TELLEZ-RAMIREZ V. GARLAND, No. 22-1168 (9th Cir. 2023)
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Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2002. But in 2019, a jury convicted him of possessing methamphetamine, a controlled substance, with intent to deliver, in violation of Idaho Code section 37-2732(a)(1)(A). The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings in 2021, charging that Petitioner is removable (1) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an aggravated felony related to illicit trafficking in a controlled substance, and (2) under 8 U.S.C. Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for having been convicted of violating a state law relating to a controlled substance. Petitioner filed a motion to terminate proceedings, asserting that his conviction is neither for an aggravated felony nor for a crime related to a controlled substance. The immigration judge disagreed and ordered Petitioner’s removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner sought review of the final order of removal.
The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition. Applying the modified categorical approach, the panel concluded that Petitioner’s conviction record clearly documents that his conviction involved methamphetamine, a controlled substance under federal and Idaho law. The panel next concluded that the required mental state under federal and Idaho law—knowledge—is the same in all relevant respects: the defendant either must know what the substance is (even if the defendant does not know that it is controlled) or must know that the substance is illegal (even if the defendant does not know what the substance is).
Court Description: Immigration. Denying Omar Tellez-Ramirez’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that Petitioner’s conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver, in violation of Idaho Code section 37-2732(a)(1)(A), was a drug trafficking aggravated felony that made him removable.
Observing that the Idaho statute is overbroad as to drug type, the panel explained that the statute, plus Idaho precedent and model jury instructions, establish that it is divisible. Applying the modified categorical approach, the panel concluded that Petitioner’s conviction record clearly documents that his conviction involved methamphetamine, a controlled substance under federal and Idaho law.
The panel next concluded that the required mental state under federal and Idaho law—knowledge—is the same in all relevant respects: the defendant either must know what the substance is (even if the defendant does not know that it is controlled) or must know that the substance is illegal (even if the defendant does not know what the substance is).
Petitioner argued that Idaho’s definition of aiding and abetting is overbroad in that the Idaho definition includes solicitation, while the federal definition does not. Rejecting that contention, the panel explained that: 1) the Idaho definition of principals requires the commission of a completed crime (meaning that one who solicited an uncompleted crime could not be convicted of the crime of which Petitioner was convicted); 2) the presence of the word “solicit” in Idaho caselaw does not change the analysis, which requires a “realistic probability” that the state would punish conduct outside the generic definition; and 3) both definitions of accomplice liability require criminal intent to commit the crime and an act intended to facilitate the crime’s commission.
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