THOMAS NOUAN V. CHARLES RYAN, No. 19-15561 (9th Cir. 2019)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED AUG 23 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT THOMAS NOUAN, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 19-15561 Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02743-GMS v. MEMORANDUM* CHARLES L. RYAN; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondents-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 19, 2019** Before: SCHROEDER, PAEZ, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. Arizona state prisoner Thomas Nouan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Bills v. Clark, * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 628 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm. Nouan contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) one-year statute of limitations because (1) he misunderstood the date from which the AEDPA limitations period began running, and (2) his counsel during state post-conviction relief proceedings failed to inform him of AEDPA’s filing deadline. These contentions fail. A pro se petitioner’s “inability correctly to calculate the limitations period is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Moreover, because there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, any attorney negligence does not amount to an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Nouan has not met his heavy burden to show that an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control prevented him from timely filing his habeas petition. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). AFFIRMED. 2 19-15561
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