Gonzalez v. United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 20-55175 (9th Cir. 2020)
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Plaintiff represents three certified classes which are defined to include, in relevant part, all current and future individuals who are subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in the Central District of California, excluding individuals with final orders of removal or who are subject to ongoing removal proceedings. The district court entered a judgment and two permanent injunctions in favor of plaintiff and the Probable Cause Subclass on Fourth Amendment claims. The State Authority Injunction enjoins the Government from issuing detainers from the Central District to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in states that lack state law permitting state and local LEAs to make civil immigration arrests based on civil immigration detainers. The Database Injunction enjoins the Government from issuing detainers to class members based solely on searches of electronic databases to make probable cause determinations of removability.
The Ninth Circuit first held that plaintiff had Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief when he commenced suit; second, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the Probable Cause Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) with plaintiff as the class representative; third, the panel held that 8 U.S.C. 252(f)(1) does not bar injunctive relief for the claims in this case because the only provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) whose text even refers to immigration detainers is not among the provisions that section 1252(f)(1) encompasses; fourth, the panel reversed and vacated the State Authority Injunction because the presence or absence of probable cause determines whether the Government violates the Fourth Amendment when issuing a detainer, not state law restrictions; fifth, the panel reversed and vacated the Database Injunction because it is premised on legal error and lacks critical factual findings; and finally, the panel reversed summary judgment for the Government on plaintiffs' claim pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
Court Description: Immigration In a class action in which the district court issued two permanent injunctions enjoining the issuance of certain immigration detainers in light of Fourth Amendment challenges, the panel: (1) affirmed the district court’s certification of a subclass, (2) reversed and vacated one injunction, (3) reversed and vacated the other injunction, and remanded for the district court to reconsider the claim related to that injunction, and (4) reversed and vacated summary judgment for the Government on a claim related to another subclass, and remanded for the district court to reconsider that claim. Gerardo Gonzalez is a citizen of the United States who has never been removable. After he was arrested on state law criminal charges, however, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent ran his name through electronic databases and determined that he was removable. The GONZALEZ V. USICE 3 officer issued an immigration detainer, a form by which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requests, in relevant part, that a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency (LEA) temporarily detain an alien in that agency’s custody “for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by [DHS].” 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. Gonzalez represents three certified classes that include all current and future individuals who are subject to an immigration detainer issued by an ICE agent located in the Central District of California, excluding individuals with final orders of removal or who are subject to ongoing removal proceedings. The Probable Cause Subclass is further limited to persons where the detainer was issued solely on the basis of electronic database checks. The district court entered two injunctions with respect to the Probable Cause Subclass: the State Authority Injunction and the Database Injunction. The district court also granted summary judgment to the Government on a claim brought by the Judicial Determination Class. A motions panel of this court stayed the State Authority Injunction and denied the request to stay the Database Injunction. First, the panel held that Gonzalez had Article III standing to seek prospective injunctive relief, concluding that he faced an ongoing and prospective detention injury when he commenced suit. The panel also concluded that the Government’s cancellation of the detainer within hours of Gonzalez bringing suit did not moot his claims, citing the “inherently transitory” exception to mootness. Second, the panel affirmed the certification of the Probable Cause Subclass with Gonzalez as the class representative. The panel concluded that the subclass 4 GONZALEZ V. USICE satisfied the commonality requirement, explaining that the challenged policy of issuing detainers solely on the basis of electronic database checks is the “glue” that holds the class together. The panel also concluded that the subclass satisfied the typicality requirement. The panel rejected the Government’s contention that Gonzalez, as a U.S. citizen, is atypical of noncitizen class members over whose claims the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which limits review of claims arising from removal proceedings. Assuming the relevance of jurisdiction over the unnamed noncitizen class members, the panel concluded that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar jurisdiction over the claims here because the claims challenge the legality of detention and are independent of the removal process. The panel also concluded that a determination about the lawfulness of the challenged policy under the Fourth Amendment and corresponding relief would provide relief to the entire class. Third, the panel held that injunctive relief in this case is not barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which provides that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as amended . . . .” The panel explained that § 1252(f)(1) does not bar injunctive relief for the claims in this case because the only provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) whose text even refers to immigration detainers, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d), is not located in “Part IV” and therefore is not among the provisions that § 1252(f)(1) encompasses. The panel also rejected the Government’s argument that its detainer authority is implied by provisions covered by § 1252(f)(1), explaining that it must assume that Congress acted intentionally, and that the detainers here do not directly GONZALEZ V. USICE 5 implicate the authority of the provisions cited by the Government. Fourth, the panel reversed and vacated the State Authority Injunction, which enjoins the Government from issuing detainers from the Central District to LEAs in states that lack state law permitting state and local LEAs to make civil immigration arrests based on civil immigration detainers. The panel explained that the presence or absence of probable cause determines whether the Government violates the Fourth Amendment when issuing a detainer, not state law restrictions. In so holding, the panel underscored that it did not decide here whether immigration detainers might violate principles of federalism or preemption, noting that Plaintiffs had waived such claims. Fifth, the panel reversed and vacated the Database Injunction, which enjoins the Government from issuing detainers to class members based solely on searches of electronic databases to make probable cause determinations of removability. The panel concluded that three errors required reversal: (1) the district court’s incomplete set of reliability findings concerning the databases at issue; (2) the district court’s legal error in concluding that the databases are unreliable because no database was intended to show probable cause of removability; and (3) the district court’s failure to address whether there was systemic error in ICE’s probable cause determinations based on searches of the databases. The panel remanded for the district court to reconsider the claim. Finally, the panel reversed the summary judgment for the Government on Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), in which the Supreme Court explained that the Fourth Amendment requires that probable 6 GONZALEZ V. USICE cause be timely decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. The Gerstein claim was brought by the Judicial Determination Class, which was defined, in relevant part, to include those individuals detained pursuant to a detainer for longer than 48 hours. Explaining that the district court erred in concluding that Gerstein does not apply in the civil immigration context, the panel concluded that, because the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause to seize or detain an individual for a civil immigration offense, it follows that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt probable cause determination by a neutral and detached magistrate to justify continued detention pursuant to an immigration detainer. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to apply the correct legal standard. Dissenting, Judge Bade wrote that Congress enacted a clear jurisdictional bar to injunctive relief in § 1252(f)(1) and that the majority erred in holding that § 1252(f)(1) does not bar injunctive relief in this case. Judge Bade found the majority’s approach flawed for two reasons: the majority (1) ignored the plain language of the statute, and (2) erroneously concluded that § 1357(d) is the sole source of ICE’s authority to issue detainers. Judge Bade wrote that the majority’s approach opens the door to sweeping challenges to basic tools of immigration enforcement.
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