Coalition on Homelessness v. City of San Francisco, No. 23-15087 (9th Cir. 2024)
Annotate this CaseThe United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, a coalition on homelessness and seven current or formerly homeless residents of San Francisco, who sought to prevent the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing any ordinance that punishes sleeping, lodging, or camping on public property. The plaintiffs argued that such enforcement violated the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, the defendants argued, for the first time, that the enforcement actions did not leave unhoused individuals with nowhere else to go, but instead required them to relocate from specific encampment sites and only at certain times. The Ninth Circuit deemed this argument waived as it was not brought up in the lower court and even if it was considered, the argument would not change the outcome as the defendants' enforcement of the laws were no narrower in scope than the laws at issue in prior cases, Martin v. City of Boise and Johnson v. City of Grants Pass. The court held that the defendants have yet to show that the preliminary injunction was improper based on the arguments and evidentiary record before the district court.
Court Description: Homelessness In an action seeking to prevent the City and County of San Francisco (“City”) from enforcing any ordinance that punishes sleeping, lodging, or camping on public property, the panel affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs on their Eighth Amendment claim as to the City’s new arguments regarding the geographic and time limitations of some of the enjoined ordinances, and in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in COAL. ON HOMELESSNESS V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 3 part for the district court to clarify the preliminary injunction as to the remaining issues.
The panel published its opinion to address the City’s contention—raised for the first time in this appeal—that the limited geographic scope of the encampment resolutions and the time-limited nature of one of the enjoined ordinances distinguishes this case from Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), and Johnson v. City of Grants Pass, 72 F.4th 868 (9th Cir. 2023). The City argued before the district court that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Eighth Amendment claim because the City offers shelters before requiring any unhoused person to vacate public property. On appeal, the City argued for the first time that the shelter offers were irrelevant because, unlike in Martin and Johnson, the challenged enforcement actions do not leave unhoused individuals with nowhere else to go—instead, they require individuals to relocate from specific encampment sites and only at certain times.
The panel determined that the City’s limited geographic scope argument was waived because the City conceded that it did not raise the argument before the district court. Even if the panel had discretion to review the argument, it declined to do so in the first instance, noting that the record was undeveloped, and the City had no excuse for failing to raise it below despite having ample opportunity to do so.
The panel next held that the City’s new argument did not establish a basis to reverse the district court. The enjoined laws were no narrower in scope than the laws at issue in Martin and Johnson, and the City’s assertion that it conducted encampment resolutions in a geographically limited way was a factual point that was contradicted by plaintiffs’ evidence. The panel concluded that at this stage, 4 COAL. ON HOMELESSNESS V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO the City had not shown that the preliminary injunction was improper based on the arguments and evidentiary record before the district court.
Finally, the panel declined to consider the City’s argument—again raised for the first time on appeal—that enjoining enforcement of San Francisco Police Code § 168 was improper because that provision is time restricted. Section 168 prohibits sitting or lying on a public sidewalk only “during the hours between seven (7:00) a.m. and eleven (11:00) p.m.” The panel held that evaluating the City’s new argument on appeal required factual developments that the panel currently lacked. Because the City’s attempts to distinguish this case from Martin and Johnson ultimately turned on factual questions, the panel was not inclined to reach these questions in the first instance.
Dissenting, Judge Bumatay stated that nothing in the text, history, and tradition of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause comes close to prohibiting enforcement of commonplace anti-vagrancy laws, like laws against sleeping on sidewalks and in parks. The district court’s broad injunction falls starkly outside the original meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, disregards the long history of anti-vagrancy laws, and broadly expands Martin and Grants Pass. It should be vacated immediately. COAL. ON HOMELESSNESS V. CITY & CNTY. OF SAN FRANCISCO 5
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