Stirling v. Minasian, No. 18-55834 (9th Cir. 2020)
Annotate this Case
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion to remand his case to state court, where he wants to pursue his claim that a JAG colleague, defendant, is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because defendant is licensed only in states outside of California.
The panel held that defendant was "acting under" a federal officer within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(2). The panel rejected plaintiff's contention that this was not a "civil action or criminal prosecution" under section 1442(a)(1), and held that defendant was a "person" within the meaning of the statute; there was a causal connection between plaintiff's claims and defendant's actions taken pursuant to a federal officer's directions; and defendant raised a colorable federal defense under the Supremacy Clause. In this case, defendant was appointed by and reports to a federal officer and is permitted by federal regulation to practice law, in a specific and limited capacity, without becoming a member of the California Bar. Therefore, defendant has a colorable defense that this federal regulatory scheme preempts a claim by a private individual that would have the effect of invalidating those federal regulations in states, like California, that do not require all JAG Trial Defense Service attorneys to become members of the California Bar.
Court Description: Removal Jurisdiction / Federal Officer. The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying Dwight Stirling’s motion to remand his case to California state court after the defendant removed the case to federal court. Stirling is an attorney in the Judge Advocate General Corps (“JAG”) of the California Army National Guard, and a member of the California State Bar. Stirling sought to obtain a ruling that his JAG colleague Lawrence Minasian was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law because Minasian was licensed only in states outside of California. Minasian is an attorney licensed in Tennessee and Arkansas, who lives in California and serves as a Regional Defense Counsel in the California Army National Guard’s JAG Trial Defense Service (TDS). 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) allows for the removal to federal court of a “civil action or criminal prosecution” against the “United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States.” The panel held that Minasian was entitled to remove this case to federal court as a “person acting under” an officer of the United States. STIRLING V. MINASIAN 3 The panel rejected Stirling’s argument that this was not a “civil action or criminal prosecution” under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). First, the panel held that Minasian was a “person” within the meaning of the statute. Second, the panel held that there was a causal nexus between Stirling’s claims and Minasian’s actions taken pursuant to a federal officer’s directions, where Minasian was directly supervised by a federal Title 10 officer who served as the Chief of the Army National Guard Trial Defense Service, and Minasian’s practice reflected the type of federal supervision and management envisioned by the applicable federal regulations and guidance. Third, the panel held that Minasian raised a colorable federal defense under the Supremacy Clause whereby Minasian was appointed and practiced under a federal regulatory scheme that preempted a claim by a private individual that would have the effect of invalidating those federal regulations in states, like California, that do not require all TDS attorneys to become members of the State Bar.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.