VICTOR WASHINGTON V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, No. 22-35320 (9th Cir. 2023)
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Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington a pro se action to challenge the denial of his claim for disability benefits by the Social Security Administration. A magistrate judge of that court, acting with the full civil authority of that court, reversed and remanded the matter to the agency for rehearing after the government conceded that there was an error in the agency’s adjudication. Plaintiff appealed that decision.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel considered whether the magistrate judge had authority to exercise the full civil jurisdiction of the district court over Plaintiff’s claim. There is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction over the case, but Plaintiff challenged whether he had given the consent that was required for a magistrate judge to exercise that jurisdiction. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the antecedent question of whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment on behalf of the district court. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that, as a pro se litigant, he believed he was consenting to the magistrate judge’s issuance of a report and recommendation, not a final judgment. The panel held that Plaintiff was fully informed of the district court’s conclusion that he had knowingly and voluntarily consented to the assignment to the magistrate judge. Further, the court wrote that Plaintiff was unable to show good cause or extraordinary circumstances to withdraw consent. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.
Court Description: Magistrate Judges / Social Security / Credit-as-True Rule The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denying Victor Washington’s application for disability benefits under the Social Security Act.
As a threshold matter, the panel considered whether the magistrate judge had authority to exercise the full civil jurisdiction of the district court over Washington’s claim. There is no doubt that the district court had jurisdiction over the case, but Washington challenged whether he had given the consent that was required for a magistrate judge to exercise that jurisdiction. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the antecedent question of whether the magistrate judge validly entered judgment on behalf of the district court.
The Federal Magistrate Act governs the jurisdiction and authority of federal magistrate judges. General Order (“G.O.”) 05-17 of the District Court for the Western District of Washington establishes procedures to solicit consent by those parties in those cases to the assignments to magistrate judges. If either party timely declines consent, the case is reassigned to a district court judge. After Washington filed a complaint challenging the ALJ’s decision in the Western District of Washington, the district court assigned the case Magistrate Judge Brian Tsuchida, who sent the parties a consent form. Neither party responded to the form by declining consent to the assignment by the stated date.
The panel held that the declination-of-consent form used in this case fulfilled the requirements of implied consent set forth in Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003), and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015). The form apprised Washington of the consequences of consent, the voluntary nature of consent, and the availability of a district judge upon declining consent. The form’s language was substantively similar to consent forms in other cases where this court held that a pro se plaintiff impliedly consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Washington also voluntarily proceeded with the litigation before the magistrate judge. It was only after the district court, by the magistrate judge, rendered a decision that Washington found unfavorable that he objected to the magistrate judge decision as a final order. Washington did not dispute that he received the notice and declination- of-consent form.
The panel rejected Washington’s contention that, as a pro se litigant, he believed he was consenting to the magistrate judge’s issuance of a report and recommendation, not a final judgment. The question here was whether Washington was sufficiently informed of his ability to decline assignment of his case to a magistrate judge for all purposes. By the time of his appeal, two separate orders, one by Chief Judge Martinez and the other by Magistrate Judge Tsuchida, had already discussed and rejected his objection to the exercise of the district court’s authority by the magistrate judge. The panel held that Washington was fully informed of the district court’s conclusion that he had knowingly and voluntarily consented to the assignment to the magistrate judge. The panel recognized that Washington did not have the benefit of representation by counsel, but this court has never held that pro se litigants were incapable of knowingly or voluntarily consenting to magistrate judge jurisdiction.
To the extent that Washington’s post-objection motions were construed as a motion to withdraw consent, the panel held that argument also failed. Washington was unable to show good cause or extraordinary circumstances to withdraw consent. The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Washington consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction.
Magistrate judge jurisdiction also requires that a district court specially designate a magistrate judge’s authority to enter a final order. The panel rejected Washington’s argument that the general orders of the Western District of Washington do not authorize the automatic assignment of magistrate judges for pro se plaintiffs in civil matters or social security cases. G.O. 05-17 approved the procedure outlined in the declination-of-consent form and applied it to all civil cases filed after June 1, 2017, that were randomly assigned to a U.S Magistrate Judge. The panel held that neither the general orders nor local rules contained a carveout for pro se plaintiffs. Accordingly, the district court specially designated the magistrate judge in this case with authority to enter a final order.
As to the merits of the appeal, Washington contended that the ALJ failed to properly consider his symptom testimony, his treating physician’s assessment concerning his risk of heart attack, and other evidence in the record. He requested under the “credit-as-true” rule that the court hold this evidence to be credible and remand to the Commissioner with instructions for an immediate award of benefits. Under the credit-as-true analysis, the court determines whether the record has been fully developed, whether there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a disability determination can be made, and whether further administrative proceedings would be useful. Because the ALJ found no severe impairments prior to the date last insured, the ALJ did not proceed past step two in Washington’s disability analysis. Step two is merely a de minimus screening device to dispose of groundless claims. The panel held that regardless of whether the evidence at issue is credited, outstanding issues must be resolved before a disability determination can be made. In addition, the district court properly identified contradictory evidence in the record appropriate for remand. The panel concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding to the Commissioner of Social Security to resolve the contested issues.
Concurring, Judge W. Fletcher wrote separately to encourage the district court, and other district courts in the same position, to revise consent forms for magistrate judge jurisdiction. The consent form in this case was easily understood by lawyers, but language could be added to the form to make its meaning crystal-clear to pro se litigants like Washington.
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