LARISSA WALN, ET AL V. DYSART SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL, No. 21-15737 (9th Cir. 2022)
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Plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate, a Native American tribe—asked the Dysart School District (“District”) to accommodate her religious practice by allowing her to wear an eagle feather on her cap during high-school graduation. The District declined the request on the ground that the policy permitted no exceptions. Plaintiff arrived at graduation wearing an eagle feather, and District officials prohibited her from attending. But that same day, as alleged in the complaint, the District permitted other students to wear secular messages on their graduation caps.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, asserting, among other things, that the District violated her rights to free exercise of religion and free speech by selectively enforcing its policy of prohibiting students from decorating their graduation caps.
The panel held that Plaintiff plausibly alleged, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that the District selectively enforced its policy, in violation of her First Amendment rights. As to the claim brought pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to assert that the District enforced its policy to permit the secular and forbid the religious. As alleged, the District’s policy was not enforced evenhandedly and, therefore, was not generally applicable.
Plaintiff also carried her burden at this stage to show that the District’s selective enforcement of its policy constituted impermissible viewpoint or content discrimination, in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The panel rejected the District’s argument that the restrictions were necessary in order for the District to comply with the Establishment Clause.
Court Description: Civil Rights. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting, among other things, that the Dysart School District, located in Phoenix, Arizona, violated plaintiff Larissa Waln’s rights to free exercise of religion and free speech by selectively enforcing its policy of prohibiting students from decorating their graduation caps. Waln—an enrolled member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Oyate, a Native American tribe—asked the District to accommodate her religious practice by allowing her to wear an eagle feather on her cap during high-school graduation. The District declined the request on the ground that the policy permitted no exceptions. Waln arrived at graduation wearing an eagle feather, and District officials prohibited her from attending. But that same day, as alleged in the complaint, the District permitted other students to wear secular messages on their graduation caps. The panel held that Waln plausibly alleged, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, that the District selectively enforced its policy, in violation of her First Amendment rights. As to the claim brought pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, Waln alleged sufficient facts to assert that the District enforced its policy to permit the secular and forbid the religious. Altered graduation caps—whether with a secular message or a religious symbol—presented a nearly identical threat to the District’s interests in maintaining the sanctity and formality of the graduation ceremony, avoiding disruption, and fostering unity in the graduating class. As alleged, the District’s policy was not enforced evenhandedly and, therefore, was not generally applicable. Whether Waln could prove those allegations was a matter for another day. Waln also carried her burden at this stage to show that the District’s selective enforcement of its policy constituted impermissible viewpoint or content discrimination, in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The complaint plausibly alleged a discrepancy in treatment on the basis of viewpoint and that the District enforced its facially neutral policy in a selective way. The panel rejected the District’s argument that the restrictions were necessary in order for the District to comply with the Establishment Clause. The District had not sufficiently met its burden to show that accommodating religious dress for an individual student would have any effect on other students’ rights. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Baker concurred in the judgment reversing as to Waln’s § 1983 claims for violations of her free exercise and free speech rights. Judge Baker respectfully dissented from the majority’s conclusion that these claims cleared the pleading standard enunciated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Nothing in Waln’s complaint tended to exclude the possibility that the student with the cap adorned with the secular message simply broke the rules. In Judge Baker’s view, the district court correctly determined that Waln’s complaint did not adequately allege plausible claims for relief under the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clauses based on selective enforcement. The district court erred, however, in declining to grant her leave to amend to correct these deficiencies.
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