USA V. THOMAS MERDZINSKI, No. 19-50146 (9th Cir. 2020)
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FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 10 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 19-50146 D.C. No. 5:08-cr-00139-SGL-1 v. MEMORANDUM* THOMAS HENRY MERDZINSKI, AKA Tom Merdzinski, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding Submitted January 8, 2020** Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Thomas Henry Merdzinski appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for early termination of his supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014), we * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). affirm. Merdzinski contends that the district court improperly relied on the seriousness of his underlying offense and failed to consider the totality of the evidence regarding his good conduct while on supervision. However, the record reflects that the district court identified the proper factors that guide an early termination decision. Though it discussed the seriousness of the underlying offense, it did so in the context of assessing the threat to the public posed by early termination and in assessing the nature and circumstances of the offense and Merdzinski’s history and characteristics, which are permissible considerations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Moreover, the court expressly considered Merdzinski’s arguments and evidence in favor of termination and explained why it did not find those arguments persuasive. The court did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding that early termination of supervised release was not in the interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1); Emmett, 749 F.3d at 820. AFFIRMED. 2 19-50146
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