USSEC V. IMRAN HUSAIN, ET AL, No. 21-55859 (9th Cir. 2023)
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Defendant and his attorney created publicly-traded shell corporations and sold them to privately-held companies. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed suit against Defendants for violations of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and SEC Rule 10b5. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that Defendant had violated the securities laws and imposed equitable statutory remedies, including a civil penalty of $1,757,000. The district court found that, as a matter of undisputed fact, Defendant had received $1,757,000 in gross pecuniary gain from his violations and used that amount for the civil penalty. On appeal, Defendant challenged the amount of that penalty.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s imposition of the civil penalty. The panel held that Defendant’s declaration that legal fees of $287,500 were paid from the proceeds from the sale of five shell companies established a genuine issue of material fact whether such proceeds should be attributed to his—rather than his attorney’s—gross pecuniary gain. Because Defendant established a genuine issue of material fact whether he received or controlled the entire amount of the proceeds, the district court erred in finding on summary judgment that his gross pecuniary gain was $1,757,000. The panel further held that Defendant identified genuine issues of material fact on two additional factors that the district court considered in imposing the civil penalty: the degree of Defendant’s scienter and his recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct.
Court Description: Federal Securities Law The panel reversed the district court’s imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of $1,757,000 against Imran Husain in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s civil enforcement action against Husain and his attorney for violations of federal securities laws.
The district court held that Husain had violated federal securities laws and imposed equitable statutory remedies, including a civil penalty of $1,757,000.
The parties disagreed what standard of review applied to the factual findings which underlay the district court’s determination of the amount of the civil penalty in this case. The panel held that the Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 principles that applied to requests for injunctive relief and whether to assess a second-tier penalty for violation of the securities laws applied equally to the district court’s determination of * The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
the amount of a civil penalty. As with all relief under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, this court reviews the district court’s choice of remedy for abuse of discretion. But on a summary judgment motion, the district court can impose a civil penalty only if it determines that no genuine issues of material fact exist, and all factual uncertainty is resolved in favor of the non-moving party. The panel concluded that the district court necessarily abuses its discretion in granting summary judgment on the amount of a civil penalty if material issues of fact are in dispute.
Husain argued that the district court did not correctly determine the amount of his gross pecuniary gain under 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(d)(2), 78u(d)(3)(B). The district court determined that Husain’s gross pecuniary gain of $1,757,000 was undisputed. The panel held that Husain’s declaration that legal fees of $287,500 were paid from the proceeds from the sale of five shell companies established a genuine issue of material fact whether such proceeds should be attributed to his—rather than his attorney’s—gross pecuniary gain. Because Husain established a genuine issue of material fact whether he received or controlled the entire amount of the proceeds, the district court erred in finding on summary judgment that his gross pecuniary gain was $1,757,000.
The panel further held that Husain identified genuine issues of material fact on two additional factors that the district court considered in imposing the civil penalty: the degree of Husain’s scienter and his recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct. Ultimately, the district court may conclude that Husain’s statements are not credible and that the Assistant U.S. Attorney’s assessment in his criminal case was incorrect, but the district court erred in reaching such a conclusion on this record. The panel therefore reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the amount of the civil penalty, and remanded.
Dissenting, Judge Wardlaw wrote that the disputed facts that the majority identifies are relevant only if the statutes authorizing civil penalties are read to require that courts trace the final disposition of ill-gotten gains to each individual defendant. This is a misreading of the statutory text and the court’s precedent, which holds that defendants are liable for the funds they receive as well as the funds they distribute. Additionally, recent precedent forecloses the majority’s understanding that a district court should not weigh a defendant’s credibility on summary judgment under the civil penalty factors identified in SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980), especially on a record of admitted and undisputed violations of the securities laws. She would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in assessing an award of maximum civil penalties of $1,757,000 against Husain.
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