SEC V. JAMES WARRAS, No. 18-16684 (9th Cir. 2020)

Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FEB 7 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 18-16684 D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02280-GMNPAL MEMORANDUM* JAMES WARRAS, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 4, 2020** Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. James Warras appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his postjudgment motions for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 in this civil enforcement action brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). for an abuse of discretion. Sch. Dist. No. 1J Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Warras’s motions for reconsideration under Rule 60(b) because Warras failed to establish any basis for relief. See id. at 1263 (setting forth grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)). To the extent that Warras attempts to challenge the district court’s underlying summary judgment, we lack jurisdiction because Warras did not timely file a notice of appeal as to the underlying judgment, or post-judgment motion that tolled the time to file a notice of appeal as to the judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B); 4(a)(4)(A)(vi); Harman v. Harper, 7 F.3d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993) (appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring the entire underlying judgment up for review). We do not consider Warras’s contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal proceeding because it is outside the scope of this appeal. See United States v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he customary procedure in this Circuit for challenging the effectiveness of defense counsel in a federal criminal trial is by collateral attack on the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”). AFFIRMED. 2 18-16684

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.