USA V. JORGE GOMEZ-GOMEZ, No. 20-50163 (9th Cir. 2021)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED MAR 23 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 20-50163 D.C. No. 3:17-cr-01287-LAB-1 MEMORANDUM* JORGE GOMEZ-GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 16, 2021** Before: GRABER, R. NELSON, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges. Jorge Gomez-Gomez appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 99-month sentence and one condition of supervised release imposed upon remand following his jury-trial conviction for attempted reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 1291, and we affirm. Gomez-Gomez first contends that the district court erred procedurally by insufficiently explaining the sentence. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The district court considered and rejected Gomez-Gomez’s arguments for a shorter sentence, including the circumstances of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. And it explained in detail how Gomez-Gomez’s immigration and criminal history justified the above-Guidelines sentence. Gomez-Gomez also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Finally, Gomez-Gomez contends that the district court’s imposition in the written judgment of the standard supervised release condition that Gomez-Gomez not commit any federal, state, or local crime conflicts with its oral pronouncement of the condition. We disagree. Read in context, the court’s oral pronouncement was a shorthand description of the condition contained in the written judgment. To the extent the district court’s oral pronouncement was ambiguous, the later written judgment clarified the ambiguity. See United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1368 2 20-50163 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jackson, 167 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1999). AFFIRMED. 3 20-50163
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