USA V. CYNTHIA MONTOYA, No. 21-50129 (9th Cir. 2022)
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Defendant argued that she should be able to withdraw her guilty plea at the sentencing hearing because the district court “rejected” the non-binding sentencing recommendation under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). She asserted that the district court erred by not allowing her to withdraw her guilty plea because it supposedly treated her plea agreement as a binding plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the criminal judgment. Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that Defendant had no right to withdraw her plea. Explaining that the district court’s use of “reject” in the context of Rule 11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement has no legal effect, the panel wrote that the “rejection” of a recommended sentence under a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) agreement could logically mean only that the court rejected the recommendation itself, and the district court thus did not plainly err in not providing Defendant an opportunity to withdraw her plea. The panel wrote that Defendant was permitted to withdraw her guilty plea before sentencing only if she could show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal and that she has not done so. The panel held that Defendant’s remaining arguments fail. The magistrate judge’s failure to specifically mention a “jury” trial during the plea colloquy, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(C), did not affect Defendant’s substantial rights. The district court properly considered and explained its reasons for rejecting Defendant’s variance requests. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 100-month sentence.
Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel affirmed a criminal judgment in a case in which Cynthia Leon Montoya, who pleaded guilty to importing cocaine and methamphetamine, entered a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B). Montoya argued that she should be able to withdraw her guilty plea at the sentencing hearing because the district court “rejected” the non-binding sentencing recommendation under Rule 11(c)(1)(B). She asserted that the district court erred by not allowing her to withdraw her guilty plea because it supposedly treated her plea agreement as a binding plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that Montoya had no right to withdraw her plea. Explaining that the district court’s use of “reject” in the context of a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) plea agreement has no legal effect, the panel wrote that the “rejection” of a recommended sentence under a Rule 11(c)(1)(B) agreement could logically mean only that the court rejected the recommendation itself, and the district court thus did not plainly err in not providing Montoya an opportunity to withdraw her plea. The panel wrote that Montoya was permitted to withdraw her guilty plea before sentencing only if she could show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal, and that she has not done so. UNITED STATES V. MONTOYA 3 Montoya argued that the district court erred by not orally announcing her standard conditions of supervised release at sentencing. Reviewing de novo, the panel held that the district court did not err. The panel explained that under United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), the district court need not orally pronounce conditions that are mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) or recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines as “standard, boilerplate conditions of supervised release.” The panel wrote that here the written judgment does not conflict with the oral pronouncement of the sentence, the court’s oral sentence necessarily included the standard conditions, and the district court did not violate Montoya’s right to be present when it imposed the standard conditions in the written judgment. The panel rejected Montoya’s contention that the discussion of standard conditions in Napier was dicta. Recognizing that the Napier framework conflicts with three other circuits’ analysis, the panel wrote that it cannot ignore circuit precedent even if it disagrees with it. The panel held that Montoya’s remaining arguments fail. The magistrate judge’s failure to specifically mention a “jury” trial during the plea colloquy, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(C), did not affect Montoya’s substantial rights. The magistrate judge properly determined that Montoya was competent and that her guilty plea was voluntary. The district court properly considered and explained its reasons for rejecting Montoya’s variance requests. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 100-month sentence. Concurring in the judgment, Judge Forrest wrote separately to say that to the extent this court’s decision in United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), holds that any condition of supervised release that is categorized 4 UNITED STATES V. MONTOYA as “standard” need not be orally pronounced as part of the judgment at sentencing, it was wrongly decided.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on December 14, 2022.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on September 13, 2023.
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