SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC, ET AL V. CITY OF COSTA MESA, ET AL, No. 20-55820 (9th Cir. 2023)
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The City of Costa Mesa (“City”) began amending its zoning code to reduce the number and concentration of sober living homes in its residential neighborhoods. Two of its new ordinances—Ordinances 14-13 and 15-11 (“Ordinances”)—made it unlawful to operate sober living homes without a permit. Appellants SoCal Recovery, LLC (“SoCal”) and RAW Recovery, LLC (“RAW”) (together, “Appellants”) operate sober living homes in Costa Mesa, California, for persons recovering from drug and alcohol addiction. Appellants alleged that two new City ordinances and the City’s enforcement practices discriminated against them on the basis of disability under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Granting the City’s motions for summary judgment, the district court found that Appellants did not establish that residents in their sober living homes were actually disabled, or that the City regarded their residents as disabled.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that Appellants and other sober living home operators can satisfy the “actual disability” prong of the ADA, FHA, or FEHA on a collective basis by demonstrating that they serve or intend to serve individuals with actual disabilities; they need not provide individualized evidence of the actual disability of their residents. Rather, they can meet their burden by proffering admissible evidence that they have policies and procedures to ensure that they serve or will serve those with actual disabilities and that they adhere or will adhere to such policies and procedures. prong of the disability definition.
Court Description: Disability / Housing The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Costa Mesa in cases in which plaintiffs-appellants (“Appellants”), operators of sober living homes for persons recovering from drug and alcohol addiction, alleged that two new City ordinances and the City’s enforcement practices discriminated against them on the basis of disability under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), * The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 3 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The ordinances, which made it unlawful to operate sober living homes without a permit, define sober living homes as group homes serving those who are “recovering from a drug and/or alcohol addiction and who are considered handicapped under state or federal law,” and define group homes as “facilit[ies] that [are] being used as a supportive living environment for persons who are considered handicapped under state or federal law.” Until the ordinances were adopted, the City did not regulate sober living homes differently from other residences. The ordinances required all sober living homes, including established homes, to be located more than 650 feet away from any other sober living home or any state-licensed drug and alcohol treatment center. No existing homes were grandfathered—i.e., if two operating sober living homes were within 650 feet of each other, one would have to cease operating as a sober living home. The ordinances did not address the criteria used to determine which home could remain, but provided that applicants could request reasonable accommodations from permit conditions and requirements, like the 650-foot requirement. Appellants submitted both permit applications and reasonable accommodation requests to the City so they could continue to operate their sober living homes, even those that were operating within 650 feet of other sober living homes or state-licensed drug and alcohol treatment centers. The City found that Appellants were operating sober living homes but denied some permits and reasonable accommodation requests because the homes were operating in violation of the new separation requirement. The City issued citations to Appellants for operating the sober living 4 SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA homes without approval, and filed state court abatement actions against Appellants. Granting the City’s motions for summary judgment, the district court found that Appellants did not establish that residents in their sober living homes were actually disabled, or that the City regarded their residents as disabled. The panel held that Appellants and other sober living home operators can satisfy the “actual disability” prong of the ADA, FHA, or FEHA on a collective basis by demonstrating that they serve or intend to serve individuals with actual disabilities; they need not provide individualized evidence of the actual disability of their residents. Rather, they can meet their burden by proffering admissible evidence that they have policies and procedures to ensure that they serve or will serve those with actual disabilities and that they adhere or will adhere to such policies and procedures. The panel held that in each action, the district court therefore erred by finding that an individualized assessment of resident disability was necessary under the “actually disabled” prong of the disability definition. The panel held that in determining whether Appellants can establish disability under the “regarded as disabled” prong of the disability definition, the district court erred by finding that Appellants must prove the City’s “subjective belief” that their residents were disabled. The panel explained that under this prong, the analysis turns on how an individual is perceived by others. The panel noted that Appellants provided the district court with evidence of (1) admissions criteria and house rules, (2) employee and former resident testimony, (3) public fears and stereotypes of their residents that may have influenced the City’s perception, and (4) the actual content SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA 5 of City ordinances, denial letters, resolutions, citations, and abatement actions that acknowledged the residents in Appellants’ homes were disabled. The panel wrote that this type of evidence, if it satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), should have been considered by the district court in evaluating whether Appellants established triable issues of fact under either or both of the “actually disabled” or “regarded as disabled” prongs. The panel therefore reversed each of the district court’s grants of summary judgment and remanded for the court to consider whether the record contains evidence sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on the “actually disabled” or “regarded as disabled” prongs of the disability definition.
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