DEREK WARDLAW V. J. MERINO, No. 18-56242 (9th Cir. 2019)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED NOV 26 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEREK WARDLAW, No. Plaintiff-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 18-56242 D.C. No. 2:16-cv-03840-JAK-KES v. MEMORANDUM* J. MERINO, Individual; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 18, 2019** Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. Derek Wardlaw, a former pretrial detainee at the Twin Towers Correctional Facility supervised by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations. We * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Wardlaw failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856, 1858-60 (2016) (an inmate must exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit; and describing limited circumstances in which administrative remedies are unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or documents and facts not presented to the district court. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990). Wardlaw motion for default judgment is denied. AFFIRMED. 2 18-56242

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.