USA V. MAXIMO FLORES-LEZAMA, No. 19-50056 (9th Cir. 2020)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FEB 11 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 19-50056 D.C. No. 3:18-cr-07138-LAB-1 v. MAXIMO FLORES-LEZAMA, AKA Maximo Lesama Flores, AKA Maxino Flores-Lezama, AKA Maximo FloresLezaman, MEMORANDUM* Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 4, 2020** Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. Maximo Flores-Lezama appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 24-month custodial sentence and 1-year term of supervised release imposed following revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Flores-Lezama contends that the district court erred by imposing the custodial sentence to punish him for the conduct underlying the revocation. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court relied on only proper sentencing factors, including Flores-Lezama’s significant immigration and criminal history, and the need to afford adequate deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2007). The within-Guidelines sentence is also substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and totality of the circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Flores-Lezama also argues that the district court procedurally erred by imposing a term of supervised release without expressly finding that supervision would serve as an additional measure of deterrence and protection. Reviewing for plain error, see Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d at 1108, we conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court was aware of U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 and adequately explained the sentence. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, in light of the district court’s concerns with deterring Flores-Lezama from future criminal conduct, he has not shown a reasonable probability that the district court would not have imposed a supervised release term 2 19-50056 had it explicitly discussed the need for supervised release. See United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2008). AFFIRMED. 3 19-50056
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