GIANG NGUYEN V. SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, No. 20-56284 (9th Cir. 2022)
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After the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against three Hispanic women during jury selection, Petitioner raised an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The trial court denied the challenge, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed on direct appeal. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a California state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition raising a Batson challenge to a jury conviction. The panel held that, even if a combined race and gender class such as Hispanic women is a cognizable group for purposes of Batson, that new rule would not apply to Petitioner’s case. The panel concluded that, under circuit precedent in Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001), and Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995), the recognition of a mixed race and gender class would be a new rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), bars the application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases that were final before the new rule was announced.
The panel further held that Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race alone because the totality of the circumstances, including a comparison between the prospective jurors the prosecutor struck and those he did not, did not raise an inference that race motivated the prosecutor to exercise a strike. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision on Batson step one was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of facts.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a California state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition raising a Batson challenge to a jury conviction. After the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against three Hispanic women during jury selection, petitioner raised an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The trial court denied the challenge, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed on direct appeal. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review. Batson holds that purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection violates a defendant’s right to equal protection, and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), holds that gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality. Under Batson, to determine when the use of peremptory strikes amounts to unconstitutional discrimination, the defendant first must make a prima facie showing that the totality of the circumstances gives rise to an inference of discrimination. Second, the burden shifts to the State to explain the exclusion. Third, the trial court evaluates the prosecution’s explanation for pretext and determines if the defendant established purposeful discrimination. For step one, to show a prima facie case: (1) the prospective juror must be a member of a cognizable group, (2) the prosecutor must use a peremptory strike to remove that juror, and (3) the totality NGUYEN V. FRAUENHEIM 3 of the circumstances must raise an inference that race or gender motivated the prosecutor to strike. The panel held that, even if a combined race and gender class such as Hispanic women is a cognizable group for purposes of Batson, that new rule would not apply to petitioner’s case. The panel concluded that, under circuit precedent in Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001), and Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995), the recognition of a mixed race and gender class would be a new rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), bars the application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to cases that were final before the new rule was announced. The panel further held that the petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race alone because the totality of the circumstances, including a comparison between the prospective jurors the prosecutor struck and those he did not, did not raise an inference that race motivated the prosecutor to exercise a strike. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s decision on Batson step one was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or an unreasonable determination of facts.
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