MCLAUGHLIN V. OLIVER, No. 21-15806 (9th Cir. 2024)
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In this appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the appellant, Michael McLaughlin, challenged his state court convictions for attempted murder, battery, and burglary arising from a stabbing attack on multiple employees at a social services office in Nevada. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a defense of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent, a required element for the charges.
The district court denied McLaughlin's habeas corpus petition, but the Ninth Circuit initially vacated and remanded the decision. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court again denied relief, concluding that despite new evidence, the appellant's trial counsel had not provided ineffective assistance and that McLaughlin had not demonstrated prejudice.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, which clarified standards for considering new evidence in federal habeas proceedings, meant that the lower court was barred from considering any new evidence offered by McLaughlin. The Ninth Circuit found that McLaughlin's failure to present that evidence to the state courts "in compliance with state procedural rules" constituted a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) as construed by Shinn. The court also noted that under Shinn, it made no difference that McLaughlin's first post-conviction counsel's negligence led to that failure.
As McLaughlin conceded that he could not succeed on his ineffective assistance claim unless the new evidence was considered, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of McLaughlin's habeas petition.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Michael McLaughlin’s habeas corpus petition challenging his state court convictions for attempted murder, battery, and burglary arising from his stabbing attack on multiple employees at the Clark County Social Services office in Henderson, Nevada.
McLaughlin contended that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue a defense of voluntary intoxication with respect to the charges that required the State to prove specific intent.
The district court denied the petition, but this court vacated and remanded in an unpublished decision. In that decision, this court held that McLaughlin’s first state post- conviction counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in “fail[ing] to conduct any independent investigation of the claim” and that this consideration sufficed to establish cause and prejudice under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), to excuse the procedural default of failing to properly present the new evidence to the state courts. This court therefore concluded that the claim was subject to de novo review in federal court, and remanded for the district court to consider whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. Although 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2) generally bars consideration of new evidence that was not considered by the state courts, this court held that the bar of § 2254(e)(2) did not apply. This court held that McLaughlin had attempted to present the evidence to the state courts in his second post-conviction proceeding, and also that, under Ninth Circuit precedent, he should not be charged with the deficiencies of his first post-conviction counsel. In accordance with this court’s instructions, the district court on remand held an evidentiary hearing and received substantial evidence that had not been considered by the Nevada state courts when those courts rejected McLaughlin’s ineffective assistance claim on the merits. The district court again denied relief, and McLaughlin appealed.
In this appeal, the panel held that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022), has overruled the then-existing Ninth Circuit authority under which this court previously authorized the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to consider McLaughlin’s new evidence.
McLaughlin argued that he did not “fail[] to develop the factual basis” of his ineffective assistance claim “in State court proceedings” within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2), because he “attempt[ed]” to develop that claim by filing a successive state post-conviction petition that was rejected as procedurally barred.
The panel held that McLaughlin’s failure to present that evidence to the state courts “in compliance with state procedural rules” counts as a “fail[ure] to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings” under § 2254(e)(2), as construed in Shinn.
The panel held that, under Shinn, the fact that McLaughlin’s first post-conviction counsel’s negligence led to that failure makes no difference. The panel explained that Shinn’s holding that post-conviction counsel’s errors are imputed to the petitioner for purposes of § 2254(e)(2) is directly contrary to this court’s prior conclusion, in McLaughlin’s first appeal, that such imputation “makes no sense in the context of a claim rescued from procedural default by Martinez.” When (as here) § 2254(e)(2) applies and the petitioner cannot meet its requirements, a federal court may not consider new evidence to assess cause and prejudice under Martinez to excuse the procedural default in state court.
Because the negligence of McLaughlin’s first post- conviction counsel in failing to develop the state court is attributable to McLaughlin, there was a “fail[ure]” within the meaning of § 2254(e)(2) and the restrictions of that section therefore apply. Because McLaughlin conceded that he cannot meet the strict requirements of § 2254(e)(2), that section bars consideration of McLaughlin’s new evidence.
Accordingly, the panel could not consider McLaughlin’s new evidence or the augmented version of his trial- ineffective-assistance claim based on that evidence. It could only consider, through the deferential lens of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, whether the state court properly rejected McLaughlin’s original trial-ineffective-assistance claim. Here, however, McLaughlin conceded at oral argument that his habeas claim fails on the merits under AEDPA if § 2254(e)(2) bars consideration of his new evidence. Accordingly, McLaughlin’s habeas petition necessarily fails.
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