Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, No. 18-56553 (9th Cir. 2020)
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Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action challenging a Los Angeles parking ordinance as violating the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Under the ordinance, a person who overstays a metered parking spot faces a fine of anywhere from $63 to $181, depending on her promptness of payment.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to municipal parking fines. The panel extended the four-factor analysis in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336–37 (1998), to govern municipal fines. Applying the Bajakajian factors, the panel held that the City's initial parking fine of $63 is not grossly disproportional to the underlying offense of overstaying the time at a parking space. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on this issue. However, the panel held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City to the late payment penalty of $63. Accordingly, the panel reversed and remanded for the district court to determine under Bajakajian whether the City's late fee runs afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause.
Court Description: Civil Rights. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging a Los Angeles parking ordinance as violating the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Under the ordinance, if a person parks her car past the allotted time limit and forces people to drive around in search of other parking spaces, she must pay a $63 fine. And if she fails to pay the fine within 21 days, the City will impose a late-payment penalty of $63. The panel held that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to municipal parking fines. The panel noted that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019), incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The panel held that the Timbs decision affirmatively opened the door for Eighth Amendment challenges to fines imposed by state and local authorities. The panel therefore extended the four-factor analysis set forth in United States Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) to govern municipal fines. The panel held that the initial fine of $63 did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause because it was not grossly PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3 disproportionate to the offense of overstaying the time at a parking space. The panel reversed, however, the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City as to the late payment penalty of $63. The panel held that based on the record, it did not know the City’s justification for setting the late fee at one hundred percent of the initial fine. The panel therefore remanded for the district court to determine under Bajakaijian whether the City’s late fee ran afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause. Concurring in the judgment, Judge Bennett stated that because the City of Los Angeles conceded that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to parking fines, he concurred in the judgment. Judge Bennett wrote separately because he did not believe the Excessive Fines Clause should routinely apply to parking meter violations.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on September 11, 2020.
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