Lemos v. County of Sonoma, No. 19-15222 (9th Cir. 2021)
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting the County and law enforcement officers summary judgment, holding that plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging a claim for excessive force was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Plaintiff argues that her conviction after jury trial for violations of California Penal Code 148(a)(1) and her section 1983 claim are not necessarily based on the same transaction.
The panel held that the relevant inquiry is whether the record contains factual circumstances that support the underlying conviction under section 148(a)(1), not whether the conviction was obtained by a jury verdict or a guilty plea. The panel concluded that Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005 (en banc), and Beets v. City of Los Angeles, 669 F. 3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2012), controlled application of the Heck bar as found by the district court. In this case, viewed in light of binding circuit precedent, the record compels finding the jury determined that the arresting deputy acted within the scope of his duties without the use of excessive force, and that plaintiff seeks to show that the same conduct constituted excessive force. Therefore, the district court appropriately considered summary disposition of remaining legal issues under Heck and its progeny.
Court Description: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 / Heck v. Humphrey . The panel affirmed the district court’s order on summary judgment holding that appellant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for excessive force was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Appellant argued that her conviction after jury trial for violations of California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) (resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer), and her § 1983 claim were not necessarily based on the same transaction, and therefore not barred by Heck. The panel held that the relevant inquiry in applying Heck is whether the record contained factual circumstances that supported the underlying conviction under § 148(a)(1), and not whether the conviction was obtained by a jury verdict or a guilty plea. The panel held further that, based on the jury instructions and evidence of record before it, the jury verdict established that appellant resisted and the deputy’s conduct was lawful throughout the encounter. Furthermore, in California, the lawfulness of an officer’s conduct is an essential element of the offense of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The panel held that the record compelled a finding the jury determined that the arresting deputy acted within the scope of his duties without the use of excessive force, and that appellant sought to show that the same conduct constituted excessive force. The district court LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA 3 appropriately considered summary disposition of remaining legal issues under Heck and its progeny. In reliance, the panel found that Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005 (en banc), and Beets v. City of Los Angeles, 669 F. 3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2012), controlled application of the Heck bar as found by the district court. Judge Berzon dissented. She wrote that the jury was instructed that there were four possible factual bases on which it could convict appellant, and three of the factual bases pertained to acts not an issue in appellant’s section 1983 claim. Success on appellant’s section 1983 claim therefore did not necessarily imply that her conviction was invalid. In concluding that Heck barred appellant’s excessive force claim, the majority fundamentally erred.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on January 21, 2022.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on July 19, 2022.
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