CORECIVIC, INC. V. CANDIDE GROUP, LLC, No. 20-17285 (9th Cir. 2022)
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At issue were several statements in articles published by Morgan Simon on Forbes.com that connected CoreCivic to the detention of separated families at the U.S. border and characterized its lobbying efforts as pushing for punitive criminal and immigration laws. Simon’s firm is Candide Group. CoreCivic filed suit against Simon and Candide Group (collectively “Candide”) for defamation and defamation by implication. Candide made a special motion to strike CoreCivic’s complaint under California’s antiSLAPP Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 425.16.
The Ninth Circuit held that the special motion provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court, and affirmed in part the district court’s order granting Candide Group, LLC’s motion to strike the defamation complaint. The panel held that the court’s prior precedents control. In United States ex rel. v. Lockheed Missiles &Space Co., the court held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal diversity actions because there was “no ‘direct collision’” between the statute and the relevant rules, and the twin purposes of Erie favored its application.
The panel turned to the merits of Candide’s anti-SLAPP motion. Because CoreCivic did not contest on appeal that the suit implicated Candide’s First Amendment rights, the panel needed only to determine–applying the 12(b)(6) standard–whether CoreCivic stated a claim for defamation under California law. The panel concluded that CoreCivic failed to plausibly plead a defamation or a defamation by implication claim based on statements about its connection to the separation of immigrant families at the U.S. border, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims.
Court Description: California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute. The panel held that the special motion provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal court, and affirmed in part the district court’s order granting Candide Group, LLC’s motion to strike a defamation complaint brought by CoreCivic, Inc., under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. At issue were several statements in articles published by Morgan Simon on Forbes.com that connected CoreCivic to the detention of separated families at the U.S. border and characterized its lobbying efforts as pushing for punitive criminal and immigration laws. Simon’s firm is Candide Group. CoreCivic filed suit against Simon and Candide Group (collectively “Candide”) for defamation and defamation by implication. Candide made a special motion to strike CoreCivic’s complaint under California’s anti- SLAPP Act, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16. CoreCivic argued on appeal that the special motion to strike provision cannot be applied in federal court because it conflicts with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 12, and 56. Recognizing that this argument is foreclosed by this court’s precedents, CoreCivic further argued that this precedent should be revisited due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). CORECIVIC V. CANDIDE GROUP 3 The panel held that the court’s prior precedents control. In United States ex rel. v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., the court held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied in federal diversity actions because there was “no ‘direct collision’” between the statute and the relevant rules, and the twin purposes of Erie favored its application. 190 F.3d 963, 972–73 (9th Cir. 1999). In Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2018), the court held that special motions to strike challenging the legal sufficiency of complaints should be evaluated under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A three-judge panel may overrule the decision of a prior panel only where an “intervening higher authority” is “clearly irreconcilable” with the reasoning of that decision. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The panel held that Shady Grove was not “intervening” authority because since it was decided, the court has routinely applied the California anti-SLAPP statute in federal court. The panel further held that Shady Grove was not clearly irreconcilable with circuit law. Even if it qualified as “intervening authority,” Shady Grove did not put forward a new framework; it merely framed the direct collision inquiry in a new way. To the extent this reframing changed the inquiry at all, it could nevertheless be reconciled with Planned Parenthood. The panel concluded that it could apply the prior circuit precedent without running afoul of the intervening authority, and that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applied. The panel turned to the merits of Candide’s anti-SLAPP motion. Because CoreCivic did not contest on appeal that the suit implicated Candide’s First Amendment rights, the panel needed only to determine–applying the 12(b)(6) standard–whether CoreCivic stated a claim for defamation 4 CORECIVIC V. CANDIDE GROUP under California law. With respect to the claims reached by the district court–those concerning the family separation statements–the panel held that CoreCivic’s express defamation theory failed because it did not adequately plead falsity, and that its implied defamation theory failed because its proffered interpretation of Simon’s statement was implausible. The panel concluded that CoreCivic failed to plausibly plead a defamation or a defamation by implication claim based on statements about its connection to the separation of immigrant families at the U.S. border, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of those claims. Because the district court did not reach CoreCivic’s claims relating to statements about its lobbying activity, the panel remanded those claims to the district court for resolution in the first instance. Judge Bea dissented. He agreed with the majority that California’s anti-SLAPP motion was applicable in federal court, that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shady Grove did not abrogate this court’s precedents so stating, that the district court properly granted Candide’s anti-SLAPP motion on CoreCivic’s express defamation claim for failure to plead falsity, and that the lobbying-based defamation claims should be remanded to the district court. He dissented on the sole issue of Candide’s implied defamation claim because, on that claim, the district court erred in granting Candide’s anti- SLAPP motion. A jury should be allowed to decide whether a defamatory meaning was conveyed to readers. CORECIVIC V. CANDIDE GROUP 5
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