WILLIAM GILLIAM V. PORTER MCGUIRE KIAKONA & CHOW, No. 21-16097 (9th Cir. 2022)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED NOV 23 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT WILLIAM H. GILLIAM, Individually, as Personal Representative ESTATE VIVIAN T. LORD; and, as successor, a dissolved Hawaii Corporation, Pacific Rim Property Service Corporation, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 21-16097 D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00372-JMS-KJM MEMORANDUM* Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PORTER MCGUIRE KIAKONA & CHOW, LLP, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii J. Michael Seabright, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 15, 2022** Before: CANBY, CALLAHAN, and BADE, Circuit Judges. William H. Gilliam appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Gilliam’s requests for oral argument, set forth in the opening and reply briefs, are denied. dismissing for lack of standing his action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Meland v. WEBER, 2 F.4th 838, 843 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed for lack of standing Gilliam’s FDCPA claim because Gilliam failed to allege facts sufficient to establish an injury in fact as required for Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (explaining that constitutional standing requires an “injury in fact,” causation, and redressability; “injury in fact” refers to “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Gilliam’s action without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile). We reject as meritless Gilliam’s contention that he is the owner of the condominium property at issue in this action. Gilliam’s opposed motion for miscellaneous relief (Docket Entry No. 34) is denied. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining 2 21-16097 that arguments or allegations raised for the first time on appeal are not considered); United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that documents and facts not presented to the district court are not considered on appeal). AFFIRMED. 3 21-16097
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