082(9), Fla. Stat. (2003).
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evidence of confirmation did not warrant or mandate evidentiary hearing on motion for
postconviction relief).
However, the Florida Supreme Court has recently ruled that a defendant who
files a legally insufficient rule 3.850 motion should be given at least one opportunity to
correct the deficiency, unless it is apparent that the defect cannot be corrected. See
Spera v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S680, --- So.2d ----, 2007 WL 3196507 (Fla. Nov. 1,
2007), rehearing denied, No. SC06-1304, ---So.2d ---- (Fla. Dec. 26, 2007). Although
the trial court denied Luckey’s motion prior to the issuance of Spera, this case was in the
appellate “pipeline” when Spera was decided. Therefore, Spera applies. See Smith v.
State, 598 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.1992).
In his sixth claim, Luckey contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to warn him that he faced a mandatory term of life imprisonment as a PRR if he rejected
the State's fifteen-year plea offer in favor of going to trial. An evidentiary hearing was
held on the matter.
Our review of the transcript of this hearing raises substantial
competency concerns that the trial court should have addressed before proceeding
further. At the start of the proceeding, Luckey claimed that he did not understand why
he was in court or what was going on. He offered to plea guilty to whatever charges he
was there to address, and repeatedly noted that he had just been transported from the
“psych” unit. When questioned about whether he had any discussions with his trial
counsel about plea offers by the State or whether he recalled any discussion about
being a PRR, Luckey stated that he did not recognize his trial counsel, James Caldwell,
who was present at the hearing. Luckey could not recall going to trial on a burglary
charge, and claimed to be unaware that he had received a life sentence. Luckey also
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repeatedly informed the court that he was taking medication for his mental condition,
and asked if he could come back to court after taking his medication – when he might be
able to understand what was going on and why he was there.
Under these
circumstances, the trial court should have ordered a competency evaluation before
proceeding with an evidentiary hearing on Luckey’s claim. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210; see
also, Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 186-88 (Fla. 2005) (recognizing trial courts are to
order competency hearings whenever it appears necessary based on the defendant's
history or behavior in court); Molina v. State, 946 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
(holding a trial court's failure to order a competency hearing on its own motion whenever
it has reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is not competent to proceed
constitutes an abuse of discretion).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Luckey’s claims two, three, four
and five, and reverse its denial of the other two claims.
We remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
TORPY and COHEN, JJ., concur.
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