BRIAN BROWN V. BARBARA VON BLANCKENSEE, No. 20-15750 (9th Cir. 2021)

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED AUG 24 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRIAN L. BROWN, No. Petitioner-Appellant, v. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 20-15750 D.C. No. 4:19-cv-00437-RCC-LCK MEMORANDUM* BARBARA VON BLANCKENSEE, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 17, 2021** Before: SILVERMAN, CHRISTEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Federal prisoner Brian L. Brown appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing de novo, see Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011), we affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Brown contends that the Bureau of Prisons violated his right to due process and his First Amendment rights of access to the courts and to his legal property by seizing his property, including legal documents, medical records, and religious documents, and by interfering with his efforts to seek administrative remedies. As the district court correctly concluded, the appropriate remedy for these claims lies in a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than a § 2241 petition. See Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1991) (federal prisoner asserting civil rights violation must file a Bivens action rather than a § 2241 petition); see also Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000) (a § 2241 petition is limited to challenges to “the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution”). Even if, as Brown contends, the alleged seizure of his property and interference with his administrative remedies constituted a disciplinary action, that action did not subject him to greater restrictions of his liberty sufficient to invoke habeas jurisdiction. See Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2016). Brown’s “Motion for Arrest of Clerk’s Judgment” is denied as moot; Brown’s opening brief was timely filed and has been considered by the court. AFFIRMED. 2 20-15750

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.