SARAHROSE KILPATRICK V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, No. 20-35741 (9th Cir. 2022)
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In denying Plaintiff’s request for Social Security disability benefits, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) relied on the testimony of a vocational expert to conclude that a person with Plaintiff’s limitations, age, education, and work experience could still perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. On appeal, Plaintiff claimed that the ALJ erred in not addressing competing job numbers that her counsel provided using his own methodology.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of a claimant’s application. The court held in the context of similar challenges to ALJ decisions that an ALJ need only explain his rejection of significant probative evidence. The court reasoned that in accordance with Social Security Act regulations, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) is entitled to rely on a vocational expert’s testimony to support a finding that the claimant can perform occupations that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.
The court reasoned that to engage in a meaningful review of a disability claim, an ALJ may not ignore significant probative evidence that bears on the disability analysis, but an ALJ need not discuss all evidence that was presented. Here, Plaintiff’s attorney did not replicate the VE’s methodology, and Plaintiff’s different approach led to different numbers. There is no basis to conclude that these results qualified as significant probative evidence that the ALJ was required to address.
Court Description: Social Security. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of a claimant’s application for Social Security disability benefits. In accordance with Social Security Act regulations, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) is entitled to rely on a vocational expert’s testimony to support a finding that the clamant can perform occupations that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.960(b)(2), 416.966(e). Relying on Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1052 (9th Cir. 2017), the claimant argued that because her counsel filed a post-hearing submission that provided different national job numbers than the VE, “the ALJ was required to consider the conflicting information about job numbers and resolve any conflicts.” Id. The panel held that the claimant read Buck too broadly, and Buck did not create the categorical obligation that claimant sought to impose. To engage in meaningful review of a disability claim, an ALJ may not ignore significant probative evidence that bears on the disability analysis, but an ALJ need not discuss all evidence that was presented. Unlike in Buck, claimant’s attorney did not replicate the VE’s methodology, and claimant’s different approach led to different numbers. There is no basis to conclude that these results qualified as significant probative evidence that the ALJ was required to address. Claimant’s attorney had no KILPATRICK V. KIJAKAZI 3 identified expertise in calculating job figures in the national economy. Claimant also argued that the ALJ’s failure to resolve the conflict between job number estimates violated the Social Security Administration’s procedural requirements. The panel held that this argument lacked merit. Under Social Security Ruling 00-4p, ALJs must identify and obtain a reasonable explanation for any conflicts between occupational evidence provided by VEs and information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). No such error occurred here where the ALJ specifically asked the VE whether his testimony conflicted with the DOT, and the VE confirmed it did not.
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