JOSE FLORES-VASQUEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, No. 20-73447 (9th Cir. 2023)
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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal. He argues that the BIA erred in finding that his prior menacing conviction under Oregon Revised Statute Section 163.190 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”), rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal.
The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that a conviction under Oregon Revised Statute Section 163.190 does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The panel explained that in the BIA’s precedential decision in Matter of J-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 642 (BIA 2019), which held that Section 163.190 categorically qualifies as a CIMT, the BIA erred in its analysis of this court’s prior caselaw. The panel remanded for further consideration of Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal.
Court Description: Immigration The panel granted a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of an appeal of an immigration judge’s order denying petitioner Jose Luis Flores-Vasquez’s application for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
The panel held that a conviction under Oregon Revised Statute § 163.190 does not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). The panel explained that in the BIA’s precedential decision in Matter of J-G-P-, 27 I. & N.
Dec. 642 (BIA 2019), which held that § 163.190 categorically qualifies as a CIMT, the BIA erred in its analysis of this court’s prior caselaw. The panel remanded for further consideration of petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal.
In an unpublished disposition, the panel denied a petition for review as to the denial of asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Dissenting, Judge Baker disagreed with the majority’s determination that the BIA’s interpretation of a CIMT in Matter of J-G-P- conflicts with this court’s prior caselaw and is therefore unreasonable. Judge Baker would apply Chevron deference to Matter of J-G-P-, because the term “moral turpitude” is ambiguous, and the BIA’s construction of it is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
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