Lopez-Marroquin v. Garland, No. 18-72922 (9th Cir. 2021)
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The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part a petition challenging the BIA's finding that petitioner's conviction for theft of a vehicle under California Vehicle Code 10851(a) is an aggravated felony, which renders him ineligible for certain forms of relief. The panel has held, and the parties do not dispute, that section 10851(a) is overbroad because it criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the generic theft offense.
Applying the framework described in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248–49 (2016), the panel held that section 10851(a) is indivisible in its treatment of accessories after the fact. Because section 10851(a) does not categorically match the generic theft offense, a conviction under section 10851(a) is not an aggravated felony. The panel overruled Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2013), on the ground that it was irreconcilable with Mathis. Therefore, in petitioner's case, he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and the panel remanded for consideration of his requests for asylum and cancellation of removal. In a concurrently filed memorandum, the panel denied petitioner's requests for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
Court Description: Immigration. Granting in part Ricardo Lopez-Marroquin’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and remanding, the panel held that vehicle theft under California Vehicle Code § 10851(a) is indivisible in its treatment of accessories after the fact, and therefore, is not an aggravated felony theft offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). In so concluding, the panel overruled Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2013), on the ground that it was irreconcilable with Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). An immigration judge and the BIA concluded that Lopez-Marroquin was ineligible for cancellation of removal and asylum on the ground that his § 10851(a) conviction was an aggravated felony. The panel noted that this court has held, and the parties did not dispute, that § 10851(a) is overbroad because it extends liability to accessories after the fact, while the generic offense does not. Thus, whether Lopez-Marroquin had been convicted of an aggravated felony turned on whether the statute is divisible as between principals and accessories after the fact. The panel explained that a statute is divisible if it sets out elements of the offense in the alternative, effectively containing multiple offenses, while a statute is indivisible if it only lists alternative means of committing a single crime. LOPEZ-MARROQUIN V. GARLAND 3 Applying the framework the Supreme Court provided in Mathis, the panel held that § 10851(a) is indivisible in its treatment of accessories after the fact. The panel observed that the statutory text is silent on whether principals or accessories after the fact must be charged as such, and that § 10851(a)’s punitive architecture fails to differentiate principals and accessories, and fails to require either alternative to be alleged in the pleading, admitted by the defendant, or found by the jury. Observing that several California cases include discussion relevant to divisibility, the panel determined that none is dispositive. Because the answer to the question of divisibility was not clear from state law, the panel, as instructed by Mathis, took a “peek” at the record of conviction for the limited purpose of determining whether the listed items are elements, but concluded that the documents were ambiguous at best. Thus, the panel concluded that state law sources and a “peek” at the record did not satisfy the “demand for certainty” required by the Supreme Court in deciding if a defendant was necessarily convicted of a generic offense. The panel concluded that it was required to overrule Duenas-Alvarez, which held—three years before Mathis— that § 10851(a) was divisible as between principals and accessories after the fact. Observing that Duenas-Alvarez relied solely on the disjunctive phrasing of the statute, the panel concluded this approach was clearly irreconcilable with Mathis, which instructs courts not to assume that a statute lists alternative elements simply because it contains a disjunctive list. Having found § 10851(a) overbroad and indivisible, the panel concluded it can never serve as a predicate offense, and therefore, Lopez-Marroquin had not been convicted of an aggravated felony. The panel thus remanded to the 4 LOPEZ-MARROQUIN V. GARLAND agency for consideration of his requests for asylum and cancellation. In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the panel denied the petition as to his requests for withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that this case was yet another example of the legal gyrations required by the modified categorical approach which leave few the wiser. Judge Callahan wrote that the majority’s convoluted path through controlling precedents obscured that, under California law, auto theft and accessory after the fact are distinct offenses with distinct elements. Judge Callahan also wrote that she did not read Mathis as compelling a finding of indivisibility, and to the extent that it could be read so, such a determination should be made by an en banc panel. Judge Callahan would follow Duenas-Alvarez and hold that application of the modified categorical approach supports the BIA’s determination that Lopez-Marroquin committed the aggravated felony of auto theft as a principal under § 10851(a).
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on April 9, 2020.
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