ARIZMENDI-MEDINA V. GARLAND, No. 21-298 (9th Cir. 2023)
Annotate this Case
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered by an immigration judge (IJ) to be removed from the United States after the IJ ruled that Petitioner’s application for relief from removal was untimely. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed with the IJ and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned for review, arguing that the rejection of his relief application violated his due process rights.
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that the IJ’s rejection of the opportunity to file a relief application on December 18 deprived Petitioner of a full and fair opportunity to be heard. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s immigration proceedings were fundamentally unfair because (1) the purported deadline to submit a relief application was ambiguous; (2) Petitioner’s counsel offered to submit the application on the day of the apparent deadline while the IJ was still on the bench, making any delay in the proceeding practically nonexistent; and (3) the IJ’s denial of a continuance so that Petitioner’s recently-retained counsel could submit the application was an abuse of discretion. The panel concluded that the IJ’s rejection of Petitioner’s application clearly affected the outcome of the proceedings and thus caused him prejudice because the merits of his application were never considered by the agency at all.
Court Description: Immigration The panel granted Andres Arizmendi-Medina’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal of an immigration judge’s determination that his asylum application had been abandoned because it was not timely filed, and remanded for consideration of his application for relief from removal.
After two continuances to secure legal representation, and a subsequent change of venue, Arizmendi-Medina appeared before an IJ who denied his request for an additional continuance to hire an attorney, found Arizmendi-Medina removable, provided him with an I-589 relief application, and set the next hearing date for December 18, 2018. The IJ explained to Arizmendi-Medina that if he returned to court on December 18 saying that he still needed more time to find an attorney, and that he was not able to fill out the asylum application, it was likely that the court would conclude that he had abandoned the opportunity to apply for asylum and related relief. The court provided Arizmendi-Medina a “Notice of Hearing,” which marked the December 18 hearing as a “Master” hearing as opposed to an “Individual” hearing.
Arizmendi-Medina appeared for his hearing on December 18 with a recently-retained attorney who requested a brief continuance to file Arizmendi-Medina’s relief application. The IJ informed Arizmendi-Medina’s attorney that the relief application was due that day. The government argued that the application should be deemed abandoned and the IJ agreed. Arizmendi-Medina’s attorney requested the opportunity to make a window filing, which would have allowed her to complete and submit the application before the court closed for the day. The IJ rejected the request, again stating that “the application was due today.” Arizmendi-Medina’s attorney then requested that the IJ allow her to submit the application while the IJ was still on the bench that day. This request was also rejected, with the IJ declaring that the application was due that morning. The IJ deemed Arizmendi-Medina’s relief application abandoned pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (now appearing at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(h)), and found that Arizmendi-Medina failed to establish good cause for a continuance given the previous continuances the prior IJ granted for him to locate an attorney.
The panel held that the IJ’s rejection of the opportunity to file a relief application on December 18 deprived Arizendi-Medina of a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Recognizing that IJs can set and extend time limits for the filing of applications, and that under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(h) applications that are “not filed within the time set by the [IJ] . . . shall be deemed waived,” the panel wrote that IJs in setting and enforcing deadlines cannot proceed in a manner that deprives a noncitizen of due process. The panel concluded that Arizmendi-Medina’s immigration proceedings were fundamentally unfair because (1) the purported deadline to submit a relief application was ambiguous; (2) Arizmendi-Medina’s counsel offered to submit the application on the day of the apparent deadline while the IJ was still on the bench, making any delay in the proceeding practically nonexistent; and (3) the IJ’s denial of a continuance so that Arizmendi-Medina’s recently-retained counsel could submit the application was an abuse of discretion. The panel concluded that the IJ’s rejection of Arizmendi-Medina’s application clearly affected the outcome of the proceedings, and thus caused him prejudice, because the merits of his application were never considered by the agency at all. The panel remanded for the agency to consider Arizmendi-Medina’s application in the first instance.
Dissenting, Judge Forrest wrote that IJ satisfied due process by giving Arizmendi-Medina sufficient notice of the application deadline and the consequences for failing to meet it, and the IJ did not abuse his discretion in deeming Arizmendi-Medina’s application abandoned when Arizmendi-Medina failed to meet the filing deadline. Further, Judge Forrest would not have considered the alternative unexhausted claim raised by the court sua sponte related to the IJ’s refusal to grant a further extension.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.