KWANG PARK V. MERRICK GARLAND, No. 21-70623 (9th Cir. 2023)
Annotate this Case
Petitioner pleaded guilty to 13 drug-related charges, including possession of cocaine for sale under California Health and Safety Code Section 11351. In removal proceedings, the agency found Petitioner removable for having committed a drug-trafficking aggravated felony and for having committed a controlled-substance offense. Applying the presumption established in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002)—that drug-trafficking offenses are, particularly serious crimes—the agency concluded that Petitioner’s Section 11351 conviction was a particularly serious crime that barred withholding. The agency also denied CAT relief.
The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel explained that in Matter of Y-L-, the Attorney General instructed that aggravated felonies involving illicit drug trafficking are presumptively, particularly serious crimes and that this presumption may be overcome only in the most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and compelling. The panel noted that the BIA’s particularly-serious-crime analysis here was cursory but concluded that the BIA applied Matter of Y-L- ’s presumption and that the BIA’s decision was supported by adequate reasoning. Observing that neither the IJ nor the BIA recited the Matter of Y-L- criteria, the panel explained that they are not required to do so.
The panel further concluded that, even if it had found that the BIA erred by considering facts not expressly incorporated into Matter of Y-L-’s minimum standard, it would still deny Petitioner’s petition because it was a legal certainty that Petitioner could not satisfy Matter of Y-L-’s minimum criteria. Thus, the panel concluded that this was one of those narrow circumstances where remand was unwarranted.
Court Description: Immigration. Denying Kwang Park’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that the BIA applied the proper legal standard in denying withholding of removal and that the BIA properly denied relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
Park pleaded guilty to 13 drug-related charges, including possession of cocaine for sale under California Health and Safety Code § 11351. In removal proceedings, the agency found Park removable for having committed a drug- trafficking aggravated felony and for having committed a controlled-substance offense. Applying the presumption established in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270 (A.G.
2002)—that drug-trafficking offenses are particularly serious crimes—the agency concluded that Park’s § 11351 conviction was a particularly serious crime that barred withholding. The agency also denied CAT relief.
Addressing Park’s contention that the agency applied the wrong standard to its particularly-serious-crime determination, the panel explained that, in Matter of Y-L-, the Attorney General instructed that aggravated felonies involving illicit drug trafficking are presumptively particularly serious crimes and that this presumption may be overcome only in the most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and compelling. The panel noted that the BIA’s particularly-serious-crime analysis here was cursory, but concluded that the BIA applied Matter of Y-L- ’s presumption and that the BIA’s decision was supported by adequate reasoning. Observing that neither the IJ nor the BIA recited the Matter of Y-L- criteria, the panel explained that they are not required to do so. The panel also noted that the BIA considered facts not directly referenced in Matter of Y-L-’s minimum factors, but explained that those criteria were not exhaustive. The panel further concluded that, even if it had found that the BIA erred by considering facts not expressly incorporated into Matter of Y-L-’s minimum standard, it would still deny Park’s petition because it was a legal certainty that Park could not satisfy Matter of Y-L-’s minimum criteria. Thus, the panel concluded that this was one of those narrow circumstances where remand was unwarranted because the law dictates the outcome that the agency must reach.
As to CAT relief, Park alleged that the BIA committed multiple errors in denying such relief. First, Park argued that the BIA exceeded its regulatory authority by impermissibly engaging in predictive fact-finding. This argument was premised on the IJ’s misstatement that Park had not shown that he would be tortured on account of a protected ground. The panel rejected that contention, explaining that the BIA did precisely what it is required to do: it concluded that the IJ’s predictive factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and then considered whether those facts constituted torture and concluded that Park had not established it is more likely than not he will be subject to torture either for refusing to do or agreeing to perform military service, or due to his convictions in the United States. The panel also concluded that the BIA corrected the IJ’s misstatement of the legal standard for CAT relief, explaining that the BIA found that Park nonetheless failed to establish that it is more likely than not he will be tortured, regardless of the basis, upon his removal to South Korea. Thus, the panel concluded that the IJ’s legal error did not undermine its factual findings and was cured when the BIA applied the correct legal standard to the facts found by the IJ.
The panel also rejected Park’s contention that the BIA failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision, explaining that this argument was based on the mistaken view that the panel could review only the BIA’s decision. The panel concluded that, when read alongside the IJ’s multi-page CAT analysis, the BIA’s decision adequately conveyed the reasoning behind the denial of CAT relief.
Turning to the merits of Park’s CAT claim, the panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Park is unlikely to be tortured because of his California drug convictions. The panel explained that, generally, prosecution and punishment for criminal activity do not constitute torture. Further, the panel concluded that South Korea’s extraterritorial-jurisdiction law, allowing it to re-prosecute its citizens for crimes committed and punished outside of South Korea, is not inherently torturous. Nor was there any evidence that South Korea would apply its law more harshly to Park than to someone else similarly situated to him. Additionally, the panel concluded that the agency properly found that the possibility that South Korea may prosecute Park and impose harsh punishment for his California drug crimes is entirely speculative.
The panel also concluded that the agency’s determination that Park will not be tortured under South Korea’s military-conscription policy was supported by substantial evidence. The panel noted that news articles Park submitted demonstrate that some members of the South Korean military have had tragic experiences, including mistreatment and suicide. However, the panel explained that military conscription and punishment for evasion of military duty seldom constitute torture. The panel further explained that the record did not establish that South Korea’s decades- old conscription policy, which applies equally to all male citizens within the designated age range, is imposed with the intent of inflicting pain and suffering. The panel observed that the same was true of South Korea’s alternative to military conscription—three years of labor—which is equally available to anyone who wishes to avoid military service.
The panel also concluded that Park did not meet his burden to show that he would face a particularized risk of mistreatment from military conscription as a cultural outsider, and rejected Park’s claim that the agency failed to consider the aggregate impact of Park’s claimed risks of torture.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.