USA V. GUADALUPE CAMPOY-RUBALCABA, No. 19-10424 (9th Cir. 2020)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED NOV 16 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS Nos. 19-10424 19-10425 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. Nos. 2:18-cr-01122-GMS-1 2:19-cr-00449-GMS-1 v. GUADALUPE CAMPOY-RUBALCABA, AKA Guadalupe Campoy, AKA Guadalupe Lopez-Perez, MEMORANDUM* Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 9, 2020** Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges. In these consolidated appeals, Guadalupe Campoy-Rubalcaba appeals from the district court’s judgment imposing a 24-month sentence following his guiltyplea conviction for reentry of a removed alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). its order revoking supervised release and imposing a 4-month consecutive sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Campoy-Rubalcaba does not challenge the 4-month sentence imposed upon revocation. Accordingly, we affirm in Appeal No. 19-10424. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (issue is waived if it is not argued in the opening brief). In Appeal No. 19-10425, Campoy-Rubalcaba first contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, instead focusing only on his criminal history, and by inadequately explaining the sentence. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained its reasons for imposing the within-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Contrary to Campoy-Rubalcaba’s argument, the court was not required to “tick off” all of the § 3553(a) factors, or address specifically each of his mitigating arguments. See id. Campoy-Rubalcaba next contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable given his mitigating circumstances. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence is 2 19-10424 & 19-10425 substantively reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Campoy-Rubalcaba’s criminal and immigration history. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also United States v. Gutierrez-Sanchez, 587 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The weight to be given the various factors in a particular case is for the discretion of the district court.”). The record does not support Campoy-Rubalcaba’s claim that the district court placed undue weight on the dismissed charges that led to his discovery by immigration authorities, or relied on any erroneous facts concerning those charges. AFFIRMED. 3 19-10424 & 19-10425
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