BRIANNA BOLDEN-HARDGE V. CALIFORNIA STATE CONTROLLER, ET AL, No. 21-15660 (9th Cir. 2023)
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Plaintiff a devout Jehovah’s Witness, objected to California’s loyalty oath because she believed it would violate her religious beliefs by requiring her to pledge primary allegiance to the federal and state governments and to affirm her willingness to take up arms to defend them. he Controller’s Office rejected this proposal and rescinded the job offer. Plaintiff sued the Controller’s Office and the California State Controller in her official capacity, alleging violations of Title VII under both failure-to-accommodate and disparate-impact theories. She also asserted a failure-to-accommodate claim against the Controller’s Office under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and she alleged that the refusal by both defendants to accommodate her religious beliefs violated the Free Exercise Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
THe Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that, as currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s alleged injury was redressable only through a claim for damages. The panel held that she lacked the actual and imminent threat of future injury required to have standing to seek prospective relief on any of her claims, but she could attempt to cure this defect by amendment. The panel held that Plaintiff could seek damages from the Controller’s Office on her claims under Title VII. As currently pleaded, she could not obtain damages for her free exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The panel held, however, that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff leave to amend to seek damages from the State Controller in her individual capacity.
Court Description: Employment Discrimination / Free Exercise Reversing the district court’s dismissal of Brianna Bolden-Hardge’s complaint challenging a state employer’s refusal to allow a religious addendum to the public- employee loyalty oath set forth in the California Constitution, and remanding, the panel held that Bolden- Hardge stated claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act and was entitled to leave to amend her claims under the Free Exercise Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
Bolden-Hardge, a devout Jehovah’s Witness, objected to California’s loyalty oath because she believed it would violate her religious beliefs by requiring her to pledge primary allegiance to the federal and state governments and to affirm her willingness to take up arms to defend them.
When she was offered a position at the California Office of the State Controller, the Controller’s Office asked her to take the loyalty oath. She requested an accommodation to sign the oath with an addendum specifying that her allegiance was first and foremost to God and that she would not take up arms. The Controller’s Office rejected this proposal and rescinded the job offer. Bolden-Hardge returned to a lower- paying job at the California Franchise Tax Board, which then required her to take the oath but permitted her to include an addendum like the one that she had proposed to the Controller’s Office.
Bolden-Hardge sued the Controller’s Office and the California State Controller in her official capacity, alleging violations of Title VII under both failure-to-accommodate and disparate-impact theories. She also asserted a failure-to- accommodate claim against the Controller’s Office under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and she alleged that the refusal by both defendants to accommodate her religious beliefs violated the Free Exercise Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
Bolden-Hardge sought declaratory relief for all of her claims, and she sought damages for all of her claims except the California free-exercise claim.
The panel held that, as currently pleaded, Bolden- Hardge’s alleged injury was redressable only through a claim for damages. The panel held that she lacked the actual and imminent threat of future injury required to have standing to seek prospective relief on any of her claims, but she could attempt to cure this defect by amendment. The panel held that Bolden-Hardge could seek damages from the Controller’s Office on her claims under Title VII, which abrogates states’ sovereign immunity, and FEHA, which similarly subjects state employers to suits for damages. As currently pleaded, she could not obtain damages for her free- exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which does not provide a cause of action to sue state entities or state officials in their official capacities. The panel held, however, that the district court abused its discretion in denying Bolden-Hardge leave to amend to seek damages from the State Controller in her individual capacity.
The panel held that, because Bolden-Hardge had standing to seek damages on her claims under Title VII and FEHA, it had jurisdiction to consider the merits of those claims. The panel held that Bolden-Hardge pleaded a prima facie case of failure to accommodate religion under Title VII and FEHA by alleging that she held a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with the “faith and allegiance” component of the loyalty oath, which was an employment requirement. Assuming without deciding that accommodating Bolden-Hardge would violate the California Constitution, the panel held that the Controller’s Office could not rebut Bolden-Hardge’s prima facie case by arguing that violating state law would pose an undue hardship as a matter of law. The panel explained that the presumption of undue hardship applies only when accommodating an employee’s religious beliefs would require a private employer to violate federal or state law. Where the employer is part of the very state government that is responsible for creating and enforcing the law, and there is no indication that violating that law would subject the public employer to an enforcement action by another part of state government, deeming accommodation a presumptive undue hardship at the pleadings stage would permit states to legislate away federal accommodation obligations. The panel noted that the Third Circuit has similarly focused on the risk of enforcement in assessing undue hardship.
The panel held that Bolden-Hardge pleaded a prima facie case of disparate impact, which requires a plaintiff to (1) show a significant disparate impact on a protected class or group, (2) identify the specific employment practices or selection criteria at issue, and (3) show a causal relationship between the challenged practices or criteria and the disparate impact. The panel held that to satisfy the first prong of a prima facie case, the plaintiff need not support her claim with statistics where a disparate impact is obvious. The panel further held that, at this stage of the case, the Controller’s Office did not show that it was entitled to a business necessity defense.
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