ANTHONY MERLO V. CITY OF PALO ALTO, No. 18-17182 (9th Cir. 2020)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FEB 10 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ANTHONY MERLO, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 18-17182 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:18-cv-03943-BLF v. MEMORANDUM* CITY OF PALO ALTO, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 4, 2020** Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. Anthony Merlo appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process violation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Merlo’s action arising from the state court’s entry of the vexatious litigant order because Merlo failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the City of Palo Alto was liable for any due process violation. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must . . . demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”); see also Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 584 F.3d 1232, 1236 (9th Cir. 2009) (elements of a procedural due process claim). Contrary to Merlo’s contention, the district court properly characterized his due process claim as arising under § 1983. See Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Merlo leave to amend because amendment would have been futile. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court “acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile”). AFFIRMED. 2 18-17182

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.