DOUGLAS CLARK V. RON BROOMFIELD, No. 21-99008 (9th Cir. 2023)
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Petitioner was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murders. He was also convicted of one count of mutilation of human remains and one count of attempted murder and mayhem. The jury found a multiple murder special circumstance allegation and sentenced Petitioner to death. The California Supreme Court reversed Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder and mayhem and affirmed Petitioner’s murder convictions and death sentence.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition challenging his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of first-degree murder. The panel held that Petitioner’s pre-AEDPA October 1992 pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an “actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by appointed counsel in April 1997. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the district court properly concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Petitioner’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court
Court Description: Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty. The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Douglas Clark’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of first-degree murder.
The panel held that Clark’s pre-AEDPA October 1992 pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an “actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits, and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by appointed counsel in April 1997.
The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court.
The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the district court also properly held that the purported August Faretta demand was equivocal.
The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that the trial court’s revocation of Clark’s pro per status during trial did not violate Faretta was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel wrote that the state court’s decision to consider Clark’s threat to “stand mute” before the jury in light of the record as a whole was not an unreasonable application of Faretta, which permits the termination of self- representation when a defendant deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.
The panel held that the district court properly concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Clark’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Under California law, a “Marsden motion” is typically based on a claim that the appointed counsel’s representation has in some significant measure fallen below the level required by the Sixth Amendment. The panel wrote that Clark’s assertion that an irreconcilable conflict existed with his lead counsel and that the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the conflict rose to a Sixth Amendment violation is foreclosed by Carter v. Davis, 946 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2019). The panel noted that Clark asserted only that his conflict with lead counsel “guaranteed an inadequate defense presentation,” but neither raised a claim of ineffective assistance nor identified a single act of ineffectiveness. The panel explained that (1) Clark’s request for a federal evidentiary hearing is precluded by Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011); (2) the request is also precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) because Clark failed to develop any additional facts at trial and solely raised the claim on appeal; (3) Clark did not allege facts that, if proven true, would entitle him to relief; and (4) because the Supreme Court has never recognized a Sixth Amendment claim based on an irreconcilable conflict in the absence of alleging ineffectiveness, a hearing would be futile.
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