Corrigan v. Haaland, No. 20-35393 (9th Cir. 2021)
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Department of the Interior and Intervenor WWP in an action challenging the BLM's denial of plaintiffs' request to transfer a "preference" to receive a permit to graze on certain federal land allotments.
The panel applied step one of the Chevron framework and concluded that the IBLA correctly applied the clear and unambiguous language of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 (TGA) and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), which established that a grazing preference could not be exercised after the corresponding grazing permit was not renewed for bad behavior. Because the IBLA correctly interpreted and applied the statutory authorities, and therefore did not act contrary to law, it follows that the decision is not arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment.
Court Description: Grazing Permits. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department of the Interior and Intervenor Western Watersheds Project in appellants’ action challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s denial of their request to transfer a “preference” to receive a permit to graze on certain federal land allotments. Appellants Michael Hanley, IV, Linda Hanley, and Hanley Ranch Partnership sought to transfer to Appellants K. John Corrigan and M. Martha Corrigan the preference. The BLM denied the preference transfer application based on its conclusion that Hanley Ranch Partnership did not hold any preference that it could transfer. The Department of the Interior’s Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”) upheld the BLM’s denial. The panel upheld the IBLA’s decision at step one of the Chevron framework because the IBLA correctly applied the clear and unambiguous language of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, which established that a grazing preference could not be exercised after the corresponding grazing permit was not renewed for bad behavior. The panel rejected the ranchers’ contention that a grazing preference remains attached to base property until separately cancelled. Because the IBLA correctly interpreted and applied the 4 CORRIGAN V. HAALAND statutory authorities, and therefore did not act “contrary to law,” the decision was not arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The panel noted that it was clear that the ranchers would fare no better under the Grazing Regulations, which were wholly consistent with the statutes they implemented.
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